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Two incidents have forced the United States to take significant steps to prepare for large-scale 
disasters: the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the devastation that resulted from Hurricane 
Katrina on August 29, 2005.  Emergency managers respond under the mantra “all emergencies 
are local.” While this is a good tag line, it is through the planning and preparation efforts at all 
levels of government that an emergency response system can work efficiently and effectively. 
This study focuses on the state level to first, understand how organizations can be designed to 
contain both structure and flexibility in the emergency management context, and second, identify 
the role of personal interactions, communication, legal structures and leadership within these 
types of organizations.  California was carefully selected because of its size, national economic 
importance, and experience with preparing for and responding to multi-jurisdictional incidents. 
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1.0    CHAPTER 1: THE NECESSITY AND EXPERIENCES OF EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 
Emergency preparedness and responses within the United States entail huge challenges. 
Besides the most obvious, responding to a disaster when it occurs, William Waugh and Gregory 
Streib point out a more significant concern. “Modern emergency management presents a paradox.  
On one hand, emergency response requires meticulous organization and planning, but on the other 
hand, it is spontaneous” (Waugh and Streib, 2006, 132).   
Because emergency preparedness and response activities are governmental 
responsibilities, traditional management techniques are used in part to define organizational 
structures.  Rule of law is basic.  Yet, these approaches, while important to responsible 
governance, can be too cumbersome to meet the rapid, changing and uncertain conditions that 
large-scale emergencies present.  To deal successfully with these challenges, more flexible 
governmental organizations and processes need to be present.  The question is not if it is possible 
to have this type of governmental framework, but how arrangements of this magnitude can 
operate effectively, efficiently and economically.  The “how” is answered through 
intergovernmental interactions utilizing the best of traditional management structures and network 
theory after organizational learning takes place. 
For this research, the State of California is studied because of its size and national 
economic importance.  From the 2000 United States Census, California has 33,871,648 residents 
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and a total land and water area of 163,695.57 square miles (United States Census, 2000).  The 
state with the next largest population is Texas at 20 million people. These two states dominate the 
other continental states by both population and, except for Alaska, total land and water area.  
Table 1 compares the five highest ranked states in terms of population. 
Table 1.  Five highest ranked states in terms of population with the housing units and area also identified 
(United States Census, 2000). 
Rank  Area in square miles 
Geographic area  Population 
 
Housing 
 units  
Total 
area 
 
Water 
area 
 
Land 
area 
  United States 281,421,906 115,904,641 3,794,083.06 256,644.62 3,537,438.44
              
1 California 33,871,648 12,214,549 163,695.57 7,736.23 155,959.34
2 Texas 20,851,820 8,157,575 268,580.82 6,783.70 261,797.12
3 New York 18,976,457 7,679,307 54,556.00 7,342.22 47,213.79
4 Florida 15,982,378 7,302,947 65,754.59 11,827.77 53,926.82
5 Illinois 12,419,293 4,885,615 57,914.38 2,330.79 55,583.58
 
California was also selected because of its experience with preparing for and responding 
to multi-jurisdictional emergencies, such as those so severe that a federal disaster is declared.  
From 1953 to August 2008, California had 73 federally declared disasters. This record is only 
exceeded by Texas, which has 82 federally declared disasters.  The medium number of federally 
declared disasters per state is 35 from 1953 to August 2008.  In addition to the major disaster 
declarations, California received six emergency declarations and 91 fire management assistance 
declarations (FEMA, 2008).  The categories of disasters or years of assistance are described in 
Table 2.  
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Federal declarations are made subsequent to a series of events that must take place.  After 
a major incident, the local government, if mutual aid support is not sufficient, will make a formal 
request to the state government for assistance.  If the state responds, a disaster assessment will be 
made through local, state and federal governments and volunteer organizations to identify need.  
If the need for additional resources is determined, the state, via the governor, will make a formal 
request to the federal government.  When this happens, the state must commit long-term funding 
to assist in recovery efforts.  The request then goes through the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) for further evaluation.  FEMA makes a recommendation to the President of the 
United States as to whether or not federal funding should allocated for assistance.  The President 
then either grants or denies the request.  The process can take as little as a few days or as long as 
few months, depending on the severity of the incident (USOHS, 2008).  
Because of the demographic and geographic make-up of the State and the frequency of 
multi-jurisdictional incidents, California was studied.  To gain a broad understanding of the 
emergency management systems, six counties within the three California Regional Emergency 
Areas and selected encompassing cities and relevant special districts are investigated.  The focus 
is how the regional emergency operation centers, the operational areas, and the local and field 
operations work together both to prepare for and to respond to an emergency, concentrated among 
four factors: personal interactions, official communications, legal policies, and leadership. 
For the purpose of this study, emergency preparedness is defined using the National 
Preparedness Goal.  In President Bush’s December 17, 2003, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/HSPD-8, national preparedness is defined as “the existence of plans, procedures, 
policies, training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the 
ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events” (HSPD-8, 2003).  The same 
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definition is used, varying only in language regarding the Federal level, which is not part of this 
investigation. 
 
Table 2.  California Disaster History that had Federal Declarations (FEMA, 2008). 
        
Federal Major Disaster Declarations (1953 to August 2008)   
  Type Number   
  
Water-related (caused by severe 
storms, flooding, landslides, 
mudslides, levee breaks, and/or 
dam breaks) 46   
  
Fires (urban fires, wild fires and 
forest fires) 13   
  Earthquakes 10   
  Severe Freezes 3   
  Other (Impact of El Nino [1994]) 1   
  TOTAL 73   
      
Federal Emergency Declarations (1977 to August 2008)   
  Type Number   
  Fires 4   
  Drought 1   
  Other (Hurricane Katrina Evacuation [2005]) 1   
  TOTAL 6   
      
Federal Fire Management Assistance Declarations (2002 to August 2008) 
  Year Number   
  2008* 10   
  2007 17   
  2006 8   
  2005 7   
  2004 21   
  2003 16   
  2002 12   
  TOTAL 91   
                         (*as of August 19, 2008)     
 
Within six years, two incidents have forced the United States not only to rethink 
emergency response but also to take significant steps to strengthen appropriate preparedness 
measures.  Those incidents were the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City and on the 
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Pentagon and the Katrina Hurricane devastation in the southern United States on August 29, 
2005.  While the first was man-inflicted and the second was precipitated by a natural disaster, 
emergency responders operated largely from the same premise that “all emergencies are local.”  
In that regard, the first responders are the most important players to secure a situation and to help 
serve people’s immediate needs.  However, all levels of government have important roles to play 
in response and, for this study, emergency preparedness prior to such catastrophes. 
Taking Hurricane Katrina, for example, the notion that “all emergencies are local” may be 
immediately true, i.e., the most affected by the disaster are the local people.  However, the 
impacts transcend local and even regional boundaries.  After that storm hit and the levees broke, 
governments at all levels responded.  The local police, fire and emergency medical services 
(EMS) were the first on the scene, but many other governmental entities were preparing to 
coordinate services.  Each state lent support--from volunteers who assisted through the Red Cross 
(Red Cross, 2008) to the 42 states who received federal disaster relief from September 5 to 30, 
2005, for assisting regional evacuations (FEMA, 2008).  Nonprofit organizations from local 
church groups to large foundations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red 
Cross, lent support. 
The international response was also impressive with 145 countries offering assistance.  Of 
those, 126 offers were directly accepted either by the United States government or through the 
American Red Cross.  This assistance consisted of monetary resources, supplies, and emergency 
response teams.  Multinational organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the 
World Health Organization, and the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
offered a variety of support.  International NGOs such as the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent also provided services. (CREW, 2008) 
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Beyond these organized responses, many individuals waged their own campaigns to assist 
those who lost their material possessions.  Individuals from other states, who were not impacted 
by the storm or its aftermath, collected clothing and other supplies through local clubs and 
organizations and found ways to get help to devastated Mississippi and Louisiana neighborhoods; 
sometimes by collaborating with local response units that sent support.  
These examples illustrate that the notion that “all emergencies are local” has great 
usefulness but it is far from adequate--except for first responders.  While the physical impacts 
may be in specific, local areas, the immediate and necessary responses transcend local boundaries.  
Even with a smaller emergency that does not result in such a visible outpouring of support, 
experience shapes future policies to respond to such situations.  These policies result in how 
governments prepare for emergencies. 
 Recent news stories report that governments at all levels are taking proactive approaches 
to address preparedness measures before incidents occur.  This is evident in federal efforts to 
change the nation’s emergency response procedures (Lee and Fletcher, 2006), state efforts to 
reinforce infrastructure projects like the California levy system (Schwarzenegger, 2006), and local 
efforts to protect city centers like New York’s “ring of steel” (Mollenkamp and Haughney, 2006) 
and ports such as Los Angeles (Gorman and Freedberg, 2005).  
 In a White House report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned 
(2006), four major flaws in federal reaction to the storm and its aftermath were revealed--lack of 
unified management, command and control structures, “knowledge of preparedness plans, and 
regional planning and coordinating” (52, 2006).  While the report mainly concentrated on the 
federal level, references to state and local levels continually emerged.  These themes stressed the 
importance of establishing and maintaining intergovernmental relationships and open 
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communication, and the creation of a clear command structure when a large-scale emergency 
occurs.  Recognizing that these efforts do not occur in a vacuum, this research focuses on one 
level of government--California counties--and investigates the factors that affect 
intergovernmental interactions in threat preparedness.  A better understanding of these 
relationships must be realized to understand how this relatively new governmental operational 
approach combines both structure and flexibility to anticipate future preparedness and response 
efforts.   
1.1.   ADMINISTRATIVE SHIFTS 
 California is a leader in emergency management trends because of its necessity to respond 
to natural disasters, especially earthquakes, fires, and floods that regularly impact many 
communities which cross jurisdictional lines.  As a result, the degrees of flexibility and rigidity of 
the response system has greatly varied.  Prior to the 1950s, a statewide emergency response 
system was largely unorganized; instead it relied on independent local preparedness and response.  
This was consistent with the administrative approach at the time to maximize efficiency in 
governmental processes and empowering local jurisdictions.  The downfall of the approach is the 
lack of coordinated effort to respond to multi-jurisdictional incidents.  In the 1950s, mutual aid 
agreements began to emerge.  However, these agreements were largely independent, occurring in 
some areas but not others.  Subsequently, in the mid-1970s, seeing the positive effects of 
collaborative action in fighting wildfires, California created the Incident Command System (ICS).   
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ICS is a highly flexible approach in responding to emergencies.  When an incident occurs, 
ICS has established protocols to identify the person in charge (unity of command) and a 
consolidated incident action plan when multiple jurisdictions or agencies are involved.  Especially 
in regard to the unity of command, this para-military approach does a number of things.  First, 
because an incident commander is identified early in the field, decisions can be made quickly and 
a direct response can occur.  There is no question about who calls the shots and who is 
responsible for the collective actions.  Second, as a critical component of effective response, 
decisions can be made that directly relate to the incident, given the environment in which it occurs 
and the resources immediately available.  In order for ICS to work, some departments must be 
able to yield decision-making authorities and resources to work for the greater collective good. 
In the early 1990s, after a number of earthquakes and urban fires, most notably the 1991 
Oakland Ridge Fire, California reorganized its emergency management procedures under the 
California Standardized Emergency Management Systems (SEMS).  While originally building off 
of the successes of ICS, SEMS attempts to create a common language, structure and procedures 
when responding to an incident.   According to the 2006 SEMS Guidelines, the ICS, which it 
incorporates, has five functions: 
1. Command--“direct, order or control of resources” 
2. Operations--“coordinated tactical response” 
3. Planning/Intelligence--“collection, evaluation, and documentation of information” 
4. Logistics--“facilities, services, personnel, equipment, and materials” 
5. Finance/Administration--“financial and cost analysis” of the incident (SEMS, 2006, 4-
9) 
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This approach has three features: a modular organization of ICS, Incident Action Plans, 
and Unified Command.  Of these features, the hardest to understand is the unified command 
structure, as it is different than the unity of command previously practiced in ICS.  To clarify the 
distinction, SEMS must be revisited. 
SEMS claims to create flexible and rapidly-responding systems needed to respond to 
incidents.  Yet, it appears that the system is becoming more administratively burdensome and 
thereby reducing the flexibility of previous systems.  Most importantly, this is seen between the 
concepts of “unity of command” and “unified command.”  While unity of command has one 
person clearly identified to make in-the-field decisions throughout the incident, unified command 
turns response into a group process.  As a possible attempt to reduce the silos created in the 
former ICS organizational structure, particularly among the fire departments and law 
enforcement, a unified command approach is now used to bring all parties to the table where they 
may share decision-making authority.  Having different stakeholders make shared decisions blurs 
the line of responsibility for each level of government and/or agency. 
As described in the 2006 SEMS Guidelines, “Unified Command is a procedure used at 
incidents, which allow (sic) all agencies with geographical, legal, or functional responsibilities to 
establish a common set of incident objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan” 
(18).  In untested application, this is true.  Yet, a growing concern is that this approach may 
become too administratively cumbersome to have effective application when a large, multi-
jurisdictional incident occurs that crosses specialties.  For example, when a large fire occurs, as 
happened in South Lake Tahoe with the Angora Fire in 2007, the focus is clearly on putting out 
the fire, removing people from danger, and minimizing the incident’s impact. 
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The Angora Fire began on June 24, 2007, and was 100% contained by July 10, 2007.  
While the official cause is under investigation, it is suspected that day hikers caused the fire.  It 
burned 3,100 acres and destroyed 329 residences, commercial buildings, and other structures.  
The fire ranked 14th of California’s largest wildfires by structures destroyed  (CAL FIRE, July 3, 
2007). 
 Kit Bailey, U.S. Forest Service Forest Fire Chief for the Lake Tahoe Basin, was the initial 
incident commander (Ferchland, 2007).  At this time, his actions cannot be analyzed from official 
reports, but from newspaper accounts, his initial actions seem more consistent with “unity of 
command” rather than “unified command” by directing resources to where it was needed without 
a formal group process.  This is consistent with the current SEMS guidelines where one 
commander is initially identified. 
According to the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), the 
unified command system was utilized with cooperating agencies including: “all fire agencies 
within the Tahoe Basin, United States Forest Service, CAL FIRE, California Highway Patrol, 
South Lake Tahoe Police Department, El Dorado County Sheriffs Office, Red Cross, and Civil 
Air Patrol” (CAL FIRE, July 3, 2007).  It is unclear how each of these partners affected the 
immediate decisions made in the field as a collective body. 
Even without knowing the role of each partner, SEMS has many advantages including one 
set of objectives, a collective approach, improved information flow, common understanding of 
other agencies priorities and restrictions, a response that is consistent with all agencies’ legal 
restrictions, and a duplication or response efforts is reduced or eliminated.  This was evident in 
the response activities in 2007. 
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1.2.  EARTHQUAKES, FIRES, AND FLOODS 
To better understand these administrative and procedural evolutions, the scope of 
California’s natural disasters must be recognized.  By contrast with natural disasters, preparation 
for man-made incidents, as is part of the mission of homeland security efforts, entails threat 
assessment based on intelligence of terrorist activities.  While it is quite plausible that some sort 
of terrorist incident can occur in California, fortunately, the development of emergency 
management was not a result of these types of incidents.  Instead, California’s experience with 
natural disasters, most notably earthquakes, fires and floods, has shaped how it prepares for and 
responds to incidents.  The threat assessments used to prepare for these incidents are based on the 
geographic composition and monitoring of the state, weather conditions, housing areas, and 
history. 
1.2.1. Earthquakes 
According to the United States Geological Survey, California has experienced at least one 
hundred thirty (130) earthquakes with a magnitude of 5.8 or larger since 1769 (USGS, 2008).  In 
each instance, California’s emergency management system was put into action.  Some cases 
simply resulted in local and county responses with little regional or state assistance because of the 
location of the tremor or the design of the emergency management system at the time of the 
incident.  Yet, in other cases, like the deadly Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989, a larger response 
was necessary.  
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Earthquakes happen on a daily basis.  In most cases, the earthquake is small and centered 
in rural areas.  Illustration 1 identifies earthquakes within the State over a one-week period from 
August 12, 2008 to August 19, 2008.  In this one week alone, over 314 earthquakes were reported 
in California.  
More troubling than the frequency of earthquakes, however, are the numerous fault lines 
within the State and the location of major urban areas in relation to these faults.  California has 37 
major faults, with the San Andreas Fault perhaps the most recognizable, as it runs the length of 
the coast from Los Angeles to San Francisco.  The largest urban areas within the State--Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego--are in close proximity to major fault lines.  These faults 
are identified in Illustration 2. 
Over three decades, 1978-2008, nine major earthquakes hit, most notably the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake in 1989 and the Northridge Earthquake of 1994.  In each of these cases, portions of 
major cities were devastated.  While statewide efforts are made to minimize damage and loss of 
life, the simple fact still remains that major fault lines are beneath two of the largest cities--Los 
Angeles and San Francisco--and near San Diego and other major urban areas within the State.  
Despite preparedness measures, like the reinforcement of all hospitals within the State to 
withstand major earthquakes, an earthquake could still negatively and directly affect millions of 
people. 
 
Figure 1.  Index Map of Recent Earthquakes in California and Nevada, August 12-19, 2008 (USGS, 2008). 
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Figure 2.  Simplified Geological Map of California (California Department of Conservation, 2006). 
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1.2.2. Fires 
Fires are another major natural threat.  Large urban fires, except a few cases like the 
Oakland Hills Fire in 1991, are uncommon.  More prevalent, however, are large-scale wildfires.  
By August 2008, over 2,000 wildfires, most of which were naturally occurring, scorched 
California in 2008 alone (Office of the Governor, 2008).  Incidents from June 22, 2008 to August 
11, 2008 are pictured in Illustration 3.  
Wildfires are a major threat to thousands of communities throughout the State, as 
identified in Illustration 4.  With the strong fire season of 2008, many of these communities were 
evacuated as part of emergency response procedures.  The emergency management procedures 
are now engrained in fire response activities, but it only evolved through continual learning from 
past experiences and the adaptation of new strategies to combat a reoccurring threat. 
The management of wildfires is largely the responsibility of the California Department of 
Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire).  When fires occur in remote areas and are of small scale, 
Cal Fire eliminates the threat.  But, if the fires spread, it undoubtedly affects neighboring 
jurisdictions, from encroaching into federal lands or crossing political boundaries, to affecting 
resources that fall into different agencies or departments.  When this occurs, the established 
mutual aid agreements and emergency procedures go into affect.  With an increase in the number 
of wild fires, this happens on a regular basis throughout the year when rain is not present. 
 
Figure 3.  California Wildfires from June 22, 2008 to August 11, 2008. 
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Figure 4.  Communities at Risk From Wildfire (Fire and Resource Assessment Program, 2001). 
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1.2.3. Floods 
 Earthquakes and fires are not the only natural threat affecting the State.  Flooding is also 
of concern.  Flooding can result in a number of ways, including a breach in the 1,600 mile levee 
system in Northern California or in one of 1273 dams throughout the State, through torrential 
rains that can additionally cause land slides and mudslides, or through tsunamis caused by 
earthquakes or landslides (Department of Water Resources, 2008). 
 Breaches in the levee system, although rare, received much attention after the levee breach 
in Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina.  Since that time, California’s statewide efforts, albeit too 
limited to the populations living closest to the levees, have increased to strengthen the system.  
Levees not only protect communities along the Sacramento and American rivers in Northern 
California, but also provide fresh drinking water to communities in Southern California.  
Therefore, a breach in the system would flood neighboring communities and, because of the 
aqueduct system, could decrease the amount of fresh water available within both Northern and 
Southern California. 
 Flooding caused by more natural means is common.  Fifty-eight percent of the federally-
declared disasters (11 of 19) over fifteen years, 1978 to 2008, had to do with severe storms which 
resulted in flooding, landslides, and/or mudslides.  The effects of the torrential rains in 1998 were 
particularly damaging.  Flooding was one result, but so too were massive landslides as the overly 
saturated soil could simply hold no more water.  Illustration 5 highlights the landslides from that 
period. 
By far, the two types of flooding of greatest concern are through a breach in a man-made 
structure (levee or dam) and torrential rains.  A flooding threat that has received less attention is 
from the aftermath of a tsunami.  Although largely not known, there have been 38 tsunamis in 
 
Figure 5.  Landslides Reported From the 1998 Storms (California Department of Conservation). 
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California over the last 100 years.  Most of them are small, hitting the coastline with a wave just 
over one meter, but waves have been as high as twelve meters as was the result of a 1934 incident 
in Newport Beach (CGS-Tsunamis, 2008).  With 840 miles of coastline (second only to Alaska’s 
5,580 miles of coastline), the chance of another tsunami hitting California is great (The World 
Almanac, 2007, 450). 
 Tsunamis can happen from two different ways--local or distant points of origin.  Tsunamis 
caused by a local event would occur because of landslides, potentially through over saturation of 
rainwater, or earthquakes.  Distant points of origin could be the result of an oceanic earthquake, or 
an earthquake originating from the Pacific Rim or Alaska.  A lesser threat to cause a tsunami is a 
meteor. (CGS-Tsunamis, 2008) 
 When a tsunami hits, lower elevation communities are affected the most.  Metropolitan 
areas that have a significant number of communities at lower elevations include Los Angeles and 
neighboring cities, and smaller urban areas like Eureka, which are scattered along the coast.  
Naturally, it would depend on the strength of the tsunami when it hit the coast as to what 
communities are affected and by how much.   
 Earthquakes, fires and floods are a real threat to the inhabitants of California.  If the 
incident was not prepared for properly and was on a large scale, it would have a national 
economic impact.  Because of the frequency of incidents, California has created an emergency 
management system that can reasonably respond to incidents in a way that quickly addresses the 
threat and take measures to protect its inhabitants. 
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1.3.  EXISTING RESEARCH 
 Emergency management and homeland security, collectively, are relatively new fields of 
study, surfacing mostly after the terrorist attacks in 2001.  Important research before that time 
focused on public policy and management around natural disasters--earthquakes, floods, and fires.   
Since that time, larger academic foci revolve around preparedness, response and mitigation 
efforts. 
 Four journals are notable in this concentration: Journal of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management (JHSEM), Homeland Security Affairs (HSA), Journal of Homeland 
Security (JHS), and Homeland Defense Journal (HDJ).  However, their academic importance 
varies.  As listed, JHSEM is the most academically sound in the traditional sense.  The latter 
journals are more relevant to some practitioners.  Until recently, the articles in JHSEM focused 
more on managing disasters, threat assessment, the emergency management system, and historical 
reflections on large-scale events. 
 Other journals, like Public Administration Review and Public Works Management and 
Policy, have published articles on the subject, but they by no means focus on it as an on-going 
theme.  Articles are typically on the federal government’s policies or agencies and response 
efforts during Hurricane Katrina.  Except for three notable exceptions, articles tend not to discuss 
interactions across levels of government. 
 In 2006, Louise Comfort and Thomas Haase published an article in Public Works 
Management and Policy that studied the communication infrastructure and interaction as a result 
of Hurricane Katrina.  In that study, they found five significant discrepancies.  Of those, the most 
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significant for this study was the gap between organizational design and investment in resources 
and training (2006). 
 While California has many resources and is accustomed to responding to cross-
jurisdictional emergencies, the allocation of funding is a great concern.  This study will illustrate 
the amount, stability, and application of funding in a later chapter.  Additionally, there is a 
growing concern that, similar to Comfort and Haase’s discussion at the end of their report, 
organizational hierarchical structures are not utilized to their best potential, especially when it 
comes to interacting on a regional level. 
 In Kiki Caruson and Susan MacManus’ paper on the importance of regionalism in 
responding to disasters, they stressed the importance of regional support and response, indicating 
that “municipal and county officials can tailor their efforts to meet the unique needs of their local 
communities while still harnessing the economies of scale offered by regional organizations” 
(2007, 20).  While in their paper regional connections were seen as critical, in this study, results 
indicate that the region is the weakest link across all state and governmental levels studied. 
 Finally, Sharon Caudle, in an initial publication in Homeland Security Affairs and then in 
a follow-up article in The Public Manager, argues for the importance of formal regional 
partnerships.  While this is critical, legal frameworks only provide the framework in which an 
emergency management system can work.  Her suggestion that collaborative networks are not 
needed implies that this system can efficiently and effectively work without the humanness that is 
essential during difficult times (2006, 2007). That is not the case.  Not having the personal 
connection can slow response time and effectiveness as too much energy can be spent on 
understanding neighboring partners’ strengths and limitations, not to mention their willingness to 
make tough decisions, which are based on legal intent yet not mandated, to help another 
 33  
 
 
community.  And not having the personal connections to mentor and share experiences limits the 
amount of organizational learning that can take place to better prepare, respond, and mitigate a 
future event. 
 While extensive research has been done in emergency management and homeland 
security, few published studies discuss the interactions of government levels—particularly in 
addressing the role of personal interactions, legal frameworks, leadership and communication.  
These factors and the linkages among them create structure AND flexibility in organizational 
response.  This research adds to that emergency management literature stream. 
1.4.  PURPOSE 
 The primary purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between structure and 
flexibility in emergency preparedness and response operations.  Specifically, this study focuses on 
how four factors--personal interactions, legal structures, leadership and communication--impact a 
state’s emergency management system across jurisdictions.  Because of its long history of formal 
mutual aid agreements and standardized response mechanisms, there is a strong comprehension of 
the formal processes in California.  Yet, the humanness factor has not been explored.  This 
research seeks to advance understanding of perceptions of governmental relationships among 
public levels and how these four factors enhance or hinder emergency management activities. 
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1.5.  ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This study of emergency management in California is divided across nine chapters.  
Chapter 1: The Necessities and Experiences of Emergency Management in California discusses 
the importance of studying emergency management through California’s example because of its 
large demography, varied geography, and experience with preparing for and responding to multi-
jurisdictional incidents.  Because it has the largest number of inhabitants in one of the largest land 
areas, California must deal with major natural threats--earthquakes, fires and floods--on a regular 
basis.  Responding to these incidents is complicated by urban areas and federal and state 
regulation.  Therefore, it has devised a system, over time, to effectively minimize the impacts of 
natural threats.  The resulting system retains the flexibility needed to respond to incidents with 
uncertain and changing environments while retaining the structure needed to consistently deliver 
a positive result. 
Chapter 2:  Theoretical Concepts Underlying Dynamic Emergency Management identifies 
the three established public administration literature streams on which the research is based--
traditional management, network analysis, and organizational learning theories.  While these 
theories are necessary in understanding the current emergency management system, each one, 
independently, falls short of what is actually occurring within the administration of emergency 
services.  Instead a new theoretical model has emerged--a structured network administration 
model.  This is based on the premise that hierarchical structure, flexible networks, and 
organizational learning must take place through coordination and intentional integration of the 
three aforementioned literatures. 
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To understand this relationship, Chapter 3:  Research Design and Methodology for 
Exploring California’s Approach to Emergency Management outlines the process used to answer 
how personal interactions, official communications, legal policies, and leadership affect 
emergency preparedness and response in California.  Data was collected utilizing qualitative and 
quantitative techniques.  Fifteen expert interviews were conducted to study the impact of the four 
factors across state, county and local levels.  Experts were identified based on their reputations 
and positions within key governmental structures.  In addition to the interviews, a survey was 
conducted among 196 emergency managers with a 75% response rate.  The data collected through 
these two sources were analyzed utilizing qualitative and quantitative methodologies. 
Chapter 4:  The Role of Personal Interactions in Emergency Management is the first 
chapter on the research findings.  Summed up in one word, personal interactions are “critical” 
when preparing for and responding to an incident.  More frequent interactions lead to the increase 
of trust, both among emergency managers and across the system, and they assist with the 
management of stress that is a result of tensions of incidents and of the people whom the incidents 
impact.  Personal interactions evolve over a number of ways, most notably through training and 
working together.  Knowing ones’ colleagues is a key components to make the system work.  
Chapter 4 goes into greater detail of the impact and hindrances to establishing and maintaining the 
relationships. 
In building on Chapter 4, Chapter 5:  The Role of Leadership in Emergency Management 
uncovers the characteristics of prominent leaders within the emergency management system.   
Effective leadership is a combination of knowledge, personal actions, interpersonal relations, 
management skills, and human characteristics, including core values.  Since people are at the 
heart of the emergency management system and it is people whom the system assists in time of 
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need, strong leadership is essential to manage chaos and guide to organization to maximize 
effectiveness.  The impact of political leadership is also discussed. 
Referring back to Chapter 1 that described the evolution of the legal composition of 
emergency management, Chapter 6:  The Role of Legal Structures in Emergency Management 
illustrates the interaction of managers with policies and procedures both at the State and federal 
levels.  One of the most common themes is the impression of understaffing, particularly at the 
regional level, to accomplish and prepare for large, multi-jurisdictional incidents.  The funding of 
emergency management is also explored, with increasing concern that the role of emergency 
managers is shifting to becoming grant writers instead of using expertise to understand and 
prepare for known and unknown threats. 
Chapter 7:  The Role of Communication in Emergency Management shifts gears and 
reveals the necessary parallel between the evolution of information technology systems and the 
impact on the emergency management system.  It stresses the importance of face-to-face human 
interactions while using technology to make the interaction more productive.  Hindrances, as well 
as advancements, are also revealed. 
Chapter 8:  Findings for the Roles of Personal Interactions, Communication, Legal 
Policies and Leadership in Emergency Management highlights key findings from chapters 4 
through 7, focusing on major themes and trends.  It is a compilation of findings from both the 
qualitative and quantitative research and addresses the research questions and hypotheses.  
Recommendations are also made on how to continue the momentum of a structured network 
administration while continuing opportunities to learn. 
Finally, Chapter 9:  Conclusion in Understanding California’s Networked Approach in 
Intergovernmental Interactions takes the findings one step further to place it in a larger 
 37  
 
 
emergency management context.  It reiterates essential findings and answers the question on how 
personal interactions, communications, legal policies, and leadership affect emergency 
preparedness and response within California. 
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2.0    CHAPTER 2:  THEORETICAL CONCEPTS UNDERLYING DYNAMIC 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
The emergency management system, to effectively meet chaotic and uncertain conditions, 
must be highly structured organizations and retain flexibility to respond to rapidly changing 
environments, such as those natural incidents identified in Chapter 1.  A number of early 
examples, like response to the Angora Fire, reinforce the necessity for this type of procedural 
relationship.  To contextualize the research, it is grounded in three main theories: traditional 
management, organizational learning, and network analysis.   These three theories frame the 
research study as it focuses on government processes that require both structure AND flexibility.  
In California’s case this was accomplished through continual advancements, via organizational 
learning, made to the emergency management system and through the interaction of multiple 
jurisdictions and agencies across all levels of state, county and local governments. 
This study focuses on four main factors that influence emergency preparedness and 
response--personal interactions, official communications, legal policies and leadership.  While 
each of these characteristics can be identified in the noted theories to a varying degree, they have 
stronger presences in particular theory bases.  For official communications and legal policies, it is 
traditional management theory because of its need for organizational hierarchy and foundation in 
policies, procedures, and rule of law; for personal interactions, it is network theory due to the 
lateral and informal relationships within and across jurisdictions; and for leadership, as it pertains 
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to recent research, it is organizational learning, as the leader must not only motivate but guide the 
organization for continued improvements.  This literature review, while highlighting the four 
factors, also provides a historical perspective of how the theories developed and a few of the most 
significant contributions to the theory. 
2.1.  TRADITIONAL MANAGEMENT THEORY 
Rule of law and official communications through hierarchies are the basis of traditional 
management theory that attempted to increase efficiency, effectiveness and economy through the 
mechanics of administration while retaining integrity of the personnel and offices. 
Woodrow Wilson (1887) was one of the earliest philosophers who wanted to improve the 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of government.  He advocated breaking away from the spoils 
system and separating politics from administration.  Through this approach, civil servants could 
become true experts and professionals and not be dependent on political patrons for job security. 
Max Weber, although in the German context, built, as Wilson did, on needs for reform of 
the public sector.  Weber took an  “ ideal-type ” approach to reform government and is considered 
to be the father of bureaucracy.  His concept had several structural elements: special jurisdictions, 
steep hierarchy, employment structures, a bureaucratic structure, and management rules under the 
law.  The result was an independent government structure that did not dramatically change when 
the politicians changed.  It created long-term stability with set rules and procedures where 
employees could move in and out of the system with known expectations and results. 
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Gulick and Urwick (1937) recognized a lack of coordination in Weber’s view of 
bureaucracy once the work was divided.   To bridge this gap, they identified seven functions of 
the executive: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting—
affectionately known as POSDCORB.  (POSDCORB was the original analysis of the executive; 
“directing” was later dropped in the 1970s as the theory evolved resulting in the commonly 
accepted POSCORB.) They stressed the hierarchical relationship between the authorities and 
subordinates to retain coordination and control. 
While this dialogue transpired in the public sector, it also occurred in private industry.  
Taylor (1911) stressed efficiency to obtain maximum output, rationality to arrange work in the 
most direct relationship to objectives, and productivity to retain high production levels.  He 
proposed that each employee has a certain task to do and each task has one best way of being 
done to have maximum efficiency.  His work impacted the public sector as the goal of efficiency 
was key to the Scientific Management of this time period.  These theoretical philosophies 
paralleled each other in the early part of the Twentieth Century. 
Traditional management theory had many critics.  Simon (1969), for example, advocated a 
management science based in procedural relationships, rejecting previous suggested verities of 
substantive rationality, advancing behavioral science to near dominance by the close of the 1950s.  
Waldo (1952) also critiqued bureaucratic theory by indicating that the  “values” of efficiency and 
economy through centralization and hierarchy were at odds with democratic political theory and 
needs for effectiveness.  In his book, Democracy and the Public Service, Frederick C. Mosher 
focused on the paradox of “bureaucracy and democracy” as a core challenge of public 
administration.   
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Throughout the next generation, traditional theory became increasingly criticized for its 
inflexibility, the typically large size of government, and slow reaction time.  It also created a 
philosophical divide between efficiency and equity.  New Public Administration emerged in 
America at the turn of the 1960s-1970s, in part, to bridge this gap.  This movement was motivated 
by social equality and attempted to remove the impersonal and neutral bureaucracy.  It attempted 
to create equity in the distribution of governmental services, modify the traditional hierarchical 
structure to focus more on teams or group decision-making processes, institute a boundary-
exchange to alter the relationship of the administration to its clients, and create a socio-emotional 
process that included sensitivity training (Frederickson, 1971).  Frederickson argued that social 
equality should be the focus of public administration.  This proposition challenged the then 
conventional understanding of public administration to create an efficient and economical system 
to provide public goods and services.   
Understanding the field in terms of the New Public Administration movement was short-
lived, but it was an important movement as it brought politics back into public administration and 
the need of better connecting administration with the people whom it serves.  New Public 
Management quickly followed. 
According to Christopher Pollitt, New Public Management has four main components: 
greater use of market-like mechanisms to provide public services, decentralization of 
management, continual need to improve service quality, and a greater focus placed on meeting the 
needs of the “customer” (1993).  One of the most widely published writings was Ted Gaebler’s 
and David Osborne’s Reinventing Government. 
Reinventing Government, which was on the New York Times Best Seller list when it came 
out in 1992, suggested ten strategies that government administrations should undertake: 
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1. Steer don’t row 
2. Empower communities 
3. Encourage competition 
4. Be mission driven--as opposed to rule driven 
5. Be results-oriented by funding outcomes 
6. Meet customer needs 
7. Concentrate on earning money--not spending 
8. Investing in preventing problems 
9. Decentralizing authority 
10. Solve problems by market forces (1992) 
This renewed interest in governmental role and operation was prominent at all levels of 
government, including in the Clinton/Gore presidential administration with the National 
Performance Review.  New Public Management not only focused on how to improve 
administrative strategies through decentralization and devolution, but it also influenced the policy 
debate on how to manage public bureaucracies.  Barzelay suggested that New Public Management 
had two main elements: one which “focuses on the political and organizational processes through 
which policy change takes place” and the other “is the substantive analysis of public management 
policy” (2001, 157-158).   
Internationally, the New Public Management movement made an impact before being part 
of the US academic debate, especially in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia 
(Radin, 2006, 226).  While New Zealand was one of the most notable applications, it was also 
implemented in countries not in the Commonwealth Realm, such as France, as evident in Etienne 
Minvielle’s study of the Regional Hospital Agencies.  In that article, Minvielle illustrated the use 
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of innovation and decentralization to modernize the management of the French hospital system in 
the allocation, planning and use of resources (2006).   
Total Quality Management (TQM) had common links to the New Public Management 
movement but was relatively short-lived in the public sector.  Grounded in W. Edwards Deming’s 
fourteen points that focused on work productivity, image and quality assurance from his studies of 
Japanese industry in the 1950s, TQM revolved heavily on the quality of products and service 
delivery. In the TQManager, Schmidt and Finnigan identified a number of key concepts that can 
be seen in other management trends, like recognizing organizations as complex systems, meeting 
customer needs, continuing improving the product or service, using teams and groups, and 
“developing relationships of openness and trust” (1993, 5), but it falls short of market forces and 
other corporate cultures that prohibit the effective and realistic application of TQM.  Yet, the 
underlying concepts continually evolve into more open and flexible organizations. 
Patrick Dunleavy, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow and Jane Tinkler proposed that the New 
Public Management movement has yielded to management practices influenced by reintegration, 
needs-based holism, and digitization changes in what they term as “digital-era governance.”  In 
this movement, “reintegrating functions into the governmental sphere, adopting holistic and 
needs-oriented structures, and progressing digitalization of administrative processes” are all key 
in today’s governmental structures. (2006)  This dramatic shift and understanding of information 
technology resources was explored in 2001 with Jane Fountain’s Building the Virtual State: 
Information technology and institutional change.  
In this book, Fountain proposed that technology is not meant to replace the bureaucratic 
structure, per se, but is to be used as a tool for coordination and communication and as a catalyst 
for organizational change.  She stressed creating and sharing networks of information.  Through a 
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greater understanding of how technology could be used in administrative processes, a new 
understanding of management relationships has emerged. 
Facilitative State concepts of social self-governance, market economies, and facilitative 
governments grew internationally, coincident with the decline of socialism and the collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc.  This moved away from a dominant ‘big government’ approach that concentrates 
heavily on welfare and warfare responsibilities to “social, economic and political self-
governance” (Newland, 2007, 33).  Newland stresses the need to search for human dignity for 
individuals and society and to search for reasonableness under a rule of law while trying to 
manage modern paradoxes that face today’s public sector, like democracy and bureaucracy, 
divisive politics/institutional conflicts and seamlessness of business/government/politics, and an 
increased access to information but reduced time to reflect upon and use it (Newland, 2007). 
Even though the academic trends of more open and flexible organizations that stressed 
genuine cooperation and coordination evolved from the 1960s, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Centers and Pentagon, reversion to traditional command and control 
frameworks occurred.  The importance of understanding the law and official communications was 
illustrated in how the government addressed terrorism and natural threats.  Traditional 
management theory creates the organizational and legal structures in which intergovernmental 
interactions takes place.  This structure is necessary to reduce threats and to respond to incidents 
when they occur.  However, other concepts and practices oriented to networked governance have 
persisted to create flexibility within the structure. 
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2.2.  ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING THEORY 
Cheryl King and Lisa Zanetti suggested that “the function of public managers…is not only 
to satisfy citizen needs and desires but also to transform them in the public interest.”  In so doing, 
move away from impersonal, mechanical organizations, as traditional management practices can 
be perceived, to public organizations with the common values of “commitment, compassion, and 
passion.” (2005)  This transition cannot take place without a fundamental shift of infusing the 
management of public services--getting the job done with leadership principles--having the vision 
and skills to get there. 
A number of recent authors, like Barbara Crosby and John Bryson in Leadership for the 
Common Good (2005), and Montgomery van Wart in Dynamics of Leadership in Public Service 
(2005), explore the essential components of effective leadership like communication, decision-
making, negotiation, ethical/value-based leadership, shared-power.  Van Wart, in particular, 
addresses the importance of “advanced learning” as opposed to “basic learning” to cause real 
leadership growth (2005).  While effective leadership requires personal development, it has a 
significant impact on the daily operation of an organization.  When an organization has a strong 
leadership drive, learning, and thereby increased effectiveness, efficiency and economy, has the 
opportunity and support to take place.  Argyris and Schon are leading scholars to this approach in 
bringing about effective organizational learning and change. 
They suggest that organizational learning focuses on the processes, which are 
demonstrated by behaviors based on actionable knowledge, rather than simply actionable 
knowledge (which is knowing what needs to be done to realize certain goals) (Argyris and Schon, 
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1996). In explaining this further, Argyris and Schon suggest two different models: Model I 
(single-loop learning) and Model II (double-loop learning). 
Model I behavior creates strategies of action without inquiring as to the values of those 
actions.  In this model, people use their theories-in-use to govern their behavior and they do not 
question what they are doing or why they are doing it.  The principles of Model I include 
achieving the intended purpose, maximizing winning, suppressing negative feelings, and acting in 
a rational manner.   
Model I behavior has two consequences.  First, it is used as a defensive mechanism where 
the individual is protected from identifying weaknesses.  Second, it leads to misunderstanding by 
responding to a problem the same way that it was created.  No new information is gained and the 
employee does what he or she has always done.  There is no growth within the organization. 
To create growth, Argyris and Schon suggest Model II behavior, or double loop learning.  
This approach evolved from a long line of humanistic organizational theorists like McGregor 
(1957) with his Theory X and Theory Y.  It focuses on the individual understanding where 
problems occur and how to fix them.  Double-loop learning is based on three elements: valid 
information, free and informed choices, and internal commitment.  This approach links values 
with organizational transformation.  Model II can be achieved through reflection and a self-
recognition of individuals in organizations as agents of that organization. 
This last approach is important to organizations that operate in a multi-jurisdictional 
environment; it encourages continual growth within the organization to meet complex, changing 
environments.  This growth enables the organization and individuals to trust more and to practice 
effective communication (Argyris 1962, Argyris and Schon 1978, Golembiewski 1972).  
Organizational learning also enables individuals to think and act on their own.  In emergency 
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management, this is of particular importance as no two events are the same; the type of event, 
severity, and impact both financially and culturally, always change.  Yet, emergency managers 
must respond.  By learning and building upon past experiences, the next response has a greater 
positive impact because it allows the emergency manager to quickly address familiar challenges 
while being able to dedicate more energy towards new threats. 
In a 2005 paper, Donald Moynihan focused on organizational learning in emergency 
management.  In his case study, he examined an inter-organizational taskforce responding to the 
contamination of a fatal poultry infection called Exotic Newcastle Disease.  He found “six distinct 
ways in which networks learned: virtual experience, learning from others, learning from 
information systems, learning forums, [standard operating procedures] and learning from the 
past” (2005, 17).  Such learning, along with Model II behavior, directly relates to how agencies 
approach emergency preparedness by building on experiences and relying on trust to create future 
emergency response procedures.  
In a recent article, Louise Comfort discussed the important, yet often overlooked, role of 
cognition in preparing for and responding to incidents.  In this context, she defined cognition “as 
the capacity to recognize the degree of emerging risk to which a community is exposed and to act 
on that information” (Comfort, 2007).  Cognition occurs through learning in the sense that one 
must have the experience to know the rules, but also be able to recognize the discrepancies 
between normal performance and a new threat.  The individual and organization build upon past 
experiences and create the structural and cultural environment for inquiry. 
Learning as an organizational culture requires long-term support and guidance by the 
administration to oversee and foster the changes.  It is not a quick fix but requires strong 
leadership to sustain a value driven environment.  California, through the evolution of emergency 
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management as described in the previous chapter, has embraced learning practices to continually 
refine the effectiveness of its system.  The result is having personal interactions, leadership, legal 
structures, and communication to be the core drivers in making the system work.  Each of these 
factors evolved through organizational and personal learning.  This learning approach expands 
traditional management theory to build upon networks of individuals and, in turn, organizations. 
2.3.  NETWORK THEORY 
 Unlike traditional management theory, network theory is less hierarchical and relies more 
on interpersonal relationships and inter-organizational relationships to enhance performance.  In 
1967, Warren Bennis asked a poignant question, “Will bureaucratic organizations as we know 
them disappear because they are unable to adapt to rapidly changing environments?” (Bennis, 
1967).  This question, along with his identified threats to bureaucracy--rapid change, growth, 
complexity of technology, and change in management behavior--foreshadowed decades of study 
in what is now collectively called network theory. 
 Using Richard Scott’s terminology, network theory is an open system that is highly 
complex and interacts with its environment with a capacity of self-maintenance where boundaries 
are often blurred (2003).  Network theory’s roots are in chaos theory and complex adaptive 
system research. 
Herbert Simon and James Thompson were among the first leading researchers to identify 
the complexities of organizations.  Simon focused on complexity issues and illustrated the key 
role of information in decision-making.  Also, as reflected Thompson’s work, Simon explained 
 49  
 
 
that certain phenomena are “artificial,” that is, they are contingent on the designer’s goals and 
purposes.  This is distinct from natural phenomena that do not have a human influence.  Human 
decisions impact organizational results, regardless to how complex an organization might seem.  
He also proposed that complexity takes the form of a hierarchy with many subsystems and 
subsystems of subsystems. (1969) 
Thompson, in his influential book Organizations in Action, created a systematic 
configuration of organizations, their interactions, and administrative processes.  He proposed that 
an organization is dependent on the environment in which it operates.  This includes 
opportunities, constraints, and technology that affect the design and interaction of the 
organization. (1967) 
These two works provided a shift in ideology from a highly structured organization to one 
that is more interactive within its environment.  
During the same decade, Daniel Katz and Richard Kahn focused on the interaction of the 
environment and organization and suggested that a constant exchange of information is needed 
for successful performance.  They also proposed that integration and coordination must exist--
integration of shared norms and values and coordination of priorities and routines. (Katz and 
Kahn, 1966).  
But, even with the information exchange, Ronald Burt, in Structural Holes, recognized 
that gaps occurred when two individuals interacted with complementary resources or information 
and that a third individual or organization was necessary to fill the gap.  Although evolving from 
a business context, the rationale holds true in governmental entities. 
Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust solidified network analysis as a theory within the 
academic community.  In Social Network Analysis (1994), they created a comprehensive 
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explanation of the application of network theory in social research with detailed illustrations of 
data collection, mathematical calculations and modeling techniques. 
W. Baker identified four essential characteristics to networks: flexibility, decentralized 
planning, lateral ties among members, and integration across formal boundaries of discipline 
(Nohria and Eccles, 1992).  Baker, along with such researchers as Robert Axelrod and Michael 
Cohen, who advanced the complex adaptive systems framework and stressed the importance of 
interaction (2000); John Holland, whose research focused on an agent’s ability to adapt to other 
adapting agents (1995); Paul Sabatier, who stressed the need to simplify complexity before 
making policy decisions (1993); and Louise Comfort, who identified elements of CAS as 
nonlinear relationships, dynamic operations, and unpredictable outcomes (1999), helped to shape 
what now constitutes network theory. 
Two of the most recent network theorists are Albert-Laszlo Barabasi and Duncan Watts.  
Barabasi (2002) used the concept of the Internet and hubs to explain how communication within 
networks takes place.  When one link goes down, the information is rerouted from another link.  
By this technique, the network is able to adapt to unforeseen and changing environments.  He 
cautioned, however, that, if too many links are down, it causes the whole system to shut down.  
These links, or nodes, are not fixed or static; they change during the course of a network’s 
existence.   
Watts (2003) researched networks as applied to the social sciences.  He stressed the 
importance of individual interactions, both strong and weak (small-world) relationships.  These 
interactions strengthen the organization through the connectedness of its members as people learn 
through personal interactions and structure their knowledge accordingly.   
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Two other theorists worth noting are George Frederickson and Anne-Marie Slaughter.  
Frederickson, with his Theory of Conjunction, focused on the importance of cross-jurisdictional 
collaboration when it came to local, metropolitan services, like public safety, utilities and 
transportation.  In this way, local governments are able to share expertise and pool resources to 
advance the entire community as opposed to an independent locale (Frederickson, 1999).  On a 
larger scale, Anne-Marie Slaughter’s Disaggregation of Nation-State Sovereignty reiterated the 
need of neighboring communities, in her case nation-states, to facilitate collaboration in 
specialized fields (Slaughter, 2004). 
Network theory facilitates understanding of how the “pieces” fit together in complex 
environments.  Making and retaining relationships (even if done in a small, indirect way) and 
maintaining flexibility and lateral ties are critical in social and professional networks.  These 
strengths are countered by some weaknesses. 
Coser (1975), for example, recognized many negative consequences of networks, 
including an erosion of democratic principles, promotion of groupthink, a return to “good old 
boy” type of hiring, and “enabling greedy institutions” (Berry, et.al.). Today, one of the largest 
criticisms to network theory is deficient accountability.   
Unlike traditional management, there are no clear accountability measures because the 
traditional hierarchical structures are modified and the chain of command is distorted (Nohria and 
Eccles 1992, and Putnam 2000).  Additionally, financial accountability, one of the most easily 
identifiable types in public administration, has little effect in network theory as too many 
boundaries are blurred.  As a possible solution, Behn (2001) suggested a “compact of mutual, 
collective responsibility” which would be a general understanding among all participants who are 
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committed to a single purpose. This approach is little more than a “hand-shake” and does not 
effectively solve the accountability dilemma on a large scale. 
Muhittin Acar and Peter Robertson researched the accountability issue at length in 
educational partnerships.  They found eight major categories of challenges to partnership 
accountability.  Most significant were difficulties in gaining access to information (Acar and 
Robertson, 2004).  
Focusing particularly on emergency management, the need for informational access and 
open communication practices is well documented.  Louise Comfort and Thomas Haase, for 
example, studied the network linkages of organizations involved with the Hurricane Katrina 
response efforts.  They found that the limited capacity to exchange information resulted in the 
“collapse of coordination in disaster operations” (Comfort and Haase, 2006, 328).  This 
conclusion reinforces the need for open communication when operating in a network scenario to 
increase accountability measures. 
The connotation of accountability, however, is changing.  Ronald Moe and Robert 
Gilmore suggested that today’s accountability, to their disapproval, is focused on politically 
responsive performance at the expense of responsible policy implementation as defined by the 
rule of law.  In regard to contracting out to the private sector, they suggested that “almost by 
design, widespread practices of [contracting out] frustrate any serious attempt to hold government 
officials accountable for the implementation of fundamental government policy” (1995, 141).  
They advocate that public administration must return to its roots in public law instead of 
gravitating towards what they consider laissez faire entrepreneurial practices.  This perspective is 
supported by Laurence Lynn, Carolyn Heinrich, and Carolyn Hill through their definition of 
public sector governance as “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative 
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practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and 
services” (2001, 7). 
The governance movement not only embraces rule of law, but recognizes a fundamental 
shift in the way governments operate.  While a hierarchy is still visibly present, the bureaucratic 
nature of the organizational structure is reduced.  This movement reflects a morphing of network 
and traditional management theories. 
Network theory, in its purest sense, with extensive flexibility and a flat organizational 
structure, does not necessarily increase governmental effectiveness or economy.  Modern research 
indicates that a blend of both network theory and traditional management theory is becoming 
commonplace to provide public goods and enhance service delivery. 
Keith Provan and Brint Milward stressed the importance of retaining some management 
theory principles in the application of network theory.  In their study of four community mental 
health systems, they drew four conclusions: 1. “network effectiveness will be enhanced when the 
network is integrated, but only when integration is achieved through centralization of the 
network”, 2. “network effectiveness will be highest when mechanisms for external control are 
direct and not fragmented”, 3. “network effectiveness will be enhanced under conditions of 
general system stability”, and 4. network effectiveness ranges from low to high under a resource 
rich environment, as compared to low to moderate under a resource scarce environment (Provan 
and Milward, 1995).  These four conclusions illustrate the need to have a central authority within 
a network.  This is not to suggest that a steep hierarchy is necessary, but simply that the system 
cannot be void of this type of structure.   
Two more recent publications also illustrate the hierarchical change in governance.  
Carolyn Hill and Laurence Lynn wrote an article in 2004 on the decline of hierarchical 
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governance.  After reviewing over eight hundred individual research studies, they suggested that 
“shifts away from hierarchical government toward horizontal governing reflect…a gradual 
addition of new administrative forms that facilitates governance within a system of constitutional 
authority” (2004, 173).  Maybe more significant than this article, however, is Stephen Goldsmith 
and William Eggars’ Governing by Network. 
In this book, Goldsmith and Eggars spend considerable time not only explaining 
frameworks of contemporary governments, but how to manage networks.  They recognize the 
accountability dilemma and suggest that there has to be an alignment of values and trust among 
all of the partners within the network.  This approach counters traditional management theory that 
relied on process standardization (2004). 
The full implementation of pure network theory is not practical in contemporary 
government environments.  Instead, a combination of concepts and practices of network theory 
and of traditional management is undertaken.  Gregory Dees, Jed Emerson, and Peter Economy 
elaborate on three such exchanges: coordination, cooperation and collaboration.  Each concept 
varies in definition, characteristics and resources.  The most ideal stage is a collaboration network 
where information is exchanged, resources are shared, and capacity is enhanced for mutual 
benefit, all to achieve a common purpose.  This requires a full sharing of “resources, risks, 
rewards and responsibilities” (2002). 
David La Piana and Michaela Hays identify three levels of collaboration: collaboration 
focused on achieving organizational goals, collaboration focused on responding to programmatic 
needs of clients, and collaboration focused on resolving complex community problems (2005).  In 
each case, collaboration takes commitment to share resources, to operate from a common 
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understanding of core values and shared goals, to learn from each other, and perhaps most 
importantly, to create an environment of trust. 
Robert Agranoff suggests ten lessons of collaborative networks in the public sector: 
1. The network is not the only vehicle of collaborative management. 
2. Managers continue to do the bulk of their work within the hierarchy. 
3. Network involvement brings several advantages that keep busy administrators involved. 
4. Networks are different from organizations but not completely different. 
5. Not all networks make the types of policy and program adjustments ascribed to them in 
the literature. 
6. Collaborative decisions or agreements are the products of a particular type of mutual 
learning and adjustment. 
7. The most distinctive collaborative activity of all of the networks proved to be their work 
in public sector knowledge management. 
8. Despite the cooperative spirit and aura of accommodation in collaborative efforts, 
networks are not without conflicts and power issues. 
9. Networks have their collaborative costs as well as their benefits. 
10. Networks alter the boundaries of the state only in the most marginal ways; they do not 
appear to be replacing public bureaucracies in any way (2006). 
Agranoff’s insights illustrate the need for networks while retaining fundamental 
components of traditional management approaches.  Of the ten noted above, three lessons need 
further refinement for the emergency management context as studied through this research.  In his 
Lesson 4, Agranoff proposed that “networks are different from organizations” because it is non-
hierarchical, that is, “players at the table begin largely equal as organizational representatives, 
 56  
 
 
most actions are discussed and decided by consensus, resources are multi-sourced, and there are 
relatively few sanctions for withdrawal” (2006, 58).  In application, this may not be entirely 
accurate, at least with informal networks.  Take for example this scenario: Local Emergency 
Manager 1 has a professional relationship with Local Emergency Manager 2 in a different state, 
brought about by training together.  While they may have equal titles, if an incident occurs in City 
1, Local Emergency Manager 2 is limited in what she can offer in supporting Local Emergency 
Manager 1 because of mutual aid agreements and other laws, not to mention the political and 
cultural environment in which each city operates, regardless of the resources which she has 
available to her or the collective agreements which they have made.  In his analysis, Agranoff 
accurately describes collaborative partnerships where the players have the authority, both legally 
and administratively, to make decisions on behalf of their respective agencies, yet not all 
networks have that level of formality. 
In Lesson 6, Agranoff correctly suggested that “collaborative decisions or agreements are 
the products of a particular type of mutual learning and adjustments” (2006, 59).  In the 
emergency management field, this is a result of experiencing events, learning from them, and 
preparing for future, similar events.  Mutual aid agreements, for example, are the result of cross 
jurisdictional disasters where, upon reflection, it is better to work together than to wait for the 
incident to affect a neighboring community.  Even the identification of an incident commander, a 
person who is in charge at the event site, is a pre-identified collective decision. This concept is 
reflective of a facilitative state where social self-governance efforts collectively work to benefit a 
specific region. 
Lesson 7, in relation to the importance of knowledge management, is of particular interest 
to emergency management because of the number of emergency managers and the complex 
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environments in which they work.  It would be impossible for each emergency manager to be 
proficient in, for example, fire, police, medical, and public works response.  Instead, they are 
reliant on network knowledge so that, when an incident occurs, it can be responded to in an 
appropriate and effective manner.  Emergency managers must know the legal systems, 
technological resources, and personal capabilities in which they operate while also understanding 
the availability of outside resources and how to access them.  This is done through training, both 
individual and group. 
Understanding the design and role of networks within the public sector has evolved 
greatly since the 1960s, largely through organizational experiences and learning.  California’s 
experience with the emergency management system could not be possible without the networks 
created across and with the different levels of government.  These interactions create the 
flexibility within the system that cannot be captured through traditional management theories.  
While there is still an underlying need for a hierarchical structure with commonly accepted 
organizational processes, networks foster the humanness to provide public services. 
2.4.  THEORY SUMMARY 
There is no doubt that traditional management theory is necessary in today’s governmental 
structures.  After all, it provides a logical framework in which to create legal structures, organize 
personnel, and implement policy and command structures.  Yet, this type of system lacks 
flexibility to respond to rapidly changing and uncertain conditions.  While the military, probably 
the most successful organization to model this theory, is largely successful in adapting these 
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principles, it also has incentives and disincentives not present in other governmental entities.  In 
that regard, another system must be in place to facilitate successful organizational development. 
Organizational learning, while being a systemic way to learn from past experiences to 
shape how the organization responds to new conditions, is often too slow to utilize in the rapidly 
changing world of emergency response and relies heavily on effective leadership principles.  
Because emergencies can happen in a moment without notice, double loop learning in a specific 
new situation is too time consuming to implement in such instances.  While the strategy is helpful 
in learning from experiences over time and in such exercises as California’s statewide Golden 
Guardian emergency response simulation for preparedness, such reflection is too late unless it 
occurs prior to an actual threat or a series of threats.  This is where network theory comes into 
practice. 
Network theory provides the flexibility necessary to respond to changing and/or uncertain 
conditions through relying on personal interactions.  It relies on a host of experts who may or may 
not have direct organizational links with the other respondents.  For the purpose of this study, 
network theory is used to facilitate understanding of interagency collaboration in threat 
preparedness.  This research assumes that the governmental approach to emergency preparedness 
and response, while grounded in traditional management theory that has a comprehensive 
organizational structure and is governed by rule of law, has learned that it must also be flexible.  
This flexibility, with people and systems in place ready to react, is necessary to appropriately 
respond to rapid, uncertain, and changing situations.  This study is designed to facilitate a better 
understanding of what these approaches mean in intergovernmental/interagency collaborative 
efforts both to prevent and to respond to large-scale emergencies. 
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2.5.  NEW THEORETICAL MODEL 
The theoretical model for this study is one of structured network administration.  By the 
very nature of the terminology, the model appears to be flawed, for how can networks that thrive 
on flexibility and interpersonal relationships be tied to a structured system where value is placed 
on efficiency, effectiveness and economy with little regard to humanness?  But, indeed, this is the 
case.  Since emergency management is of societal concern and therefore part of government 
responsibilities, it is inherently important to contain the structure and procedures necessary to 
maintain public accountability.  Yet, it must retain the flexibility driven by human decisions that 
can overcome complexities resulting from chaotic environments.  It is this necessity that makes 
traditional management theory at odds with emergency management. 
A structured network administration combines the best components of traditional 
management and network analysis theories, but only through the discovery and reform process of 
organizational learning.  Organizational learning, with information being open to all parties 
involved, can create a structure where lateral ties and integration form relationships across 
disciplines and levels of government while retaining the rule of law and hierarchy needed for 
effective governance.  This is accomplished through true collaborative efforts where the 
motivating factor is to make the entire system better with an appreciative understanding that all 
positions, levels of government and agencies, and departments are equally important to the 
success of emergency preparedness and response, and without regard to personal egos that could 
shift the approach of these efforts. 
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3.0    CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY FOR EXPLORING 
CALIFORNIA’S APPROACH TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
 
 Building upon the traditional management, organizational learning, and network theories, 
this research is designed to enhance understanding of the factors that impact emergency 
preparedness and response within the State of California.   
3.1.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The primary question is: 
QUESTION: How can an organizational design retain both structure and flexibility 
to operate effectively, efficiently and economically? 
To answer this question knowledgeably, these sub-questions are addressed: 
Sub-question 1: How do personal interactions, official communications, legal policies, and 
leadership affect emergency preparedness and response within the 
California jurisdictions studied?  
Sub-question 2: How does the frequency of interaction impact effectiveness? 
Sub-question 3: How do these factors facilitate or inhibit threat preparedness and response? 
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3.2.  SAMPLE DESIGN 
 To answer the research questions, data were collected through three sources--expert 
interviews, surveys and professional reports.  This approach was undertaken because, while each 
approach has strengths, all these have weaknesses that can be balanced from the other approaches.  
Expert interviews are excellent at collecting data that brings personal perspectives to each of the 
factors studied and can uncover trends that cannot be captured by the survey.  Yet, the interview 
process is time consuming, for both the researcher and informants, and therefore, is limited in the 
number of experts that can be reached.  Surveys can reach a broad audience of experts but is 
limited to structured questions that are excellent for studying broad themes but are difficult to 
extrapolate the subtle data that can only be reached through shifting the interview questions or 
following up with different research methodologies.  Finally, the professional report analysis 
captures concrete data that bring a historical and organizational perspective in understanding the 
evolution of the factors studied. 
 Experts were identified through one of two ways: 1. their position within the organization, 
or 2. their reputation with in the emergency management system.  Since this study looked at the 
entire emergency management within the State of California, experts were identified at all levels 
of government from the local level through the State.  Figure 6 presents a basic organization chart 
of typical interaction across the emergency management system. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coastal Region 
(Regional Level) 
Inland Region 
(Regional Level)
223 Cities plus 
Special Districts 
(Local and/or Field 
Level) 
11 Counties 
(Operational and/or 
Local Level)
122 Cities plus 
Special Districts 
(Local and/or Field 
Level) 
31 Counties 
(Operational and/or 
Local Level) 
16 Counties 
(Operational and/or 
Local Level) 
Southern Region 
(Regional Level) 
Office of Emergency Services 
(State Level) 
133 Cities plus 
Special Districts 
(Local and/or Field 
Level) 
 
Figure 6.  Basic organization chart of California’s emergency management system. 
 
 (The regions were identified through the California Office of Emergency Services, and the 
counties and cities were identified through the California State Association of Counties.) 
The State-level experts were selected based on their positions within the emergency 
management system.  This was done not only because of their current responsibilities, but more 
importantly, their career-long involvement with emergency management.  Therefore the Director 
of the Office of Emergency Services, the Director of the Homeland Security Directorate, the 
Director of Technological Services, and the three regional administrators were selected.  
(California has three emergency management regions--Inland, Coastal and Southern.)  To identify 
county and local experts, the second approach was used. 
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 Since there is a greater volume of county and local emergency managers, the experts were 
identified based upon their reputation in the larger emergency management system.  To obtain a 
balanced view, key senior emergency managers at the State-level identified informants within 
each of the three emergency management regions. 
 For the surveys, the experts were identified by their participation in the Golden Guardian 
2006 training exercises.  These emergency managers participated in the planning sessions by 
invitation only.  Therefore, the planners and consultants of Golden Guardian identified their 
importance to the overarching preparedness and response activities. 
3.3.  DATA COLLECTION/SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
 This research focuses on how four factors--personal relationships, official 
communications, legal structures, and leadership--impact California’s emergency preparedness 
and response.  To that end, qualitative and quantitative methods are employed to understand its 
effectiveness.  Structured interviews and surveys were tested on a focus group in Sacramento 
prior to being used.  Members of the focus group include those with professional and/or academic 
backgrounds in emergency response and preparedness. 
 Members who reviewed and tested one or both instruments included: 
Dr. Louise Comfort, Professor, University of Pittsburgh 
Dr. Phyllis Coontz, Professor, University of Pittsburgh 
Dr. Aaron Swoboda, Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh 
Dr. Chester Newland, Professor, University of Southern California 
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Dr. Ross Clayton, Dean Emeritus, University of Southern California 
Dr. Dan Haverty, Chief Assistant Deputy Director, California Office of Homeland 
Security 
Battalion Chief Jim Woodward (Ret.), California Office of Homeland Security 
Sgt. Major B.J. Bjornson (Ret.), California Office of Homeland Security 
Captain Dan Bout, California Office of Homeland Security 
Once the final instruments were created, expert interviews were conducted with the 
following representatives between February and June 2007: 
a. Six county disaster coordinators, representing each Regional Emergency Operation 
Center (REOC) district.  The counties interviewed were: 
1. Placer County (Inland Region)--Rui Cunha, Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
2. Sacramento County (Inland Region)--Rick Martinez, Emergency 
Operations Coordinator 
3. Yolo County (Inland Region)--Bill Martin, Emergency Services 
Manager 
4. San Francisco County (Coastal Region)--Michael McKinley, Senior 
Emergency Planner, City and County of San Francisco, Office of 
Emergency Services and Homeland Security 
5. Alameda County (Coastal Region)--Jan McClellan, Emergency 
Services Coordinator 
6. San Diego County (Southern Region)--Karen Parker, Emergency 
Services Coordinator 
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b. Three regional administrators 
1. Inland Regional Branch--Charlie Wynne, Regional Administrator 
2. Coastal Regional Branch--Rich Eisner (retired), former Regional 
Administrator 
3. Southern Regional Branch--Steve Sellers, Regional Administrator 
c. Three local disaster coordinators (one per region) 
1. Southern Region--Ellis Stanley, General Manager, City of Los 
Angeles Emergency Preparedness Department 
2. Coastal Region--Tracy Hein, Emergency Services Manager, City of 
Novato 
3. Inland Region--Rainer Streib, Emergency Services Coordinator, 
Emergency Preparedness Office Administrative Services Division, 
City of Fresno 
d. One senior representative from each of the following State organizations: 
1. CA Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
General Jack Hagan, Director, Homeland Security Directorate, 
former Deputy Director of Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Team 
2. CA Governor’s Office of Emergency Services 
Henry Renteria, Director 
3. CA Department of Technology Services 
P.K. Agarwal, Director 
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While the interviewees are identified above, because of the sensitivity of the responses, an 
undisclosed random number is assigned to the participants to protect their identity, if directly 
quoted in this report.  The researcher interviewed each of the aforementioned in person.  The 
interviews were digitally recorded (audio only) and transcribed. 
All attempts were made to avoid the common failings which Meuser and Nagel identified: 
an “expert” proving not to be an actual expert on the subject matter, an expert discusses internal 
matters instead of interview topic, an expert changes between role of expert and private person, or 
an expert providing a “lecture” instead of answering the question (Uwe, 2002, p.89).  The major 
approach is to interview the “right” person.  In consultation with CA Department of Homeland 
Security senior officials, the identified people were interviewed because of their positive 
reputation within the California emergency preparedness and response communities and their 
proven expertise within the field. 
Surveys were conducted at final planning conferences for the 2006 Golden Guardian  
emergency preparedness exercise. Golden Guardian is a statewide exercise in California to test 
and strengthen emergency response capabilities at the local, regional, and state levels.  It 
comprises at least three different components--seminars, tabletop exercises, and a two-day, 
statewide exercise.  The exercises are sponsored by the California Homeland Security Exercise 
and Evaluation Program, California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, and the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness. 
The survey was disseminated to attendees at three final planning conferences: Southern 
Region in San Bernardino (September 27, 2006), Coastal Region in Oakland (October 25, 2006), 
and the state in Sacramento (October 5, 2006).  The researcher directly administered the survey at 
two of the conferences while a senior CA OHS administered the survey to one of the regions.  
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Originally, four final planning conferences were expected to participate in the survey.  The 
fourth meeting was held in Fresno with less than ten emergency managers or coordinators 
attending.  The researcher decided that, because of distance and time necessary to obtain the 
information with such a small turn out, it was not practical to survey these members.   
Of the first three conferences, senior state, county and local disaster coordinators attending 
those meetings were surveyed, with 147 participants responding (response rate of 75% [147 
responses from 196 surveyed]).  The stakeholders were from these disciplines:
Fire Service        Law Enforcement 
Emergency Management    Emergency Medical Services 
Public Work      Hazmat 
Health Care      Public Safety Communications 
Government Administration 
  The research instruments were created to maximize response rate and participant 
openness through designing and testing the instruments with academicians and governmental 
officials who engage in emergency management activities.  In about a one-year time frame, the 
data were collected.  
3.4.  PROCESSING OF INFORMATION AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
 Data for the study was collected through semi-structured interviews and a survey. 
Interviews 
The interviews took place during a five-month period.  In total, fifteen people were 
interviewed across each level of government to gain an understanding of how factors affect 
emergency preparedness within the State of California.  Notes were taken during the structured 
interviews, and all of the interviews were digitally recorded for analysis purposes.  The 
interviews were conducted in person by the researcher and lasted from approximately 45 minutes 
to 90 minutes.  The interviews were transcribed and coded before analysis.  The survey 
quantifies the study. 
The interviews were coded using a thematic technique because group comparisons are 
made in relation to specific issues.  The groups that were studied and the levels of government 
were derived from the research question on emergency management in California.  The data 
were collected through semi-structured interviews where the same base questions were asked to 
each informant.  This allows comparability to take place among the defined topics.  This 
approach meets the criteria as outlined by Uwe Flick in An Introduction to Qualitative Research 
(2002). 
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 Other coding strategies were considered but were determined not appropriate for this 
study.  Theoretical coding, with open coding, axial coding, and selective coding, was not 
appropriate.  Since four distinct themes were explored, no one interview would have contained 
enough data to warrant this approach.  Had the research only focused on one area of study, then 
synthesizing the data through this approach could lead to a grounded theory about one particular 
aspect.  Qualitative content analysis was not a viable option either as the categories were created 
based on the content of the text as opposed to the researcher identifying them before hand and 
then fitting the remarks into the categories. 
Survey  
The survey was designed and tested to take each respondent about ten to twelve minutes 
to fill out.  The majority of the questions ranked a response on a numeric scale from zero to five 
to gain a better understanding of frequency and effectiveness of the interactions at different 
levels of state and local government.  On the ranking, one (1) was “not at all” frequent or 
effective and five (5) was “very” frequent or effective; a zero (0) indicated that the question does 
not apply.  The end of the survey contained six (6) demographic questions.  Not all of those 
surveyed answered each question.   
For the demographic questions, in five cases, respondents marked two responses for 
which sector they worked--“county” and “city/local.”  When entering the data, the research 
included those five respondents (numbers 57, 100, 128, 134 and 141 from San Francisco), as 
“city/local” entries.  This was done for several reasons.  First, these representatives came from 
governmental organizations that had a city/county designation, meaning the responsibilities and 
obligations of these two distinctions are merged into one jurisdiction as both a municipal 
corporation and a state administrative division. Second, the mean of their collective responses 
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 tended to be more common with the other “city/local” respondents as opposed to the “county” 
respondents. 
The mean, median and mode was calculated, and correlations were conducted. 
 There were 147 respondents to the survey out of 196 experts surveyed.  The survey had a 
75% response rate.  Of those respondents, 28.6% were from the State level, 26.5% were from the 
county level, and 12.9% were from the local level.  A complete list is described in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Frequency of Response by Sector. 
 SECTOR 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No Response 16 10.9 10.9 10.9 
  City 19 12.9 12.9 23.8 
  County 39 26.5 26.5 50.3 
  Federal 9 6.1 6.1 56.5 
  Nonprofit 8 5.4 5.4 61.9 
  Private Company 6 4.1 4.1 66.0 
  Special District 8 5.4 5.4 71.4 
  State 42 28.6 28.6 100.0 
  Total 147 100.0 100.0   
 
 Since emergency management is still largely a male-dominated field (although this is 
fortunately changing), the researcher did not seek out female-specific informants, but instead 
relied on the Golden Guardian planning session selection process.  Approximately twenty 
percent of the respondents are female. 
Table 4.  Frequency of Response by Gender. 
 GENDER 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No Response 17 11.6 11.6 11.6 
  Female 29 19.7 19.7 31.3 
  Male 101 68.7 68.7 100.0 
  Total 147 100.0 100.0   
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 Even though all of the respondents are involved with the emergency management system, 
the researcher inquired as to the field of occupation to obtain a better understanding of their 
backgrounds.  The largest numbers of informants are involved with law enforcement (18.4%), 
emergency management (15.6%) and fire service (14.3%).  This was expected since the focus of 
the Golden Guardian exercise is on-the-ground simulations that require first responders and the 
activation of the emergency management system. 
Table 5.  Frequency of Response by Field of Occupation. 
 Field of Occupation 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Emergency Management 
23 15.6 15.6 15.6 
  Emergency Medical 
Services 6 4.1 4.1 19.7 
  Fire Service 21 14.3 14.3 34.0 
  Government Agency 5 3.4 3.4 37.4 
  Health Care 10 6.8 6.8 44.2 
  Law Enforcement 27 18.4 18.4 62.6 
  Military 10 6.8 6.8 69.4 
  No Response 20 13.6 13.6 83.0 
  Other 13 8.8 8.8 91.8 
  Public Transportation 7 4.8 4.8 96.6 
  Public Works 5 3.4 3.4 100.0 
  Total 147 100.0 100.0   
 
 The respondents were the correct group to survey as it was comprised of emergency 
managers from throughout the State, but it concentrated on State, county and local respondents 
who belong to the fields most closely associated with preparedness and response activities, 
namely field operations (law enforcement and fire) and emergency management. 
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 3.5.  SIGNIFICANCE 
 The significance of this duel approach is multifold.  First, it adds to the literature on 
organizational theory and emergency management by investigating intergovernmental 
relationships that are present within a state office through concentrating on the state system from 
field operations to the California Office of Emergency Services.  Second, this study is timely and 
is intended to help shape how government officials are approaching emergency preparedness.  
Finally, this study is intended to identify and suggest ways of overcoming barriers that thwart 
effective emergency preparedness and assist in organizational learning. 
 The number of experts who contributed data to the study was 162 (147 surveyed and 15 
interviewed).  Gender differences are noticeable in the field of emergency management, with just 
under 20% of the surveyed informants and 20% of the interviewed experts (3 female emergency 
mangers of 15 experts interviewed).  The survey was conducted prior to the interviews that 
exemplified and expounded upon the critical quantitative findings.  This approach, and the strong 
sample size, enabled specific conclusions to be drawn. 
 To place the study in a larger context, five hypotheses were created.  The null hypotheses 
suggest that no relationship exists between frequency of the identified factor and effectiveness. 
H0? There is no effect between frequency and effectiveness. 
 The four other hypotheses propose an interaction between frequency and effectiveness 
across each of the four factors studied. 
H1? More frequent personal interactions results in increased effectiveness for emergency 
preparedness and response. 
H2? More frequent official communications results in increased effectiveness for emergency 
preparedness and response. 
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 H3? More frequent interaction with legal policies results in increased effectiveness for 
emergency preparedness and response. 
H4? More frequent interaction with organizational leadership results in increased    
effectiveness for emergency preparedness and response. 
 When t-tests were done, effectiveness was the dependent variable and frequency was the 
independent variable as it is proposed that frequency has a direct affect on effectiveness.  
Correlations were calculated to determine the strength of the relationship between frequency and 
effectiveness of the factors studied. 
This study has many limitations.  First, the experts for the survey were limited to 
participants in the 2006 Golden Guardian statewide training exercise.  For this year, it was 
limited to three counties and a state response.  The emergency planners attended the session 
through invitation only, and the researcher had no influence on who participated in it.  Second, 
interviews were conducted with experts in the field who were identified either because of their 
positions within their organizations or their professional expertise.  Third, all of the responses are 
subjective and are not based on one incident.  Therefore, the responses could be biased based on 
interpretation and a particular experience that the expert had.  Given the state-wide approach, this 
could not have been controlled.  Finally, the sample size is large in the aggregate, but smaller 
across levels of government.  Therefore, general conclusions could be drawn from the survey 
results, but, when focused on a particular level of government, weaker conclusions were drawn 
because of the smaller sample size. 
Given these limitations, a comprehensive study was still possible.  The primary question 
could be effectively answered and new understandings of the emergency management system 
were concluded.  The first of these understandings was about personal interactions. 
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 4.0    CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF PERSONAL INTERACTIONS IN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION 
From the very first interviews, the need for personal interactions became evidently clear.  
While some governmental agencies can be perceived to be “bureaucratic” and impersonal, the 
field of emergency management is quite different.  It carries with it the need to humanize 
policies that directly impact communities during times of need.  Therefore, personal interactions 
are created over time and are solidified to understand the personal strengths and abilities of 
counterparts in other communities and other levels of government.  This is done to create a 
system in which resources can be mobilized effectively during times of stress.   
4.2.  DESCRIBING PERSONAL INTERACTIONS 
When asked to describe personal interactions in emergency preparedness and response, 
the reaction was nearly always the same--critical.  As Interviewee 1 responded, “personal 
interactions are probably one of the most critical aspects to responding to emergencies.”  Their 
business focuses on people, and because of that, relationships must be created before an event 
happens.  Informant 6 said that, during trainings in which she participated, this theme was 
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 continually reiterated--“you don’t want to exchange business cards at the scene of an event.”  
The operating rationale is that the system has to function collaboratively through the interactions 
of the different responders and officials and the initial interaction should not be at the time of the 
incident. 
“When you’re preparing communities or organizations for disaster preparedness, 
response and recovery, it’s not about the plans and the documents and the tools that you have to 
do this, it’s about the relationships and about what you establish beforehand in communication 
skills and interaction with them and the personal one-on-one interactions you have with the 
appropriate people,” explained Informant 13. 
The personal interactions allow a transfer of personal knowledge that assists in the 
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation of incidents.  There has to be an understanding 
of how different colleagues respond to stressful environments and when they can contribute to 
the ultimate goals of minimizing casualties and property loss.  This interaction builds trust, 
which is essential for effective networks to transpire, and it facilitates communication.   
4.3.  ON TRUST 
Trust was a reoccurring theme, both through the interviews and in the literature review.  
Trust in the system, which is the procedures and processes found in traditional public 
management, was inherent.  Therefore, most of the experts’ focus was on trust among colleagues 
to make the system work.  After all, Informant 7 proposes that personal interactions are the 
“grease on which all business is done.”  This type of trust is more consistent with relationships 
that are more lateral in nature.  Informant 5, a local emergency planner, reflected: 
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 By virtue of the intensity and the focus of the police and fire 
department…, they're a bit less trusting of somebody that’s dictating 
emergency management procedures [from outside the departments].  So, 
consequently, the interaction with individuals and the proof of trust and 
all the things that go along with that, the understanding of where you fit 
in the scheme of emergency management with police and fire 
departments is very important.  So, that individual intercommunications 
and building trust with that is incredibly important…I think if that trust is 
built up, there's just more of an effort to [have reasonable interactions]. 
In developing this trust, Informant 11 said: 
I think it's a long-term process.  I think part of it has to do with honesty 
and developing credibility with people.  You tell them you're going to do 
something as an official that you follow through with that or have an 
explanation to why it can't happen.  I think you have to be realistic when 
you're calling your promises and your assessments.  You don't want to 
set up an expectation that can’t be rightfully filled or fulfilled.  I think it's 
just developing the ability to talk with people and to communicate on a 
baseline with them.  Having the ability to relate to their circumstance has 
a lot to do with it.  Coming in, in the old adage of, “Hi, I'm from the 
government and I'm here to help,” you know, and I'm sure you’ve heard 
that before, that only goes so far and then people want you to, whether 
they recognize it or realize it or not, they don't want you to necessarily 
feel their pain, but they want you to at least understand that they're in 
turmoil or in trauma and act accordingly.  There has to be a certain 
amount of sensitivity in this job.  You have to understand that people are 
in crisis.  How do you contend with that?  How do you deal with that?  
How do you provide support for that?  You can't treat people like so 
much cattle, you know, there's human conditions here that we have to be 
cognized of and aware of.  They're not just statistics, you know, and that 
the issue of unmasking numbers on death and destruction and casualties, 
that's a statistical gain that's necessary operationally in situation, we need 
that data, but behind that we have to understand there's real human 
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 suffering or in a broader context, there's suffering within the 
environment. 
This suffering causes a stressful environment in which to work.  Emergency managers act 
quickly but they are not immune to hardships that an incident inflicts.  The question then 
becomes, how does one operate under these conditions while still keeping focused on their 
responsibilities and working collectively?  Informants again commented on the need for frequent 
interactions to create better working environments and to know who the players are before an 
incident occurs.  Not having a working knowledge of the respondents creates unnecessary delays 
in an incident where literally every second counts.   Informant 1 gave this example: 
[W]e just had a major fire this past September…the fire started on 
Bureau of Land Management land…and it transitioned from there to U.S. 
Forest Service land, and for a period of time, threatened State-
responsibility area.  So there were three fire entities potentially.  BLM 
principally, while they have fire entities, they’re not as much into the 
business of fighting the fire as they are managing the forests and 
managing the property.  All of those three entities, BLM, U.S. Forest 
Service, and then also CAL FIRE, formerly CDF, basically had to work 
together very early on in that fire.  It takes a little bit of time if you 
haven’t worked with each other to figure out what capabilities and 
limitations you have and what the primary jurisdiction is going to allow 
you to do as it relates to fighting the fire.  And that time naturally 
impacts the employment of resources because clearly from a local 
perspective, we were prepared with local agencies to get in and assist in 
putting out the fire as soon as we could, but the reality is a lot of the 
ground that was where the fire was burning was actually Forest Service 
ground.  And Forest Service had, from their perspective, pretty good 
control on the fire and they were shaping in a certain direction.  So it 
takes some time to get those things sorted out from not just an 
operational perspective, but just also a personal perspective of the 
firefighter who is in charge from the Forest Service communicating with 
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 the firefighter who is in charge from CAL FIRE communicating with any 
of the other local entities who were participating in the fire.  Instances 
where we have agencies that have worked together routinely, they’re 
usually able to get past that real quick and very, very quickly decide that, 
yes, I know this fire chief right here is an absolute competent incident 
commander and everybody knows that, all of the local jurisdictions 
around them know that.  And so whatever he says, we’re going to do and 
we give up that command of control very, very quickly potentially. 
Informant 2 commented that more interaction leads to a better working relationship.  This 
interaction, in turn, reduces stress when an incident occurs because the people already know each 
other.  Stress is certainly present, but remarks from Informant 14 suggested that it may not be 
negative, simply part of the job.  He explained that if he did not enjoy what he was doing, he 
would not be there, and that multiple years of training and experience allow him to react in a 
positive way to plan for and respond to incidents. 
4.4.  ON STRESS 
So the larger question becomes, if the emergency management operates under a 
potentially stressful environment, how do the people in the field successfully operate?  As 
Informant 7 commented, the world is a chaotic place, sometimes more chaotic than others.  And 
in order to have the best outcome, one must manage the chaos and not control it.  His approach 
is to 
[surround] yourself with good people, [train] as a team, [listen] to your 
people and [understand] early on what you really have control over and 
what you don't.  You've got to learn what you can really control and what 
you can't control and what is important and what is not important, and the 
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 biggest part is really putting together a good team, surrounding yourself by 
smart people, and listening to them. 
This type of interaction emerges in a variety of ways.  The most evident are trainings and 
conferences, but certainly relationships also emerge when responding to an incident.  Emergency 
managers also provide opportunities to build relationships outside of formal events.  
Informants talked about the importance of learning from other emergency managers and 
training exercises.  Multiple informants shared the importance of mentoring each other in both 
applying policies and responding to incidents.  This was true with more experienced managers 
mentoring less experienced, but it also existed among managers who had similar years of 
experience.  The significance of training together was also mentioned multiple times.   
Responding to an incident together is another way to strengthen relationships.  While the 
interactions that transpire during non-response times are critical in initiating and maintaining the 
relationships, responding to an incident reveals human characteristics that cannot be simulated 
during training exercises because of the intense, emotional connection to the response.  As 
Informant 13 remarked, “Obviously when you see them under pressure and under a stressful 
situation, it reveals a lot about their ability to handle stress and deal with it, and you learn a lot 
about people by going through an event.” 
4.5.  ON LEARNING 
Learning takes place beyond responding to emergencies.  Certainly there is a need to 
learn from each other for personal and professional development, but the organization must also 
learn.  Learning takes place through having valid and open information, the opportunity to make 
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 free, yet informed, decisions, and a commitment within the organizational structure to make the 
necessary adaptations to improve outcomes.  California exemplifies these criteria and continually 
learns from past experiences to strengthen it’s emergency response procedures.  A clear example 
is how the system has changed over time.  Prior to the 1950s, the emergency response activities 
took a local-only approach.  In the 1950s, that began to change as the benefits of working 
together and sharing resources became evidently clear.  That led to mutual aid agreements 
among neighboring jurisdictions.  In the 1970s, the incident command system (ICS) identified 
the on-the-ground commander to facilitate incident response.  By the 1990s, the Standardized 
Emergency Response System merged the successes of ICS with standardized equipment and 
operating language so that emergency managers and responders state-wide utilized the same 
techniques and strategies.  SEMS then led the National Incident Management System to create a 
national strategic plan. 
Organizational learning takes place through critically analyzing the response to incidents, 
whether through training exercises or responding to an incident itself.  As a demonstration of 
how organizational learning takes place during training exercises, consider this example from 
Informant 1: 
For our mass-casualty incident exercise in 2006, that specific phase that 
we hosted up in the Tahoe Basin, that exercise, believe it or not, it was 
conducted on May 3rd and 4th of 2006, this past year, and on May 21st, we 
had a substantial accident on I-80.  The focus of the exercise that we did 
up in the Tahoe Basin was on a mass-casualty incident and that specific 
incident we had - the scenario was such that we had a bus accident and a 
lot of individuals were hurt.  There was a truck carrying explosives that 
fundamentally was highjacked and created the accident.  And then the 
highjackers went into a building, held themselves up, had explosives and 
all of those types of things, so we got everybody all playing now.  Don’t 
worry about the scenario, you don’t ever have to worry about that.  You 
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 just have everyone playing and you’ve got them doing the stuff that they 
need to do.   
Well, on May 21st, we had three buses coming down the hill; one put on 
its brakes, hit a car, another one plowed in behind it, and a third one 
plowed in behind it.  And in an instant, we had 90 casualties as a result of 
three buses.  That same team that had played in that exercise three weeks 
before that fundamentally got together and managed the evacuation of 32 
of those 90 casualties from that scene.  The remaining 60 were not 
injured in any significant way and we were able to evacuate them to a 
shelter until further transportation could be made available by the bus 
company to get them back on the road and on the way.  The tracking of 
those 30 patients, many of them were family members to the individuals 
who were fine and so tracking those patients was a pretty significant 
issue. And so we had to track all of that and make sure that we had 
information available.  We had exercised some of that in the exercise just 
three weeks earlier, so it was clearly an instance where one - the same 
team that did the exercise managed the real incident.  It was probably one 
of the largest mass casualty incidents that Placer County has ever 
participated in, and it couldn’t have gone better.  And clearly, the 
relationships that were established in that incident made a very, very big 
difference.  
There were actually about five accidents in about a 30-minute timeframe 
on that stretch of I-80, the bus accident, of course, being the most 
significant of those.  So the conditions were different and the points that 
came out in the after-action review following the real incident were a 
little bit different than the ones we experienced after the exercise.   
I will tell you some of the command and control issues that we 
experienced during the exercise we did not experience during the real 
incident and there’s a couple of reasons for that.  One, it’s very, very 
difficult to command and control an exercise incident on the real 
communications capabilities because fundamentally it’s disruptive to 
what’s going on for real out there.  So there are always some 
observations in exercises that you always - that you write down, you take 
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 note of, but you’re never absolutely sure that in fact if it was real that it 
would in fact be a problem because you’re not using the real system all 
the time.  So in that specific instance, there was enough difference in the 
observations that we saw in early May versus the observation that we 
saw on the 21st that I didn’t draw a direct correlation between the two.  
And again, the environmental conditions were quite different as well.  
So, I’m going to tell you, we had not gotten to the process of fixing 
issues that we observed in early May so that those issues were fixed by 
the 21st.  So there was the potential, certainly, for some of those 
observations that we had seen on the 3rd and the 4th to crop up again on 
the 21st.  But the reality is we didn’t see similar issues.  The issues were 
very different.  And, to be honest, the issues that we saw on the 21st were 
more weather related than anything else.  It was a really bad rainstorm, I 
can just tell you that right now.  And it was pretty - some of the 
observations were pretty simple things, simple such as making sure that 
you’re not taking notes on normal paper in the rain because if you’re 
tracking individual patients and where they’re going on regular paper 
when it’s raining, the ink bleeds if it gets wet. 
  
In this instance, the training was about to identify misalignment among the senior emergency 
managers and responders to minimize command and control issues that existed within their 
relationships.  Even though the actual incident occurred a few weeks later, they were able to 
learn from the exercise and make the administrative shifts necessary to respond quickly and 
effectively to a similar mass-causality scenario.  The response to the actual incident would not 
have been as successful had the players in the training exercise not learned how to collectively 
improve their response efforts. 
 82
 4.6.  ON KNOWING ONE’S COLLEAGUES 
A recurrent theme in the interviews was the need to know one’s colleagues.  This goes 
beyond generic relationships.  Instead, it is a deeper knowledge of how others operate, whom 
they represent, and what skill sets the individuals are best capable of handling. 
 Informant 9 suggested: 
The key, I think one of the keys in the personal interactions is knowing 
who is the best person to do certain things.  I am not always that person, 
the Mayor may not always be that person all of the time, the Fire Chief 
may not be that person, but it may be a community leader, it may be a 
school teacher or a school principal that would be the person. 
Clearly, thinking in those terms is incredibly powerful as it relinquishes some control to 
who is best at completing the mission at hand.  Consider this illustration from Informant 2: 
The thing that comes to mind is there was an explosion in [City X] a 
couple of years ago, a pipeline explosion where [a utility district] was 
drilling - was putting in - there was some new pipeline being put in or 
fitted or something and they hit a gas main and it caused this huge 
explosion that killed three people I believe it was, and this is a scene 
versus EOC, but there were every fire and law agency showed up on the 
scene just because they wanted to be there to help, and a couple of 
comments related to that was that the people from the lead fire agency 
there showed up and said - man, it was nice knowing the people when we 
got there - and they were speaking of law enforcement and other people 
that they had worked with and met  through this whole recent process of 
working together in the Homeland Security grants and trainings that we 
had all been doing together, so that was a comment they had made.  They 
also, in that particular case, fire - they sent in a confined-space team to 
take the bodies out and the person that was the lead of that team was 
from a different fire agency than the two people that went in.  That is 
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 unheard of.  I was told that is unheard of.  That would have never been 
done years ago. 
In this case, it was through training exercises that relationships were formed that resulted 
in a different team leader to undertake the gruesome task of recovery.  Because of the pre-
established relationships, a collective response could be undertaken. 
Informant 12 remarked: 
If we don’t get the background of the people, the flavor of the situation, 
know what it is they represent, who they represent, why they represent 
them, we sometimes miss the point they’re trying to make, so that 
personal interactions, knowing their background, knowing the fact that 
you’re working for Company Y or Community X or city Z, and a little 
bit about what your perspectives are help you interact, but it also helps 
you define what the issue is and how it affects them so therefore how it 
affects them will affect you in the end result. 
The more that one knows about what other colleagues offer plus the more ways in which 
they can interact leads to a more successful approach to an incident.  In getting to know each 
other better, cultural differences among departments become known.  Arguably the most visible 
are the cultural norms between law enforcement and the fire department personnel.  Both are 
tasked with protecting the public, but commonly in different roles.  Consequently, they are 
trained differently and have different internal cultures. 
Understanding and melding these divergent approaches is not easy.  It requires 
commitment and a willingness from senior officials to make it possible.  Informant 5 suggested 
that there is a cultural shift taking place within departments for the requirements of staff 
positions.  He used the example of the Fire Captain’s examination. 
In order to be Captain, one must complete an examination to test technical knowledge 
and situational judgment.  The evaluation also comprises questions on emergency management.  
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 This component is not inherent in lower rank hiring or promotion.  However, the critical 
importance of these skill sets is beginning to change the training of these responders.  Informant 
5 said: 
If you take the Captain’s test for the fire department, unfortunately that 
test is knowing the emergency management plan of the city and 
operations of the fire branch of Emergency Operations Center, and right 
now, that’s all very, very foreign to 90 percent of the fire officers and 
police officers in the street.  It's not part of their duties, but the way the 
world’s changing, that’s [changing for fire departments and law 
enforcement, and for] [the Department of Public Works], folks in 
construction engineering, Care and Shelter branches, people within those 
disciplines, the same thing.  They have to put their emergency managers 
hats on and understand the collaboration and the inner operability and the 
human connections that have to go on to make it work. 
More generally, Informant 2 illustrated a growing trend to value interpersonal 
relationships by suggesting that “people are starting to realize there really is a benefit to knowing 
who you are talking to when you go out on that scene or you are in an EOC environment.”  
Without this interaction, Informant 6 indicated that “if you have people that are reluctant to 
speak to other people or they don’t want to evaluate their opinion, that could definitely get in the 
way of doing good.” 
Yet, working well together goes beyond just knowing one’s abilities.  The importance of 
each of the team players must be recognized.  Part of this is putting aside egos and emotional 
barriers that can get in the way of having a collaborative response.  Informant 2 shared this story 
from a training exercise in which he participated: 
I had the good fortune to go through a training where they used this 
training tape, but then it just so happens that the pilot was the keynote 
speaker the next day at this conference that I was attending, and one of 
the things he said, and that they talk about was that not one command 
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 was giving during that whole episode where they were up in the air.  
They all worked together as a team.  They put down the barriers, they put 
down the - I am God's gift to the world attitudes - if, you know, 
somebody has those, and you really need to do that in emergency 
management.  You have to recognize that we are all an important part of 
the response and we all have important roles and nobody's role is more 
important than anybody else's.  You just have to work together. I am a 
firm believer that if something hits that we can't - like a Katrina, that you 
can't possibly predict, that it is going to be team work and common sense 
that get you through a lot of what that is and team work is going to be 
critical. 
Knowing colleagues is critical in establishing personal interactions that strengthen 
emergency response.  Yet, the benefits of interactions are not without hindrances. 
4.7.  ON HINDRANCES 
Personal interactions, as important as they are to create collective and collaborative 
responses, can have a negative impact when those in authority do not take into consideration the 
expertise in the field, the chain of command is not adhered to, certain agencies are given 
preference because of the relationships between people within those organizations, or emergency 
managers are not given the authority that they actually carry.  While the informants were vague 
in their responses, it was evidently clear that, one, they had opinions of how personal interactions 
can hinder response efforts, and, two, that they experienced impacts first hand.   
Informant 1 identified occasions when individuals with authority, because of their 
ranking within the emergency response system, can be disruptive to response efforts when they 
think that their approach is best without regard to other individual expertise. 
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 There are occasions where an individual or individuals are disruptive 
because of their method of communication potentially with other 
members of a team.  The reality is there are certainly occasions where an 
individual has the authority and the jurisdiction to establish process or 
procedures as it relates to a response and, as a result, has all of the 
authority in the world to be in command but is doing that to the detriment 
of the full team, as an example.  It can occur.  If someone’s real, real 
hard-headed about how something’s going to get done and they are 
authority and they’re being in charge and not taking input from any of 
the other technical experts that are around them, then there is potential 
for certain aspects to not get done and not get done right. 
 This description was clearly based on this manager’s previous experiences.  Yet, through 
the constant evolution of the emergency response system, the incident command system, SEMS 
and NIMS, as discussed in other chapters, attempts to limit this experience by creating open 
systems where a unified command approach can diminish some of the “hard-headedness” as 
suggested above. 
Informant 3 took a different angle.  Instead of an authoritative approach, the humanness 
of the system could yield preference to assisting another agency or organization with whom one 
has a closer relationship.  They said: 
Sure, the high road would be no, we’d all do what we have to, and I think 
for the most part we would.  We know what’s got to be done.  If I don’t 
like you, I’m still going to do the best I can to assist.  I think that’s just 
being an adult when you’re working.  It may also make you lean towards 
helping another agency over one if you have a better relationship.  You 
know, with one you’re saying they need this, but as much as those 
relationships are there, you really have to look at what’s the priority.  
Does this group really need it more than this group, whether I like you a 
lot, but this is the one that’s actually got the higher priority?  That’s what 
we’re trained to try and do.  Being people, you can always be fallible, but 
that’s really what you’re trying to do is you’re trying to prioritize what 
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 your resources are and not let that friendship take resources that should 
be going somewhere else. 
 Informant 5 gave a different example on the same theme.  Instead of it being one agency 
providing assistance to another agency because of the personal connection, this example was a 
matter of jumping chain of command because of a perceived faster response. 
I think sometimes people take that personal interactions step a little bit 
too far, and rather than going on set protocols - we have a duty officer 
position, and our duty officer is supposed to speak to Hazmat duty 
officer or the emergency medical services duty officer, the City of San 
Diego duty officer, but a lot of times, people that have worked here for a 
long time, rather than going duty officer to duty officer, they’ll just call 
their friend in O.E.S.  I think that communication can be hindered that 
way. 
Both of these examples are unfortunate because the system can only be efficient when it 
runs on processes that are mutually agreed upon, be it through the allocation of resources or how 
the work gets done.  Again, attempts are made to address priorities in a fair manner through the 
systematic approach of SEMS and NIMS.  Some examples, however, provided scenarios where, 
even when a structure is in place, the personal interactions can have a preferential outcome.   
Informant 8, for example, provided a scenario where human resources were allocated to 
assist with response efforts in a training exercise, yet, because they were not direct members of 
the different level of government, the staff members were not utilized to their best potential. 
We have it in an exercise where typically my staff is working out of the 
county and I have to intervene because they don’t see them as the right 
player.  It happens pretty much in certain counties.  They are not sure of 
the State role and responsibility even though we have trained them over 
the years.  They end up getting our person in there and putting them in 
front of the computer and have them doing data entry and I have to call 
the Director of Emergency Operations Center and say that is not proper 
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 and we need to get him in the right role there and agency representative 
there basically. 
 In this case, there may simply not be a structural approach to overcome the different 
perceptions that may exist when emergency managers or staff members from different levels of 
government within the system are deployed.  Informant 11 gave the most general response when 
they identified that: 
There is always somebody who you rub the wrong way or you stepped 
on their toes some place and you didn't even know it or you knew it and 
you stepped on their toes.  There's always going to be somebody that you 
don't 100 percent get along with.  The point is that you put that aside and 
work with them. 
 In this case, there is very little training or few policy directives that can simply overcome 
the human factors in the system where two people do not typically get along, but who can put 
aside their differences to get the job done.  This is suggestive of the values inherit in the system 
where having a positive resolution to an incident supersedes the human factors that may cause 
two people to disagree. 
 Personal interactions can hinder preparedness and response efforts, but the system tries to 
minimize those occurrences, and where it cannot be mandated, the values inherent in the system 
overcome the pettiness that may exist.  
4.8.  QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 The importance of personal interactions was evident in the survey responses of 147 
emergency managers.  When asked to rate the frequency of interactions and their effectiveness, 
the results across all levels of government had the same trend.  The effectiveness of personal 
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 interactions was congruent with the frequency of interactions.  Quite simply, the more frequent 
the interactions, the more effective they were perceived to be.  This trend is true for both 
preparedness and response as reflected in the frequency and valid percent Tables 6 
(Preparedness) and 7 (Response) and as visually displayed by box plots in Figures 7 
(Preparedness) and 8 (Response). 
 To help make sense of the chart, the dark black horizontal line was the median response; 
the gold boxes on top of and/or below the median response is one standard deviation away from 
the mean and the vertical lines are two standard deviations away from the mean.  The dots are 
outliers. 
 These charts visually demonstrate how closely related the frequency and effectiveness 
responses were for each level of government.  To confirm the strong relationships among the 
variables, the Pearson Correlation was calculated.  Within each level of government, a significant 
relationship was found at the 0.01 level for a 2-tailed test.  Greater detail can be found in Tables 
9 and 10. 
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 Table 6.  The number and valid percent at each level of government for personal interactions in preparing for 
an incident. 
KEY:  The original questions asked: 
 
1A: “In preparing for an emergency, how frequent are your personal interactions with:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
1B: “In preparing for an emergency, how effective are your personal interactions with:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable; N=the number of 
responses; %=the valid percent; Missing=the number of respondents who did not answer the question; Total=the 
total number and valid percent of responses. 
Personal Interactions--Preparedness                     
  Scale 5 4 3 2 1 0 Missing Total 
   N % N % N % N % N % N % N N % 
                                  
OES Frequency 34 23.4 15 10.3 29 20.0 35 24.1 28 19.3 4 2.8 2 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 29 20.3 16 11.2 48 33.6 15 10.5 12 8.4 23 16.1 4 147 100.0
                           
                                  
SOC Frequency 5 3.5 10 7.1 13 9.2 45 31.9 61 43.3 7 5.0 6 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 11 7.9 9 6.4 36 25.7 17 12.1 24 17.1 43 30.7 7 147 100.0
                                  
                           
REOC Frequency 11 7.7 8 5.6 17 12.0 59 41.5 41 28.9 6 4.2 5 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 15 10.7 19 13.6 39 27.9 21 15.0 18 12.9 28 20.0 7 147 100.0
                           
                                  
EOC Frequency 34 24.3 28 20.0 31 22.1 26 18.6 15 10.7 6 4.3 7 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 39 28.5 22 16.1 40 29.2 10 7.3 8 5.8 18 13.1 10 147 100.0
                                  
                           
FOPS Frequency 43 29.9 21 14.6 20 13.9 33 22.9 17 11.8 10 6.9 3 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 46 32.4 26 18.3 32 22.5 10 7.0 5 3.5 23 16.2 5 147 100.0
                           
                                  
UTIL Frequency 14 9.9 10 7.0 20 14.1 39 27.5 38 26.8 21 14.8 5 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 16 11.3 19 13.4 33 23.2 17 12.0 17 12.0 40 28.2 5 147 100.0
                                  
                           
NON Frequency 14 9.7 8 5.5 23 15.9 41 28.3 38 26.2 21 14.5 2 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 22 15.3 18 12.5 36 25.0 11 7.6 20 13.9 37 25.7 3 147 100.0
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 Table 7.  The number and valid percent at each level of government for personal interactions in responding 
to an incident. 
KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
6A: “In responding to an emergency, how frequent are your personal interactions with:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
6B: “In responding to an emergency, how effective are your personal interactions with:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable; N=the number of 
responses; %=the valid percent; Missing=the number of respondents who did not answer the question; Total=the 
total number and valid percent of responses. 
Personal Interactions--Response                       
  Scale 5 4 3 2 1 0 Missing Total 
   N % N % N % N % N % N % N N % 
                                  
OES Frequency 27 20.5 16 12.1 20 15.2 24 18.2 28 21.2 17 12.9 15 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 26 19.7 15 11.4 29 22.0 17 12.9 18 13.6 27 20.5 15 147 100.0
                           
                                  
SOC Frequency 15 11.7 14 10.9 19 14.8 20 15.6 41 32.0 19 14.8 19 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 16 12.4 13 10.1 24 18.6 14 10.9 23 17.8 39 30.2 18 147 100.0
                                  
                           
REOC Frequency 19 14.5 18 13.7 16 12.2 29 22.1 34 26.0 15 11.5 16 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 24 18.3 16 12.2 29 22.1 13 9.9 20 15.3 29 22.1 16 147 100.0
                           
                                  
EOC Frequency 33 25.0 19 14.4 27 20.5 20 15.2 18 13.6 15 11.4 15 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 33 25.4 24 18.5 34 26.2 10 7.7 12 9.2 17 13.1 17 147 100.0
                                  
                           
FOPS Frequency 46 35.9 22 17.2 18 14.1 16 12.5 15 11.7 11 8.6 19 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 45 35.2 24 18.8 27 21.1 5 3.9 11 8.6 16 12.5 19 147 100.0
                           
                                  
UTIL Frequency 14 10.9 15 11.6 20 15.5 24 18.6 34 26.4 22 17.1 18 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 18 14.0 14 10.9 34 26.4 7 5.4 21 16.3 35 27.1 18 147 100.0
                                  
                           
NON Frequency 12 9.2 8 6.2 24 18.5 27 20.8 33 25.4 26 20.0 17 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 17 13.0 13 9.9 28 21.4 14 10.7 22 16.8 37 28.2 16 147 100.0
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 KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
1A: “In preparing for an emergency, how frequent are your personal interactions with:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
1B: “In preparing for an emergency, how effective are your personal interactions with:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
See Appendix 6: Survey Instrument for the original survey listing. 
 
Figure 7.  Personal interactions Box Plot--Preparedness. 
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 KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
6A: “In responding to an emergency, how frequent are your personal interactions with:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
6B: “In responding to an emergency, how effective are your personal interactions with:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
See Appendix 6: Survey Instrument for the original survey listing. 
 
  
Figure 8.  Personal interactions Box Plot--Response. 
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  To look more deeply at the data, t-tests were conducted between state and county 
respondents.  These were the only two levels of respondents studied deeper through this method 
as they were the largest of population sizes.  From this test, eight significant differences emerged 
as identified in Table 8. 
Table 8.  Difference of means between state and county responses. 
Factor Governmental Level 
Frequency or 
Effectiveness 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(equal variances assumed) 
Personal interactions-Preparedness State Operation Center Frequency .000 
 Regional Emergency Operation Center Frequency .023 
 Emergency Operation Center Frequency .000 
 Utilities Frequency .008 
Personal interactions--Response State Operation Center Frequency .006 
 Utilities Frequency .000 
 Utilities Effectiveness .036 
 Nonprofits Frequency .004 
  
It is not surprising that the frequency across different levels of government is 
significantly different for state and county respondents.  Interestingly, this difference of 
frequency was not found for interactions with the California Office of Emergency Services, Field 
Operations, and Nonprofit Organizations for preparing for emergencies.  When responding to an 
incident, state and county emergency managers have similar frequency and perceived 
effectiveness across all levels of government except at the State Operation Center, where the 
state emergency managers have a direct role with utility companies and nonprofit organizations, 
where the county emergency managers would have a greater interest. 
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 Table 9.  Correlations for frequency of personal interaction and effectiveness across levels of government or 
sector for preparedness activities. 
 
For PREPAREDNESS Activities   
Level of Government or Sector Pearson Correlation Significance 
Office of Emergency Services (State-level) .680** .000 
State Operation Center (State-level) .666** .000 
Regional Level .694** .000 
Operational Level .747** .000 
Field Level .680** .000 
Utility Companies .826** .000 
Nonprofit Organizations .756** .000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 10.  Correlations for frequency of personal interaction and effectiveness across levels of government or 
sector for response activities. 
 
For RESPONSE Activities   
Level of Government or Sector Pearson Correlation Significance 
Office of Emergency Services (State-level) .883** .000 
State Operation Center (State-level) .862** .000 
Regional Level .794** .000 
Operational Level .801** .000 
Field Level .848** .000 
Utility Companies .814** .000 
Nonprofit Organizations .815** .000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
In analyzing the correlations, it is important to note that each level of government or 
sector has significant relationships.  This is true with the other factors as well--leadership, legal 
structures and communication.  In part, this can be explained through similar training activities 
that the emergency managers undergo and the self-selection of the group studied.  But, more 
importantly, it illustrates the continual need for frequent interaction to receive effective results. 
From comparing Tables 9 and 10 above, it is interesting to point out, that while there is 
significance, the relationship is stronger during response activities.  This suggests that 
relationships are even more important when responding to incidents than during preparedness 
 96
 phases.  Yet, it is during preparedness activities that the relationships begin to emerge and 
develop. 
4.9.  CONCLUSION 
 Out of the four factors studied, personal interactions was the most discussed.  How it 
affects preparedness and response efforts is simple--it is critical.  Constructive interactions that 
evolve over time foster environments of trust and support that are needed when working under 
stressful conditions.  The fundamental component of organizational learning starts at this level 
and strengthens as people becomes more confident in working with their colleagues.  To help 
create this collegiality, strong leadership is needed. 
 Personal interactions directly affect preparedness and response efforts.  The largest 
contribution is the creation of trust.   Trust is essential in the structural procedures, including 
training exercises, laws, established procedures and policies, as well as in the competency of 
emergency managers across all levels of government.  This is created through learning from past 
experiences and creating opportunities for emergency managers to work together.  By having 
trust within the organization, stress of the incident can be managed through support among 
colleagues.  This requires open relationships where all individuals understand their roles within 
the system, allowing the system to work as designed.  As discussed in the next chapter, 
leadership plays an important part in this awareness. 
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 5.0    CHAPTER 5:  THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION  
Leadership, as with all organizations, is an important component to the success or failure 
of an organization’s objectives or mission.  Leaders create change. Informant 1 said to try “to 
turn a condition of chaos into a condition of normality.” 
5.2.  ON QUALITIES  
When asked to identify qualities that leaders must have, the informants gave similar 
responses, which were not unexpected; these stressed vision, setting goals, listening, integrity, 
taking charge, authority, confidence, decisiveness, and empowerment.  There were also a few 
notable exceptions, like to “stay out of the way.” 
In this case, Informant 13 suggested that the system has to be allowed to work.  This is 
not a matter of just hoping that everything will come together, but to do the necessary planning 
and training so that, when an incident occurs, the system can not only respond but also have the 
resources to do so effectively.  This is not an easy task as the decision makers may have 
alternative ideas on what should be given priority.  Informant 9 said that “it is just important that 
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 we never settle.”  By this, they meant that it is important to keep moving forward and to keep 
fighting to improve the system. 
A suggested common impression of emergency managers is a group of individuals who 
go charging into a response scenario as saviors who, through barking commands, will return the 
community to the way that it was before the incident occurred.  This is very misleading.  The 
media tends to illustrate relief efforts in this way, as in the Katrina example, where the military-
lead efforts came in to save the day.  Yet, California’s approach is different.  Their approach is 
one of collaborative efforts instead of seemingly authoritarian control.  So for this case, the 
leadership in preparing for incidents is more important than the response. 
Leadership qualities in preparedness activities are negotiation, facilitation, and consensus 
building.  All of these activities must strengthen the system to let it work in an almost automated 
fashion when the incident occurs.  This includes the training of personnel not only to know how 
to be responders, but also how the different agencies and levels of government work collectively 
and how to navigate through the system.  It also includes securing enough resources, either 
directly or through mutual aid agreements, to be able to respond appropriately. 
Informant 13 said: 
defining emergency management is also what you do before the event 
happens to prepare your plans, your procedures, the exercises and 
training that you do beforehand so that the appropriate people are trained 
with the skills they need to respond to.  Our role is coordinating the 
resources that the locals need to respond to the event and also 
coordinating the state resources that are going to be there to respond. 
A number of examples can illustrate this need, from saving a whale that became 
disoriented in the Sacramento River to the wildfire devastation in Southern California in the fall 
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 of 2007.  Each case demonstrates how the partnerships created in the preparedness windows 
between incidents strengthen response efforts.   
In looking at leadership qualities more broadly, five general themes emerge that comprise 
a good leader--knowledge, human characteristics, personal actions, interpersonal relations, and 
management skill sets.  Informant 11 put it this way: 
From my perspective, I think it's someone who's going to be mission 
driven but people oriented, that is one component of it.  I think it's having a 
holistic point of seeing the issues, being able to grasp the issues quickly, 
and to act decisively, to bring forth a set of skills on decision making.  
You’ve got to be able to understand what the issues are, develop a course 
of action, and then see that through.  I think it's having the ability to work 
well with others and to understand their needs and try to at least consider 
their needs in your decision making, that's important.  And then again, 
that's going to be circumstantially based.  Commander on the battlefield 
doesn’t necessarily have the luxury of considering how that's going to 
impact above Private.  You got to charge the beach.  You got to charge the 
beach, that's the mission.  Leadership’s not an easy job. 
Each of the informants illustrated components of each of these pillars either by directly 
mentioning a trait or talking about it indirectly when responding to another question.  These 
qualities are important to create a fully formed leader.  One way to visualize it, is to think of a 
pie where each of these broad categories is a piece as illustrated in Figure 9.  Without one slice, 
the leader would not be complete. 
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Figure 9.  Interaction of Leadership Qualities. 
To get a better understanding of what these broader categories include, consider Table 11. 
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 Table 11.  Leadership Qualities in Emergency Management. 
Theme Traits 
Knowledge having tactical expertise 
having technical expertise 
understanding different issue areas 
working knowledge of community, people, issues, and 
threats 
experiencing and participating in past incident responses 
knowing available resources and how to utilize them 
Personal Actions admitting when being wrong 
stepping up/take charge or stepping aside (whichever is 
the most appropriate) 
taking responsibility 
being self aware of limitations 
leading by example 
showing good judgment  
being decisive after considering options 
having a vision 
Interpersonal Relations influencing behavior for a positive result 
being people-oriented 
working well with others 
communicating 
coordinating 
mediating 
facilitating 
Management Skills knowing how to use resources 
seeing big picture 
preparing and planning 
evaluating 
showing authority 
clarifying objectives 
setting goals/agenda 
building from past responses/lessons 
working with different agencies, levels of government 
and sectors 
Human Characteristics being true to their core values 
being honest and having integrity 
being open 
being flexible and adaptive 
understanding  
having the ability to listen 
having the ability to learn  
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 All of these distinguishing qualities are critical to having successful leadership abilities.  
Some of them, like those found in the knowledge category, are learned behaviors from being in 
the field.  Others, like the human characteristics, are core values that tie directly to who the 
emergency manager is.  To be a good leader, one must possess learned skills and have the 
inherent characteristics that allow others to trust and follow their direction.  Through this 
combination of qualities, leaders are able to create open environments where learning from 
others, learning from systems, and learning from the past can take place. 
5.3.  ON PEOPLE 
 Emergency management is a human experience.  People are at the foundation of the 
emergency management system.  Leaders in the field must have a positive and trusting 
relationship within all levels of the organization or it will become ineffective. 
Informant 11 shared: 
I think one of the main criteria of emergency management and response is 
people.  The whole context of what we do and why we do it is predicated 
on how we protect the baseline population public safety issues dealing with 
care and safety and protection.  So, I think it boils down to people and 
without the interaction amongst agencies and individuals that falls down.  
That can be a very severe missing link.  It also becomes a component from 
the point of view of leadership and how one has the ability to perform 
effectively in a leadership capacity if they don't have effective 
interpersonal relationships with others as their counterparts, from their 
coworkers or even those that they're there to protect, it falls down.  It's an 
issue of trust and continuity.  So, all these are components, I think, that 
play a very big role in it.  If you don't have effective interpersonal 
relationships or you can't work on that and develop the trust aspect, then 
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 people in leadership are going to fail in whatever they're trying to do.  
People won't follow them.  They won't abide by what they're being asked 
to do.   
 Leaders’ actions may sometime seem difficult to understand, yet, the subordinates must 
trust in the leaders’ abilities to make appropriate decisions.  There has to be a level of respect 
between the staff and senior administration so that the difficult decisions can be acted upon, as 
Informant 10 suggested. 
 The greatest thing that a leader must do during an incident, according to Informant 7, is to 
manage chaos.  He suggested that the way to accomplish that is by 
[s]urrounding yourself with good people, training as a team, listening to 
your people and understanding early on what you really have control 
over and what you don't.  You've got to learn what you can really control 
and what you can't control and what is important and what is not 
important, and the biggest part is really putting together a good team, 
surrounding yourself by smart people, and listening to them.  Managing 
chaos is no different than establishing a great corporation and running a 
major corporation.  It's no different than putting out a super bowl team.  
You can look at emergency management like a football team.  You've 
got to do individual training, collective training, you have specialty 
teams, you have huge egos, you have unity of command there, you've got 
one coach that is in charge, he makes all the decisions or he has 
delegated a certain decision-making processes down to his assistant 
coaches. 
 The team approach is critical.  However, it is not a matter of just putting people in 
positions, the team members have to be given responsibilities that they can accomplish.  A 
person on the team who would be better suited in another position can weaken the overall 
effectiveness of the collective effort.  This is not the individual’s fault, but rather the leader who 
could not identify the best role for that person.  Informant 13’s approach to putting together 
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 teams is “to have a group of people that surrounds me that understand and are subject matter 
experts in what they do.”  In that way, they can facilitate a response based on individual 
strengths instead of trying to provide all of the answers themselves. 
 Managing chaos does not necessarily come naturally.  Instead, leaders must emerge.  The 
findings from this study suggest that it happens through three ways. 
5.4.  ON LEADERSHIP EMERGENCE 
 The emergence of leaders was explained through three main paths: 1. through hierarchy, 
2. through individual characteristics, or 3. through circumstance. 
5.4.1. Hierarchy 
 When thinking about leaders emerging within an organization, particularly within civil 
service, a natural progression is through promotion.  This has many advantages, including 
knowing the system within which one works.  In California, promotion into leadership roles is 
typically a combination of seniority and ability.  The unionization of civil service attempts to 
promote the most senior qualified person into leadership roles as long as he/she is currently in 
the system and has the seniority for advancement. 
 Other approaches to create leaders within public organizations are through training 
opportunities, both formal, like encouraging staff to obtain higher education degrees, and 
informal, like offering staff training programs.  For the purpose of this study, the number or 
types of trainings were not investigated. 
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  Another informal type of creating leaders is through mentorship.  This approach was 
seemingly the most common, yet was very loosely defined.  In most cases, examples were given 
where one, more senior (not necessarily in years, but in experiences) emergency manager would 
mentor a less senior manager.  This sometimes occurred within the same agency or department, 
but also occurred across departments and even geographical areas.  All of these attempts appear 
to be encouraged within the emergency management system and, more importantly, are actively 
practiced. 
Informant 1 shared these thoughts on mentorship: 
I think leaders have to be grown in the organization.  I think leaders 
certainly benefit from training, but I think they benefit just as much from 
mentorship.  Ultimately, I think that you have to invest in growing 
leaders.  It’s a pretty deliberate effort to get leaders into a position where 
they can actually lead.  And realistically, not everybody can lead.  Not 
everyone has the interpersonal skills that fundamentally it takes to lead.  
You might be able to get them there tactically so that they can tactically 
do the mission.  You might be able to get them there technically so 
they’ve got the technical competence, but the conceptual skills that are 
needed necessarily to lead, i.e., to be able to work in the immediate 
problem, but then also to be able to look into tomorrow and into the next 
day, sometimes those conceptual skills are difficult to grow in a person 
without giving them experiences and through those experiences allowing 
them to create a model, if you will, in their minds for this type of a 
problem.  Because sometimes when we think, we think about models, 
and so I know if I did this in this incident last time, step one was this, 
step two was this, step three was this, that might work this time, so let’s 
try that.  So sometimes those conceptual skills can be there.  But 
interpersonal skills are tough to develop, as you know.  But I think in 
general you can mentor individuals to grow into leadership-type 
positions.  But I’ll be honest, it isn’t something that can be done in a day 
and it takes a career.  It takes a career to groom someone to be a leader, 
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 in my mind.  It’s something that’s got to be a deliberate effort on the part 
of an organization. 
 Either through direct hierarchical channels or through a mentorship scenario, a common 
approach for leaders to emerge within an organization is through organizational structures.  This 
research also identifies two other approaches--personal charisma and circumstance. 
5.4.2. Personal Characteristics 
 Leaders emerging through personal charisma fall in line with the mentality that some 
leaders are simply “born.”  In this case, some people are seen to have the natural talent of leading 
without the need to be taught how to lead.  Instead, it relies on the individual to have a strong 
work ethic, to make sound decisions, and the ability to see what needs to be done and to do it. 
 In thinking about this separation from the typically hierarchical approach, Informant 4 
said: 
I think there’s a difference between leadership and hierarchal authority.  
Hierarchical authority is appointed and is elevated based on - I'm not - by 
political clout.  So, we have a director who’s - who should have 
credibility because he came from local government, who virtually has - 
he has legal authority, but he has no moral or professional authority left 
in the agency because he’s been jerking people around.  We have a Chief 
Deputy Director, who was appointed by the Governor, who knows 
nothing about emergency management, who’s a political operative, who 
has no moral or professional authority or leadership, but he has the 
authority to order us all around.  So, that’s - that’s occurring…. I think 
leadership has evolved from professionalism, it’s evolved from people 
doing their job, it’s evolved from people protecting their staff from 
unreasonable demands, it’s setting - by setting an example of both 
stepping up and anticipating what needs to be done and doing it and 
supporting your staff.  And it’s sort of like you build a relationship with - 
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 down the hierarchy and then you’re able to, in fact, lead that - those 
people in the hierarchy forward.  You can’t do it by authority. 
 Although there seems to be some individual dynamics that create great leaders, this 
research is limited in studying them, other than identifying that the perception exists. 
5.4.3. Circumstance 
 Besides leaders emerging through traditional hierarchical structures, circumstances also 
influence who is perceived as a leader.  Many of the informants noted the importance of actually 
being part of a large incident.  Many subtleties cannot be simulated, most notably the stress of 
responding to a large-scale incident when it affects the very community, and quite possibly, the 
home in which one lives.  Being part of an incident response creates pre-established credibility, 
according to Informant 10, as the individual needs to navigate the response system when 
balancing the humanness of the event. 
 Perhaps more fundamental, though, are remarks expressed by Informant 8 who suggested 
that one must actually go through an incident to truly understand what needs to be done and how 
to do it.  Concern lies in the fact that many current emergency managers have not gone through a 
large, multi-jurisdictional incident so their response capabilities would be limited to what they 
were trained to do and they are reliant on the relationships that they have created. 
 One final note on circumstance, some leaders emerge when an incident occurs, even if 
they would not have previously been seen as leaders within the organization.  As Informant 11 
said: 
I've seen leaders that one would not normally consider being a leader rise 
to the occasion.  I think we have multiple evidences of that in regards to 
disasters themselves.  We see people rise to the occasion. 
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  Based on limitations of this study, leaders were perceived to emerge through three 
different ways: organizational structure, personal characteristics, and circumstance.  Of these, the 
organizational structure and circumstance tend to create the largest number of leaders as they are 
both trained and tested to respond to incidents. 
5.5.  ON POLITICAL LEADERSHIP  
From the physical reactions of the informants when asked about political leadership, it 
appears to be a very sensitive topic with a lot of opinions.  Most of the informants talked about it 
in general terms, if at all, but a few informants gave good examples not to criticize political 
leadership, but to illustrate examples and stress the importance of understanding timing when 
responding to an incident and the need to let the system work without trying to tweak it during an 
event. 
Informant 13 provided an example where political leadership insisted on taking a “photo 
op” relatively soon after a portion of a freeway collapsed.  Two days after the incident, a 
prominent politician wanted to be visible at the site while rescue efforts were still underway.  For 
security reasons, the efforts had to stop.  The impression at the time was that there could not be 
more survivors because so much time had lapsed since the incident occurred.  But, in actuality, 
there was a survivor who was found on the fourth day.  Had the rescue efforts not stopped for the 
previous day, Informant 13 felt that the person could have been found one day sooner. 
Another example was from Informant 4, who expressed frustration over a governor who 
requested a large amount of information that was not easily attainable while response activities 
were taking place.  In this scenario, a large flood had impacted multiple communities.  While the 
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 emergency response procedures were activated, the governor requested a list of all the mayors 
with contact information so that he could personally connect with them and offer support.  The 
request seemed innocent enough, but there were a few drawbacks. 
First, the information was not easily accessible.  At the time, needed information had not 
been previously collected, so that large amounts of staff time about who should have been 
involved with recovery efforts were required to fulfill the governor’s request.  This obviously 
caused resentment because another informant at a different level of government also commented 
upon the request. 
Second, in some cases, the mayor was not the best person to contact.  Because local 
government administration structures vary, like a Weak-Mayor Plan, Strong-Mayor Plan, 
Commission Plan, or Council-Manager Plan, contacting the mayor of each city to offer support 
may not have been the best approach to assess need or promise resources.  In some cases, 
contacting the city manager, for example, would have been more appropriate when the mayor is 
simply a figurehead. 
Finally, when the governor made the calls, he promised resources that were not originally 
intended to be allocated to the specific communities.  In this instance, it is a matter of having 
limited resources and allocating them based on need.  By the governor having side conversations 
outside of the collective emergency response, resources were committed, which could have had a 
larger impact somewhere else. 
The balance between political leadership and the emergency manager leadership is 
delicate as both sides need each other.  Yet, especially in times of response and recovery, the 
emergency management system must be left to work as intended.  That way baseline order is 
brought to an already chaotic environment. 
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 5.6.  QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 Similar to personal interactions, the frequency of leadership and its effectiveness go hand 
in hand.  As reported in Tables 12 and 13 and illustrated in Figures 10 and 11, the frequency of 
interacting with OES’s leadership in preparedness is essentially the same type of reaction as to 
its effectiveness.  In this case, the mean is “effective.”  The mean shifts, however, when looking 
at the frequency and effectiveness of working with the State Operation Center or regions.  While 
the mean of frequency is “less frequent,” the mean of effectiveness is “effective.”  Part of the 
difference in reaction could be attributed to how the State becomes operational. 
 The State Operation Center is activated when a large, multijurisdictional incident occurs.  
Therefore, most emergency managers have little interaction with the Center until it is activated.  
That could explain why although there was little frequency of interaction, it was effective. 
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 Table 12.  The number and valid percent at each level of government for leadership in preparing for an 
incident. 
KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
4A: “In preparing for an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interactions with leadership at:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
4B: “In preparing for an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with leadership at:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable; N=the number of 
responses; %=the valid percent; Missing=the number of respondents who did not answer the question; Total=the 
total number and valid percent of responses. 
Leadership--Preparedness                         
  Scale 5 4 3 2 1 0 Missing Total 
   N % N % N % N % N % N % N N % 
                                  
OES Frequency 18 13.0 20 14.5 35 25.4 27 19.6 26 18.8 12 8.7 9 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 21 15.2 20 14.5 46 33.3 14 10.1 21 15.2 16 11.6 9 147 100.0
                           
                                  
SOC Frequency 9 6.7 8 6.0 26 19.4 27 20.1 40 29.9 24 17.9 13 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 11 8.2 10 7.5 37 27.6 13 9.7 27 20.1 36 26.9 13 147 100.0
                                  
                           
REOC Frequency 11 8.1 14 10.3 30 22.1 37 27.2 28 20.6 16 11.8 11 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 18 13.2 13 9.6 46 33.8 13 9.6 20 14.7 26 19.1 11 147 100.0
                           
                                  
EOC Frequency 35 25.9 22 16.3 25 18.5 20 14.8 16 11.9 17 12.6 12 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 33 24.6 23 17.2 42 31.3 7 5.2 9 6.7 20 14.9 13 147 100.0
                                  
                           
FOPS Frequency 38 28.4 21 15.7 24 17.9 22 16.4 16 11.9 13 9.7 13 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 33 24.8 22 16.5 40 30.1 9 6.8 11 8.3 18 13.5 14 147 100.0
                           
                                  
UTIL Frequency 8 5.9 12 8.9 17 12.6 36 26.7 35 25.9 27 20.0 12 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 11 8.3 12 9.0 32 24.1 14 10.5 25 18.8 39 29.3 14 147 100.0
                                  
                           
NON Frequency 10 7.4 14 10.3 23 16.9 25 18.4 35 25.7 29 21.3 11 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 14 10.4 14 10.4 28 20.9 16 11.9 22 16.4 40 29.9 13 147 100.0
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 Table 13.  The number and valid percent at each level of government for leadership in responding to an 
incident. 
KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
9A: “In responding to an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interaction with leadership at:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
9B: “In responding to an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with leadership at:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable; N=the number of 
responses; %=the valid percent; Missing=the number of respondents who did not answer the question; Total=the 
total number and valid percent of responses. 
Leadership--Response                           
  Scale 5 4 3 2 1 0 Missing Total 
   N % N % N % N % N % N % N N % 
                                  
OES Frequency 25 19.5 14 10.9 29 22.7 27 21.1 21 16.4 12 9.4 19 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 27 21.3 16 12.6 29 22.8 14 11.0 24 18.9 17 13.4 20 147 100.0
                           
                                  
SOC Frequency 12 9.8 12 9.8 26 21.1 25 20.3 33 26.8 15 12.2 24 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 18 14.6 13 10.6 28 22.8 10 8.1 26 21.1 28 22.8 24 147 100.0
                                  
                           
REOC Frequency 17 13.7 14 11.3 25 20.2 26 21.0 31 25.0 11 8.9 23 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 19 15.2 19 15.2 33 26.4 7 5.6 24 19.2 23 18.4 22 147 100.0
                           
                                  
EOC Frequency 33 26.0 23 18.1 26 20.5 18 14.2 15 11.8 12 9.4 20 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 33 26.2 23 18.3 36 28.6 7 5.6 11 8.7 16 12.7 21 147 100.0
                                  
                           
FOPS Frequency 37 29.4 24 19.0 26 20.6 12 9.5 15 11.9 12 9.5 21 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 35 27.8 25 19.8 32 25.4 7 5.6 12 9.5 15 11.9 21 147 100.0
                           
                                  
UTIL Frequency 10 8.1 13 10.5 20 16.1 23 18.5 34 27.4 24 19.4 23 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 14 11.3 9 7.3 33 26.6 8 6.5 26 21.0 34 27.4 23 147 100.0
                                  
                           
NON Frequency 10 8.0 14 11.2 17 13.6 23 18.4 33 26.4 28 22.4 22 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 12 9.6 11 8.8 29 23.2 12 9.6 23 18.4 38 30.4 22 147 100.0
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 KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
4A: “In preparing for an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interactions with leadership at:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
4B: “In preparing for an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with leadership at:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
See Appendix 6: Survey Instrument for the original survey listing. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Leadership Box Plot--Preparedness. 
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 KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
9A: “In responding to an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interaction with leadership at:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
9B: “In responding to an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with leadership at:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
See Appendix 6: Survey Instrument for the original survey listing. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Leadership Box Plot--Response. 
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  Similar to the correlation results for personal interactions, the correlations between 
frequency of interaction and effectiveness are significant across all levels of government and 
sectors.  In these cases, the strength of the relationship is similar during both preparedness and 
response activities, suggesting that there is equal need for strong leadership practices at all times, 
regardless if it is during the preparedness or response stages.  The correlations for each level of 
government and sector are identified in Tables 14 and 15. 
Table 14.  Correlations for frequency interacting with leadership and effectiveness across levels of 
government or sector for preparedness activities. 
 
For PREPAREDNESS Activities   
Level of Government or Sector Pearson Correlation Significance 
Office of Emergency Services (State-level) .782** .000 
State Operation Center (State-level) .818** .000 
Regional Level .798** .000 
Operational Level .811** .000 
Field Level .819** .000 
Utility Companies .806** .000 
Nonprofit Organizations .807** .000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 15.  Correlations for frequency interacting with leadership and effectiveness across levels of 
government or sector for response activities. 
 
For RESPONSE Activities   
Level of Government or Sector Pearson Correlation Significance 
Office of Emergency Services (State-level) .755** .000 
State Operation Center (State-level) .738** .000 
Regional Level .818** .000 
Operational Level .839** .000 
Field Level .854** .000 
Utility Companies .898** .000 
Nonprofit Organizations .896** .000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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 5.7.  CONCLUSION  
When inquiring as to how leaders emerge within the organization, similar themes to the 
personal interactions were illustrated, like experience, relationship building, training exercises, 
and demonstrated professionalism.  This leads to the importance of developing leaders from 
within the emergency management field who know the intricacies of the system instead of 
bringing in people from outside the organization to lead it. 
Strong leadership practices create strong preparedness and response activities.  The 
opposite is also true.  Without strong practices, the emergency management system would 
simply not work.  By having leaders that have the knowledge of how to prepare for and respond 
to incidents, the personal actions of setting the example and taking responsibility, the 
interpersonal relationships to communicate well and influence behavior for positive results, the 
management skills to work within the confines of the system, and the human characteristic traits 
of core values, the system has the human direction to retain the flexibility to meet chaotic 
conditions.  Leadership has a direct effect on whether or not the emergency management system 
works when it is needed most, and that effect, while seen when an incident is taking place, is 
more important during the preparation and anticipation of an incident. 
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 6.0    CHAPTER 6:  THE ROLE OF LEGAL STRUCTURES IN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
Legal structures create the framework in which emergency management can take place.  
As discussed in the Contextual Framework, California’s emergency preparedness and response 
procedures are a direct result of the large-scale incidents that impact multiple jurisdictions and 
communities each year.  Through organizational “Model II” learning, California was able to 
adapt its preparedness and response because of the valid information, free and informed choices, 
and internal commitment that is inherent in the emergency management system.  Part of this 
evolution is how SEMS and NIMS are applied in its current approach, but mutual aid agreements 
are an integral part of this system.   
Mutual aid agreements are easily seen across fire departments and law enforcement 
departments in neighboring jurisdictions.  The California Master Mutual Aid Agreement clearly 
specifies how resources can be utilized, and how the agreements are to be funded.  These 
agreements are flexible, and they require trust and relationships to be successful--trust to know 
that they assure support, and relationships to understand what resources and abilities are 
available when an incident occurs.  This is consistent with Behn’s approach to collective 
responsibility (2001). 
Legal structures go beyond policies that define operational procedures.  Legal structures 
also affect funding.  Because they are a societal responsibility, emergency management 
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 operations are publicly funded.  At the local level, this is generally through city allocations; at 
the state level, state funds, etcetera.  Consequently, there is a political component on what type of 
funding is provided, the consistency of that funding, and when it occurs.  As demonstrated after 
9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, a lot of funding is allocated to emergency management after an 
event occurs.  Yet, the restrictions and types of funding are less than ideal.  Current federal grant 
monies heavily focus on purchasing equipment and training exercises dedicated to terrorism.  In 
a state that is constantly faced with natural disasters, allocating funding in this way is 
misappropriated because it does not realistically address the imminent threats. 
Some people say that how one prepares for a terrorist threat relies on the same systems as 
preparing for a natural incident.  In part, this is true.  But the type of equipment, its mobilization, 
and other resources needed to successfully address the incident, not to mention the intelligence 
requirement, varies greatly.  Allocating funds to purchase specialized equipment despite 
sufficient resources regionally is unwise when funds could be used to create sustainable 
programs with the necessary staff additions.  Yet, grants tend to focus on tangibles rather than 
personnel.  This may be appropriate for other states, but in California, the need is not as much on 
equipment but rather on the staff to make the system work.  While there are some grants that 
permit investments in enlarged staff, the general impression is that it has to be used towards 
equipment or the training of existing staff. 
During the interview process, while the initial line of questioning did not specifically 
inquire about staff shortages, half of the informants brought it up.  They believe that, at all levels, 
staff shortages are having a negative impact on the emergency management system.  Part of this 
impact is the focus of staff to be grant writers and managers instead of being able to make the 
human connection with other counterparts and levels of government that make a collaborative 
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 response possible.  Additionally, emergency management still takes a reactive approach to 
incidents.  Instead of being proactive in assessing and mitigating threats before they occur, staff 
shortages result in skeletal operations.  This has led to increased daily stress among current 
managers and, at least at the regional level, has resulted in more experienced personnel leaving 
their positions. 
In small-scale emergencies, the staff shortage may not be a big deal.  But, if a large 
incident occurs, this could drastically affect the response and recovery efforts.  In the current 
system, when a large fire occurs, personnel and resources are deployed from throughout the state 
and sometimes beyond.  This approach works because all of the California fire personnel utilize 
the same type of equipment with very specialized jobs.  In emergency management, this cookie-
cutter approach cannot work.  Since emergency management is most effective through personal 
connections and interactions, planning to bring in emergency managers from unfamiliar areas 
may cause delays in response activities.  Actions, therefore, must fit the local context.  A 
common set of laws and procedures helps in creating this match of emergency services and the 
local context. 
6.1.  DEFINED 
 When asked to define legal structures in emergency management, many of the informants 
identified key structures, like the mutual aid agreements, Standardized Emergency Management 
System, or the National Incident Management System.  The legal structures in California have 
evolved over time and have been well tested. 
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 One of the earliest collective efforts was the Emergency Services Act that began in the 
1920s and continues today.  The most recent Act, adopted in 2006, required jurisdictions to 1. 
provide state assistance, 2. recognize the state Office of Emergency Services, 3. assign functions 
of state agencies during an emergency, 4. provide for the rendering of mutual aid, and 5. create 
the necessary organizational structures to carry out the provisions of the Act (California 
Emergency Services Act, 2006). 
The legal environment has evolved from each community responding to incidents 
independently at the turn of the 20th Century to a greater collective response through mutual aid 
agreements and standardized procedures. Informant 4 explained: 
Well, in California, we have a very mature legal structure going back to 
the 30s and 40s and probably peaked in the 50s.  The Emergency 
Services Act gives the Governor the authority to declare a state in a State 
of Emergency.  It gives local jurisdictions the authority to declare local 
states of emergency.  It creates a - it gives power, extraordinary powers, 
beyond - if a local or the State declares an emergency, the Governor can 
do virtually anything he wants to do, as can a local government 
administrator.  They can waive contracting laws.  They can waive things 
like setting up shelters in buildings that aren’t ADA accessible.  They 
can waive [California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)] requirements 
for environmental review.  If we have to move a million tons of debris 
and we needed to dump it someplace, the Governor can say, we’re in a 
state of state of emergency, you have the authority to do that without a 
CEQA review of the impact.  So, all those things are directly related 
back to the Emergency Services Act, which is probably, short of Florida, 
the most mature statement of emergency management and 
responsibilities in the whole thing.  And the other elements of that, which 
go back to the 50s, a master mutual aid agreement which is - was signed 
by Governor Earl Warren, going back to I think 1953 or 54, and all the 
cities and counties in the State, and it was an agreement that the 
Governor has the authority, with some limitations, to reallocate 
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 government resources across the state if there’s a state of emergency.  
And there a lot of - certainly Louisiana and Mississippi didn't have that 
authority.  A lot of states don’t have a master mutual aid agreement…but 
California does and has for 50-plus years, and it’s exercised daily.  Fire 
mutual aid across jurisdiction boundaries and the key to it is has been 
always, if there’s a critical need, you’ll get the resources without the 
expectation of reimbursement.  I need it, you got it.  We will loan it to 
you, you give it back to us.  We won’t reimburse you.  If it’s an extended 
situation, a fire siege, just for example, there are provisions that say after 
12 hours, the State will reimburse the costs. 
During the interviews, the conversation went from identifying types of legal structures to 
the identification of their importance and the realization that the frameworks were necessary for 
emergency managers to be able do their jobs.  Informant 12 simply stated, “legal structures assist 
and allow people to do their jobs.”   
Informant 14 took it a little further by clarifying authority and how policies become 
routine over time.  He said, 
laws provide us with the general authority and when you’re out there trying 
to respond and recover effectively, those degrees of ambiguity over the 
years, because they defined the legislation, everybody has a pretty clear 
authority.  Then the authority is further given, as in the instance of the 
California Emergency Services Act, it empowers the Governor to respond 
in certain ways, as well as local government.  It tells the Governor and 
provides him with the authority to waive regulations, to redirect budget, 
already budgeted funds for the emergency, it provides authority for OES to 
task State agencies to respond.  Those are so ingrained; people don’t even 
look at them as authorities any more.  It’s just routine.  The policy has 
become routine which is where you want to be because that means that 
you’re making decisions based on authorities and based on relationships 
and getting it done. 
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 There was also a commentary about the need for legal structures to create an environment 
of accountability.  Informant 9 remarked, 
I never thought I would say this, you have to have some structure in 
place so that you have a way of accountability, so that you have a way 
that, after the fact, you can get what is due you in a reasonable fashion. 
 In California’s emergency management system, the legal structures provide the common 
language and procedures that are used across all communities while maintaining the necessary 
flexibility to adapt response activities to meet the challenges posed in each individual incident.  
This point is critical.  While the legal structures must be in place, it cannot become so restrictive 
that the organization no longer has the elasticity to apply legal intent to a broad range of similar 
incidents, given the variety of environments in which the laws have to be enforced. 
Even when asked if there were too many laws which could limit the response, the 
overwhelming response was “no.”  One informant suggested that there might even be need for 
additional legal frameworks if it resulted in further standardization of policies and procedures 
across all communities.  In the thematic coding, four more response trends emerged: national 
response plan, local implementation, understaffing, and funding. 
6.2.  ON NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 
 Informants often commented upon the national response plan, specifically the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS).  Informants from the counties spoke about it the most, 
often saying how important it is to standardize policies and procedures.  They saw it as a copy of 
California’s Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS).  Yet NIMS was critiqued 
for a number of reasons. 
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  There is an underlying opinion that NIMS focuses too heavily on field response and not 
enough energy is spent on overarching emergency management procedures.  Informant 1 
indicated that NIMS was useful but went further to say that “emergency management is not the 
same as field operations.”  Informant 8 from the regions suggested that NIMS is too specific at 
the local level.  And, there was concern from another informant that NIMS may become too 
restrictive by not taking into consideration the varying environments in which an incident may 
take place.  This includes the type of incident, who it affects, and what resources are available to 
respond. 
 The larger question, however, is the role of staffing.  There was a concern between two 
county informants that not enough time is devoted for the effective training of staff to meet the 
federal requirements.  It is unknown if this is a more general problem or just isolated 
occurrences.  
6.3.  ON UNDERSTAFFING 
 When talking about legal structures, the need for more staff became increasingly apparent 
particularly in the counties and regions.  There was an appreciation of mutual aid systems and 
emergency managers responding to incidents even if it was outside of their normal jurisdictions 
because of such agreements.  But, if a large-scale incident occurred outside of a fire scenario, 
there was increasing concern that the system may not be able to handle it effectively. 
 Under the current structure, when an incident occurs and more personnel are needed, the 
mutual aid systems go into effect.  Responders from one area are deployed to where the incident 
is occurring.  This type of response is most often seen with wild fires. 
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  As recent as late October 2007 when 23 fires plagued Southern California, a large-scale, 
state-wide effort was put into effect to quickly contain the destruction.  Fire fighters from 
throughout the State were deployed through the CALFIRE system.  California fights fires really 
well.  The concern arises on how to mobilize similar efforts when the incident is non-fire related 
like a massive earthquake or health pandemic where different resources and skill sets are needed. 
 The informants remarked consistently that they felt that they were understaffed.  Some of 
the critique came from how the counties and regions were staffed prior to major financial cut 
backs in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  In some situations, this reduced staff by as much as 
62% with the number of emergency manager and staff positions being cut from 26 to 10 in five 
years according to Informant 4.  This dramatic cut limits the number of personal relationships 
that can be developed and fostered, a critical component to emergency management as discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
 Informant 8 commented that “it is really hard for us to do an effective job in working 
with [non governmental organizations] the way we should be doing given the staff capabilities 
that we have.”  This not only affects working with NGOs, but other departments and levels of 
governments as well.  To compound the issue, there is a feeling that the current staff are bogged 
down with administrative requirements that keep them from expanding the role of the county and 
region because personnel are confined to processing paperwork--especially in regard to applying 
for grant funding. 
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 6.4.  ON GRANTS/FUNDS/FINANCING 
 Funding is always a concern as it directly affects what type of vision an organization can 
implement.  The emergency management system in California is no different.  Dramatic budget 
cuts at the State level have had a trickle-down effect into what can be accomplished at the 
regional, county and local levels.  Yet, the system still seems to work.  This may be a façade, and 
time will tell its true impact. 
 The allocation of financial resources has always been a political challenge as different 
initiatives take different priorities in any one-year for a limited amount of public funding.  This is 
true at all levels of government.  As Informant 5, a local emergency manager said, 
The budget is politically driven, if there are other needs that have to be 
taken care of by the budget, then Emergency Services may not get what 
we need.  Yes, the political influence is very, very powerful in the city.  I 
think we saw a lot of that with the President of our Board of Supervisors, 
very focused on emergency preparedness. 
 The consequence of decreased State funding is the reliance on federal grants to provide 
equipment, training resources, and occasionally staff resources.  One of the downsides to this 
approach is that it does not allow learning to take place within the organization.  Instead of 
allocating resources that would better strengthen the system over the long term, financial 
resources are used to “buy toys” as commonly remarked.  Emergency managers tend to suggest 
that there is a priority to purchase equipment, whether needed or not, because that is where the 
funding is.  In California’s system, there tends to be less need for physical equipment because of 
the mutual aid systems in place.  Instead, the money could be used to develop staff connections 
that would allow a more flexible system. 
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 To receive funding, it is almost as if emergency managers must play a game to label 
training exercises and equipment purchases to assist preparedness and response against terrorism 
even though natural disasters pose a more imminent and realistic threat.  In some cases, this re-
labeling of how the funds will be used may cause the organization to lose focus on the original 
intent and purpose of the funds.  Additionally, so much time is spent on grant applications, that it 
leaves little time for emergency managers to actually be emergency managers.  Instead, they are 
forced to spend exorbitant amounts of time completing administrative roles instead of spending 
time building relationships or creating long-term strategies.  As Informant 14 responded: 
Yes, the money is directed toward terrorism and away from everything 
else.  And you basically have an attempt right now to say all hazards.  
And here’s what happens.  We’re going to do an all-hazards exercise, 75 
percent of the issues are terrorist related and 25 percent are earthquake 
related, but we’ve addressed all hazards.  So it’s a semantic game.  We’re 
going to address all hazards.  Funding with everything is - there hasn’t 
been a terrorist incident in a while.  You should check to see how much 
money is being devoted to terrorism…Well, it becomes very difficult to 
ask the local governments to do things when the amount of time and 
effort that’s taken to apply for a grant exceeds the amount of money 
you’re going to be getting.  I don’t know whether you’ve heard that from 
locals, but I heard it all the time that we are spending an enormous 
amount of time being grant managers, for which we get very little money 
to do the grant management part. 
In expressing their frustration about how the funds are applied for and allocated, 
Informant 11 said: 
It's the focus of how the monies are being applied and the schism up at 
the federal level as to what isn't important, where are we trying to pull 
this all together, is what I’m saying.  They have separate funding streams 
and the problem is that nobody’s collecting that and saying okay, that's 
fine, it's a separate funding mechanism, but the direction of what you're 
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 doing has to come out of the same arena.  We all have to talk the same 
language here and by the time that filters down to the state grantees, 
before it comes to the sub-grantees on the funding elements, the grants - 
because it's very convoluted and you have people trying to interpret grant 
requirements and assurances and then trying to interpret that and send it 
down to the lowest possible of the operational area and they're saying 
okay, well, this is how I'm supposed to do this, that's where the problem 
lies.  So we’re all busy building programs.  We’re all busy trying to get 
as many bucks as possible to sustain a program, but in the process we’re 
losing sight of what we’re here for.  We become entirely too 
administratively involved here…One thing there is pushing the program.  
We’re pushing the program. We’re trying to insure it has vitality and it 
has something that looks good and it's sexy and it plays well in the media 
and looks good for the politicians and we can all pat ourselves on the 
back at the end of the day and say, “Boy, didn't we do good today.  Look 
how much better off we were then if we hadn’t had these funds.”  Well, 
there's some truth in that, but the problem is we’re spending an 
inordinate amount of time managing these fund loans, in amount of this 
time trying to meet grant assurances or requirements and following 
something that someone unknown person in that cubicle up at DHS in 
Washington has decided yeah, I think it needs to be done this way with 
absolutely no feedback from us.  
 Funding mechanisms were definitely of concern as they affect how the agencies are 
staffed.  There was a reoccurring suggestion that the number of emergency managers is less than 
the number that is perceived to be ideal at each level of government, particularly at the regional 
level.  When going back to laws and policies outside of funding mechanisms, there was a 
perspective of laws that work against each other. 
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 6.5.  ON HINDRANCE/LAWS THAT WORK AGAINST EACH OTHER 
 When the informants were asked if any laws worked against each other in either 
responding to or preparing for an incident, most suggested that none came to mind.  However, 
they said that the current legal structures, namely SEMS, helps to standardize procedures and 
policies across all California communities so that all efforts work from the same legal structures.  
Additionally, some potentially restrictive laws, especially those that are intended to protect the 
environment, can be temporarily overridden to let the emergency response efforts to take place.  
This is most notably done through a declared State of Emergency. 
 Other potential laws that could hinder response efforts were, at the time, proposed state 
legislation.  One example was to require coastal cities to have identified emergency evacuation 
routes identified in case of a tsunami.  This type of approach is common within urban areas that 
have large amounts of snowfall.  In that instance, certain roads that are identified as evacuation 
routes are plowed first.  For the tsunami evacuation route, the intent was to have a similar 
approach were certain roads would be given priority to clear first.  The problem is that, unlike 
snowfall, which affects the entire city, a tsunami could impact different parts of the city at 
different levels.  Therefore, identifying roads to be given mandatory priority to be made 
operational could potentially limit response efforts by legally requiring certain actions that may 
not be the best uses of limited resources during response efforts. 
There was also an expressed concern when local jurisdictions were mandated to take 
certain actions, like creating scenario plans, even if the probability of a community experiencing 
such a threat is remote.  Informant 2 commented: 
Some things are very specific and do not pertain to all of the 
jurisdictions.  After Katrina we were told that we had to do an evacuation 
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 plan in a very short period of time for our entire jurisdiction.  Well, I was 
working with Contra Costa at that time, but any jurisdiction, including 
the state, was supposed to develop an evacuation plan for their 
jurisdiction.  Well, number one, in California, we don’t have the type of 
disasters that would cause the need to evacuate a whole jurisdiction and 
so it is unrealistic, it is not common sense that we should have to do that.  
I mean, you can do it scenario based, but to say that you need to develop 
a plan - well, in the Bay Area we can’t evacuate anything because on a 
normal day of traffic, we can’t - and so you try to do an evacuation you 
are crazy.  But there may be circumstances to do that, but I think as these 
guidelines and regulations come down they are, as you said, too specific 
in that it is not one size fits all.  The locals need to have the ability to do 
it - what is most appropriate for their jurisdiction, what is most fitting.  It 
is also these requirements that are put down, always quick turnaround 
times, and they may change, based on the next disaster that happens and 
so there is just a lot of things that very shortly after a major event 
happens all of these new requirements come down.  Sometimes they are 
fitting and sometimes they are not, and it is more than emergency 
management personnel can do and that kind of stuff gets in the way. 
 While it is possible that laws could work against each other, few concrete examples were 
provided.  The largest concern is that some laws may be applied too generally instead of taking 
into consideration the immediate threats of a region, its geography, or pre-established 
procedures.  In these cases, applying a certain law broadly, while well intentioned, may simply 
not make sense for neighboring communities. 
6.6.  QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 As reflected in Tables 16 and 17 and illustrated in Figures 12 and 13, the perception of 
frequency for legal structures tends to be less effective except at the county and local levels.  
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 This suggests that the state efforts, both at the larger state level and regional level, may not be as 
effective as they could be.  This is not to propose that more legal structures are needed.  Rather, 
the current structures need to be assessed for their effectiveness and contribution to county and 
local preparedness and response efforts.  This research did not investigate what those changes 
could be.  To answer those questions requires additional study. 
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 Table 16.  The number and valid percent at each level of government for legal policies in preparing for an 
incident. 
KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
3A: “In preparing for an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
3B: “In preparing for an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable; N=the number of 
responses; %=the valid percent; Missing=the number of respondents who did not answer the question; Total=the 
total number and valid percent of responses. 
 
Legal Policies--Preparedness                       
  Scale 5 4 3 2 1 0 Missing Total 
   N % N % N % N % N % N % N N % 
                                  
OES Frequency 27 20.1 17 12.7 17 12.7 31 23.1 28 20.9 14 10.4 13 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 22 16.7 15 11.4 38 28.8 17 12.9 17 12.9 23 17.4 15 147 100.0
                           
                                  
SOC Frequency 10 7.6 8 6.1 17 13.0 29 22.1 40 30.5 27 20.6 16 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 10 7.8 6 4.7 31 24.2 17 13.3 25 19.5 39 30.5 19 147 100.0
                                  
                           
REOC Frequency 10 7.6 10 7.6 18 13.7 32 24.4 37 28.2 24 18.3 16 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 11 8.5 7 5.4 33 25.6 19 14.7 23 17.8 36 27.9 18 147 100.0
                           
                                  
EOC Frequency 24 17.9 20 14.9 22 16.4 28 20.9 22 16.4 18 13.4 13 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 24 18.3 20 15.3 37 28.2 11 8.4 15 11.5 24 18.3 16 147 100.0
                                  
                           
FOPS Frequency 28 21.1 20 15.0 16 12.0 26 19.5 24 18.0 19 14.3 14 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 26 19.8 20 15.3 35 26.7 9 6.9 15 11.5 26 19.8 16 147 100.0
                           
                                  
UTIL Frequency 6 4.5 11 8.3 16 12.0 31 23.3 38 28.6 31 23.3 14 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 10 7.8 10 7.8 28 21.7 13 10.1 27 20.9 41 31.8 18 147 100.0
                                  
                           
NON Frequency 6 4.5 8 6.0 18 13.5 35 26.3 35 26.3 31 23.3 14 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 9 6.9 8 6.2 28 21.5 20 15.4 22 16.9 43 33.1 17 147 100.0
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 Table 17.  The number and valid percent at each level of government for personal interactions in responding 
to an incident. 
KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
8A: “In responding to an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
8B: “In responding to an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable; N=the number of 
responses; %=the valid percent; Missing=the number of respondents who did not answer the question; Total=the 
total number and valid percent of responses. 
 
Legal Policies--Response                         
  Scale 5 4 3 2 1 0 Missing Total 
   N % N % N % N % N % N % N N % 
                                  
OES Frequency 18 14.3 12 9.5 21 16.7 29 23.0 23 18.3 23 18.3 21 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 20 16.0 11 8.8 28 22.4 20 16.0 17 13.6 29 23.2 22 147 100.0
                           
                                  
SOC Frequency 6 4.9 12 9.8 16 13.0 27 22.0 35 28.5 27 22.0 24 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 10 8.3 6 5.0 29 24.2 14 11.7 22 18.3 39 32.5 27 147 100.0
                                  
                           
REOC Frequency 13 10.4 8 6.4 17 13.6 30 24.0 31 24.8 26 20.8 22 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 11 9.1 11 9.1 28 23.1 15 12.4 18 14.9 38 31.4 26 147 100.0
                           
                                  
EOC Frequency 18 14.3 21 16.7 19 15.1 29 23.0 19 15.1 20 15.9 21 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 19 15.2 20 16.0 29 23.2 16 12.8 10 8.0 31 24.8 22 147 100.0
                                  
                           
FOPS Frequency 27 21.8 22 17.7 20 16.1 18 14.5 19 15.3 18 14.5 23 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 27 22.1 21 17.2 29 23.8 10 8.2 11 9.0 24 19.7 25 147 100.0
                           
                                  
UTIL Frequency 5 4.0 13 10.5 15 12.1 29 23.4 31 25.0 31 25.0 23 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 8 6.6 9 7.4 37 30.3 10 8.2 17 13.9 41 33.6 25 147 100.0
                                  
                           
NON Frequency 5 4.0 9 7.2 18 14.4 27 21.6 33 26.4 33 26.4 22 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 7 5.7 9 7.3 32 26.0 13 10.6 19 15.4 43 35.0 24 147 100.0
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 KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
3A: “In preparing for an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
3B: “In preparing for an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
See Appendix 6: Survey Instrument for the original survey listing. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Legal Policies Box Plot--Preparedness. 
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 KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
8A: “In responding to an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
8B: “In responding to an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
See Appendix 6: Survey Instrument for the original survey listing. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Legal Policies Box Plot--Response. 
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  Figures 6 and 7 illustrate that there are less frequent and thereby less effective uses of 
legal structures.  Since a strong correlation is found between frequency and effectiveness, as 
outlined in Tables 18 and 19, it would stand to reason that the system could be stronger if there 
were more interaction with legal structures.  Training is one way to accomplish this, but based on 
the concerns raised in the earlier part of the chapter regarding understaffing, it may be a matter of 
not enough staff to daily administer emergency preparedness and response efforts AND to have 
an intimate interaction with the structure that makes the system work outside of individuals’ own 
responsibilities.  For this be corrected, more staff need to be added at the levels of government 
that are currently struggling the most, namely the state and regional levels, so that the system can 
be improved. 
Table 18.  Correlations for frequency interacting with legal structures and effectiveness across levels of 
government or sector for preparedness activities. 
 
For PREPAREDNESS Activities   
Level of Government or Sector Pearson Correlation Significance 
Office of Emergency Services (State-level) .804** .000 
State Operation Center (State-level) .762** .000 
Regional Level .805** .000 
Operational Level .827** .000 
Field Level .839** .000 
Utility Companies .862** .000 
Nonprofit Organizations .828** .000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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 Table 19.  Correlations for frequency interacting with legal structures and effectiveness across levels of 
government or sector for response activities. 
 
For RESPONSE Activities   
Level of Government or Sector Pearson Correlation Significance 
Office of Emergency Services (State-level) .815** .000 
State Operation Center (State-level) .812** .000 
Regional Level .780** .000 
Operational Level .813** .000 
Field Level .847** .000 
Utility Companies .813** .000 
Nonprofit Organizations .792** .000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
6.7.  CONCLUSION 
 Legal structures are essential in creating the framework in which emergency managers 
operate.  The mutual aid agreements, SEMS, and NIMS permit the flexibility of the organization 
while creating accountability and procedural mechanisms.  While the system is a foundation in 
which emergency preparedness and response activities operate, there is a strong concern that 
staffing is insufficient.  This is evident in the responses of frequency of interaction with legal 
structures and the effectiveness of those structures.  Because there are insufficient staff members, 
the current emergency managers must assume more administrative responsibilities that hamper 
their focus on the continual betterment of the system.  This is not a healthy practice, but it is a 
reality given  the large dependence of grants as sources of funding.  Emergency managers must 
have the opportunities to evaluate the operations of the system and make changes.  This cannot 
be done when the highest priority is maintaining bureaucratic processes. 
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 When the system has more resources, it is not stagnant and is allowed to continue to 
change as new insights are uncovered.  This has evolved into a very practical and fair set of 
policies and procedures that make sense, given California’s threats.  Legal structures are critical 
to preparedness and response efforts, but they require the financial resources to permit 
emergency managers to look at the system as a whole and to make continual improvements to 
make it better.  California’s past has demonstrated that this is possible, but past models also 
included a larger state effort to staff state and regional offices. 
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 7.0    CHAPTER 7:  THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
Effective communications techniques and resources are needed to both prepare for and 
respond to an incident.  For the purpose of this study, communication responses tended to fall 
into three categories: information technology, hindrances of IT, and face-to-face interactions.  
7.1.  INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the evolution of California’s emergency management 
system was a continual growth based upon experiences and resources.  Emergency management 
at the first of the Twentieth Century was largely unorganized until the adoption if the Emergency 
Services Act in 1920, and more significantly, the shift towards mutual aid agreements in the 
1950s.  During this time period, efficiency and effectiveness of the system were stressed.  The 
1970s brought a different change, one towards increased communication effectiveness through 
the Incident Command System.  The mid-1990s focused these efforts to improve response 
through common systems and procedures while emphasizing collective, collaborative approaches 
through the implementation of SEMS.  Now, at the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, 
prominence is placed on collaboration.  From Informant 15, the evolution of information 
technology followed a similar path with a slightly different timeline. 
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 According to this expert, four different phases emerge.  The 1960s to 1980s was a time 
focused on making the system more efficient by automating processes, as in processing forms, 
timecards, etc.  Information technology in the 1980s became a communication tool with the 
extensive acceptance of using e-mails instead of reliance on other, more formal approaches like 
letter-writing or memorandums, all in an attempt to create greater efficiency.   In the late 1990s, 
IT added to public value by having information literally at one’s finger tips with the use of the 
internet.  The fourth stage, in which communications currently operate, is based on collaboration.  
With sites like MySpace, and LinkedIn, among others, technology has let people connect in 
numerous ways.  Additionally, through wikis, information continues to expand at an increasingly 
quicker rate as more people add to society’s collective knowledge.  
This evolution, and by chance coinciding with the evolution of emergency management, 
creates opportunities for the tools created through technology to strengthen preparedness and 
response efforts.  On a national scale, Intellipedia, provides a restricted database of intelligence 
collected and utilized by those monitoring terrorist activity.  Yet, other, more localized examples 
can be given.  Informant 15 provided this example. 
When the Poomacha fire erupted near San Diego, a public awareness campaign began on 
the <SignOnSanDiego.com> blog spot hosted by the San Diego Union Tribune.  From October 
21 to November 7, 2007, 564 blog entries were entered from local responders, citizens and the 
press corps to report on ground conditions, such as neighborhoods with mandatory evacuations 
and road closures, and governmental response efforts (San Diego County Wildfires, 2007).  This 
case highlighted citizen engagement while effectively notifying residents of the fire’s advance 
and emergency response in real time. 
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 Collaborative efforts were also undertaken through the sharing of maps between the 
California Department of Forestry and the water districts.  By sharing information and working 
together, they were able to identify threats and resources in the areas that were affected.  In so 
doing, they were better able to make decisions in real time, given the changing field conditions. 
In Informant 15’s words, he shares the remarkable story as an example for on-the-ground 
use of technology to communicate about the changing conditions of the incident.  Again, from 
the San Diego fires, in his words: 
Actually, one of the most effective sources was one fireman twittering 
and a lot of people logged on to his micro-blog and he was saying this is 
what I see and does anybody see anything different and people on the 
other side of the fire started to say well, I'm seeing this and, pretty soon, 
that was back to social collaboration.  That was the best fire map they 
created out of the process and it’s a very, very well documented story on 
that.  But it’s not structured, it’s not planes taking pictures and that, but 
literally, they got down to saying, what's the fire perimeter for a fairly 
expansive geography. 
When asked what brought about the collaborative, technological change, Informant 15 
said: 
It’s a combination of things, but if you talk about this collaboration type 
change, I would say there's three principal drivers.  The first one is 
obviously the fact that there's economic imperative that you're going to 
create new value at this point, clearly collaboration’s becoming the new 
way.  Second is that obviously there are tools there now.  See, before the 
email was not a collaboration tool.  The email is really the how do you 
place a letter with an email.  Same old, same old.  SharePoint is a 
collaboration tool, or Wiki is a collaboration tool.  So, secondly, the tools 
are there now.  And the third part to this argument would be that the new 
generation of workers we are hiring, the Gen-Y business and all that, 
kind of more (inaudible) book and all that, but they are much more open 
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 to collaborations.  It’s stating to kind of bring that issue in the forefront.  
Those are probably some of the drivers that are forcing the issue. 
So the use of technology improves not only relevant information to assist decision 
makers in how best to proceed, but it also provides opportunities for informal approaches, such 
as blogs, to provide up-to-the-minute updates about field conditions. 
7.2.  HINDRANCES OF IT 
During the interviews, technological advances were always mentioned, like e-mail and 
cell phones.  But, there is a strong realization that these technologies could be a hindrance to 
building relationships.  As Informant 8 remarked,  
[P]eople getting glued to their computers is a real big problem with the 
emergency operations centers because they are not interacting…[E]-
mails are very different than phone calls…Picking up the telephone and 
talking to somebody is very different than sending an e-mail and waiting 
for a response.  I think a lot of it ends up with people kind of hiding 
behind e-mails a little bit so they don’t have to have personal 
relationships.  It is just electronic information.  Passive-aggressive types, 
it is a perfect environment for them. 
Informant 8 went further to say that “most of your problems get worked out when you are 
talking to people face-to-face.  They are not getting solved on a computer.” 
In most of the interviews, the informants talked about how e-mails, while a good record 
keeping system and a convenient way to share documents or other information, can become too 
overwhelming to effectively respond.  Informant 12 proposed that 
technology has created a false sense of vetting of information...  And the 
email that we get every day can exceed our capacity to evaluate it all 
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 reasonably.  The fact that people no longer have to type a letter, put in an 
envelope, lick it, and put a stamp on it and go down to the post office has 
really changed their willingness to - and the fact that they don’t have to 
make 100 copies of a 500-page document.  They do it electronically and 
it’s encouraged them to just do this data dump, this fax, the email out that 
I’ve given you a copy, I gave you two weeks to look at it.  Well, gees, 
two weeks from now, it’s buried so deep in my email, I may not find it.  
So I think that’s one of the downsides with the last decade that we have 
become overly reliant on technology. 
Informant 12’s sentiment must not be overlooked, since society has become incredibly 
reliant on technology.  It is common to feel “connected,” yet even this term is dramatically 
changing.  While most people use it in the sense that they are connected because they can be 
reached on their cell phones or blackberries, according to Informant 15, this term is going to be 
redefined very shortly as more and more simple actions become automated and other 
advancements change our quality of life. 
The examples listed above must be put into a larger context.  First, the informants who 
expressed their frustrations about technology could be classified as “digital immigrants” (the 
terminology draws on Margaret Mead’s analysis that older generations have immigrated into 
changed societies that may be better known by children born into them).  That is, unlike people 
who are commonly classified as Gen-Xers and following generations, the digital immigrants did 
not grow up submerged with now common technological advancements like computers or cell 
phones.  Instead, they were forced to adapt to changing environments instead of having the 
benefit of growing up with it.  Because of this, their acceptance and use of the technology varies 
from how subsequent generations use and understand it. 
Second, Informant 15 suggested that there are three types of information that IT can 
create: structured information, operational information, and unstructured information.  Structured 
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 information relates to standard record keeping; driver license information is an example.  
Operational information assists in daily activities, such as maps.  The final type of information is 
unstructured, which includes policies, procedures, reports, and websites.  This type of 
information is “not intended for a transactional purpose, it’s more for knowledge work.”  
Information has a direct impact on influencing preparedness and response activities by providing 
information that is utilized to aid response efforts while placing the actions in a larger legal, 
operational and historical context. 
So, when Informant 12 expresses frustration about the amount of e-mail, the reaction is 
towards the unstructured information.  That concern was shared by other informants as well and 
is a real problem.  However, unlike more manageable types of information, unstructured 
information is difficult to manage because of type of information that it creates and the volume 
in which it is generated.  No good solution was discovered through the interviews on how best to 
manage the information. 
The greatest hindrance of information technology may not be our perceptions of it today, 
but what the future holds.  Since it is advancing so quickly and changing our society so 
rampantly, the future impact cannot even be comprehended.  Because of that, our processes in 
managing the information lags behind the modern paradox of having access to large amounts of 
information but having limited time to study, analyze and use it. 
7.3.  FACE-TO-FACE INTERACTIONS 
By far, the most important type of communication expressed was one-on-one interactions 
in person or by a telephone.  Even though physical, visible presence is not present in each 
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 instance, these types of interactions can also be considered “face-to-face,” as a direct human 
connection exists with the other person involved in communicating. 
“[F]ace-to-face communication…is absolutely the best.  It’s the best,” reflected 
Informant 5.  He explained that this type of interaction can quickly clear any misconceptions, 
and it makes the other person know that you are genuinely concerned about what he/she is doing 
or going through.  It is a way to show direct, personable support.  Another important component 
of this type of interaction is to understand individual approaches to the same problem. 
Informant 7 reflected on this example from his military experiences. 
I had three captains who were company commanders and when you were 
out in the field moving through the woods, there were certain 
checkpoints that were put on the map, and they were usually terrain 
features like the top of the hill, the intersection of a road, something 
easily definable, so one of the things was that when you reached a 
checkpoint you were to call in and say that you had reached the 
checkpoint.  And it would be just the radio operator saying you know 
Company A, checkpoint 4, Company C, checkpoint 5.  I knew that all 
three of those captains did it differently.  One of them, [Captain 1], said 
he was at Checkpoint 4, that meant [Captain 1] was physically standing 
in the middle of that intersection.  He did not report in until he physically 
- he personally was standing there.  [Captain 2], if his lead guy was there, 
he called it in.  He personally could have been 300 or 400 yards or more 
from there, and the last guy, when he called it in I was never sure if he 
was even within 1,000 yards of it or if he ever found it. That is when I 
would then turn to the artillery guy and have him call through the 
artillery spotter net down to the artillery forward observer that was 
standing next to this captain and have the question asked, where are you?  
Because I did not trust this guy, that he could read a map, that he knew 
where he was.  So, by having personal relationships with these people, 
knowing them and working with them, I had three different answers to 
the same question.  
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 The experiences shared regarding communication tended to fall back into the importance 
of personal relationships.  Communication appears to be more effective when two individuals are 
speaking directly with each other as opposed to other, less personal forms of communicating like 
e-mails. 
7.4.  QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 As represented in the frequency Tables 20 and 21 and Figures 14 and 15, unlike the other 
factors studied, the mean of frequency and effectiveness changes for the better within some 
levels of government.  For preparedness and response, effectiveness was greater than the 
frequency when interacting with regions, counties, utilities and nonprofits.  Part of this 
relationship can be explained through the use of new technologies to bridge communication 
divides.  Because of the rampant advancement in technologies, emergency managers cannot get 
trained fast enough on the implementation of new equipment to accomplish their missions.  
Therefore, even though the frequency of interaction may be less than the effectiveness of that 
interaction, the technological enhancements improve the personal interactions as described in 
previous chapters. 
 When looking at the strength of the relationships, as presented in Tables 22 and 23, the 
correlations are stronger in response activities, which is to be expected.  While the technologies 
are used in preparedness activities, it is seen on a large scale during response efforts.  This is 
when the emergency managers would have more interaction with newer technologies to assist 
them in making strategic decisions to minimize and eliminate the incident’s destruction. 
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 Table 20.  The number and valid percent at each level of government for official communications in 
preparing for an incident. 
KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
2A: “In preparing for an emergency, how frequent are your official communications with:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
2B: “In preparing for an emergency, how effective are your official communications with:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable; N=the number of 
responses; %=the valid percent; Missing=the number of respondents who did not answer the question; Total=the 
total number and valid percent of responses. 
 
Official Communication--Preparedness                   
  Scale 5 4 3 2 1 0 Missing Total 
   N % N % N % N % N % N % N N % 
                                  
OES Frequency 23 16.1 22 15.4 27 18.9 38 26.6 26 18.2 7 4.9 4 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 21 15.1 19 13.7 45 32.4 17 12.2 13 9.4 24 17.3 8 147 100.0
                           
                                  
SOC Frequency 6 4.3 15 10.7 11 7.9 42 30.0 52 37.1 14 10.0 7 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 11 8.1 9 6.6 32 23.5 20 14.7 24 17.6 40 29.4 11 147 100.0
                                  
                           
REOC Frequency 10 7.1 13 9.3 15 10.7 45 32.1 44 31.4 13 9.3 7 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 16 11.7 15 10.9 36 26.3 18 13.1 20 14.6 32 23.4 10 147 100.0
                           
                                  
EOC Frequency 33 23.6 25 17.9 25 17.9 29 20.7 19 13.6 9 6.4 7 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 32 23.5 27 19.9 34 25.0 16 11.8 8 5.9 19 14.0 11 147 100.0
                                  
                           
FOPS Frequency 38 26.8 22 15.5 20 14.1 26 18.3 24 16.9 12 8.5 5 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 36 25.9 30 21.6 27 19.4 12 8.6 11 7.9 23 16.5 8 147 100.0
                           
                                  
UTIL Frequency 9 6.3 16 11.3 12 8.5 40 28.2 41 28.9 24 16.9 5 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 14 10.1 13 9.4 37 26.8 15 10.9 20 14.5 39 28.3 9 147 100.0
                                  
                           
NON Frequency 14 9.9 14 9.9 13 9.2 32 22.7 44 31.2 24 17.0 6 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 12 8.6 18 12.9 27 19.4 16 11.5 24 17.3 42 30.2 8 147 100.0
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 Table 21.  The number and valid percent at each level of government for official communications in 
responding to an incident. 
KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
7A: “In responding to an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
7B: “In responding to an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable; N=the number of 
responses; %=the valid percent; Missing=the number of respondents who did not answer the question; Total=the 
total number and valid percent of responses. 
 
Official Communication--Response                     
  Scale 5 4 3 2 1 0 Missing Total 
   N % N % N % N % N % N % N N % 
                                  
OES Frequency 24 18.2 16 12.1 25 18.9 22 16.7 31 23.5 14 10.6 15 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 27 20.6 11 8.4 37 28.2 11 8.4 22 16.8 23 17.6 16 147 100.0
                           
                                  
SOC Frequency 14 10.9 12 9.4 21 16.4 22 17.2 43 33.6 16 12.5 19 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 18 14.1 8 6.3 31 24.2 11 8.6 26 20.3 34 26.6 19 147 100.0
                                  
                           
REOC Frequency 21 16.0 12 9.2 23 17.6 27 20.6 35 26.7 13 9.9 16 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 23 17.6 16 12.2 31 23.7 12 9.2 20 15.3 29 22.1 16 147 100.0
                           
                                  
EOC Frequency 31 23.7 22 16.8 26 19.8 24 18.3 16 12.2 12 9.2 16 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 30 23.1 25 19.2 35 26.9 9 6.9 12 9.2 19 14.6 17 147 100.0
                                  
                           
FOPS Frequency 45 35.2 26 20.3 22 17.2 10 7.8 15 11.7 10 7.8 19 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 37 28.5 28 21.5 31 23.8 4 3.1 14 10.8 16 12.3 17 147 100.0
                           
                                  
UTIL Frequency 10 7.8 16 12.5 21 16.4 29 22.7 29 22.7 23 18.0 19 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 17 13.1 12 9.2 37 28.5 9 6.9 20 15.4 35 26.9 17 147 100.0
                                  
                           
NON Frequency 10 7.7 12 9.2 18 13.8 29 22.3 34 26.2 27 20.8 17 147 100.0
  Effectiveness 16 12.2 11 8.4 34 26.0 8 6.1 23 17.6 39 29.8 16 147 100.0
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 KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
2A: “In preparing for an emergency, how frequent are your official communications with:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
2B: “In preparing for an emergency, how effective are your official communications with:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
See Appendix 6: Survey Instrument for the original survey listing. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Communication Box Plot--Preparedness. 
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 KEY:  The original question asked: 
 
7A: “In responding to an emergency, how frequent are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State) 
SOC-State Operation Center (State) 
REOC-Regional Emergency Operation Center (Region) 
EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County) 
FOPS-Field Operations (Local) 
UTIL-Utility Companies 
NON-Nonprofit Organizations 
 
7B: “In responding to an emergency, how effective are your organization’s direct interaction with legal policies:” 
The levels of government or sector are the same as the previous question. 
 
The scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
See Appendix 6: Survey Instrument for the original survey listing. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Communication Box Plot--Response. 
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 Table 22.  Correlations for frequency of communication and effectiveness across levels of government for 
preparedness activities. 
 
For PREPAREDNESS Activities   
Level of Government or Sector Pearson Correlation Significance 
Office of Emergency Services (State-level) .709** .000 
State Operation Center (State-level) .706** .000 
Regional Level .711** .000 
Operational Level .765** .000 
Field Level .755** .000 
Utility Companies .763** .000 
Nonprofit Organizations .802** .000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 23.  Correlations for frequency of communication and effectiveness across levels of government for 
response activities. 
 
For RESPONSE Activities   
Level of Government or Sector Pearson Correlation Significance 
Office of Emergency Services (State-level) .854** .000 
State Operation Center (State-level) .860** .000 
Regional Level .851** .000 
Operational Level .852** .000 
Field Level .868** .000 
Utility Companies .835** .000 
Nonprofit Organizations .852** .000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
7.5.  CONCLUSION 
 Advancements in information technology have been widely embraced in California’s 
emergency management system.  The technology that has become standard in society, like cell 
phones, are an integral part, but increasingly, so too are the use of blogs and wikis to provide 
real-time information.  The largest hindrances of IT are the amount of available information and 
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 the challenge to use it productively and effectively.  Also, technological advancements do not 
replace the importance placed on face-to-face interactions.   
 Technology has proved critical for response activities as it allows field operations not 
only communicate with each other, but it also creates linkages across the different levels of 
government and sectors.  This allows the emergency management system to work in unison to 
overcome threats.  Preparedness is an essential requirement for making this system work.  By 
becoming familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of the technology in a controlled setting, 
emergency managers are able to use the equipment more effectively when incidents occur.  
Communication and information exchange crosses jurisdictional lines and therefore creates 
opportunities for leaders at all levels within the system to emerge.  Technology, because of the 
rapid growth and use of new equipment, will continue to shape the preparedness and response 
activities to increase effectiveness.  Emergency management without these advancements would 
foster a stagnant system that would become ineffective. 
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 8.0    CHAPTER 8:  FINDINGS FOR THE ROLES OF PERSONAL INTERACTIONS, 
COMMUNICATION, LEGAL POLICIES AND LEADERSHIP IN EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
  
The original research question was to uncover how personal interactions, communication, 
legal policies, and leadership affect emergency preparedness and response.  Findings of this 
research support the importance of these four factors for effective results.  From the quantitative 
study, the clearest discovery is of a direct relationship between the frequency of interactions and 
their effectiveness in emergency services.  The null hypothesis suggesting that there is no effect 
between frequency and effectiveness can be rejected.  Frequency has a direct positive impact on 
effectiveness.  This is true with personal interactions, leadership, communication and legal 
structures.  The strong relationship among the two factors was surprising because this 
relationship held true across all levels of government, from the local level through the state.  The 
more frequent the interaction, the more effective the factor is. 
 This finding is critical.  It reveals that, for each of the components studied, the more time 
spent fostering the interaction, the more effective the result.  This is not to say that each factor 
needs to be developed across all levels of government at the same effort.  It would simply be 
impractical to do so.  For example, an emergency manager at the local level does not necessarily 
need to have frequent personal interactions with emergency managers at the state level as there 
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 are more important relationships across the local levels for mutual aid and mentorship 
arrangements and at the county level for support.  Having the local emergency managers assume 
this role not only bypasses the organizational structure and processes, but it is simply a waste of 
time that can be allocated to other activities.  Then, when an incident occurs, the system can 
work in the way that it was designed. 
The null hypothesis, which stated that there is no effect between frequency and 
effectiveness, therefore, is rejected.  There is a relationship, and hypotheses one through four are 
accepted, as the frequency of personal interactions, leadership, communication, and leadership 
has a direct impact on effectiveness. 
8.1.  PERSONAL INTERACTIONS 
 Important findings were also found through the expert interviews.  For personal 
interactions, a number of key themes were identified: description, trust, stress, learning, knowing 
one’s colleagues, and hindrances.  When describing personal interactions in the field of 
emergency management, one word continually surfaced--critical.  The importance of the human 
factor cannot be understated for it is necessary both in response efforts and for preparedness 
activities.  Personal interactions are the key component that makes the established policies and 
processes work.   
 Those interactions have to be established well before an incident occurs, and emergency 
managers across levels of jurisdiction must take extra efforts to create these bonds.  While legal 
structures create a framework for mutual aid success, the managers have to choose for 
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 themselves to invest time and energy in fostering the personal interactions that are important.  
When the bond is created, increased trust develops. 
 “Trust” was a word heard multiple times in the interviews.  There simply has to be a 
mutual commitment and assured reliance on the ability and character of the other emergency 
managers.  This foundation, which is formed over many years, creates an environment in which 
the emergency management system can effectively operate.   This relationship is critically 
important when dealing with the stress of the position. 
 As if the inherent stress of an incident were not enough, when it is large-scale and multi-
jurisdictional, it often affects many of the people who are required to respond.  This includes 
physical damage, like loss of property, but could it also easily include the safety of loved ones 
being compromised.  Therefore, the personal bonds that are created prior to an incident become 
even more important as these relationships get called on not only to do their job but to deal with 
the personal hardships that they are undergoing. 
 These relationships also manage the stressful environments by knowing to whom to talk  
or to go when an incident occurs.  This first-hand knowledge prevents delays.  Timing is 
essential and allows for a quicker response.  In this chaotic environment, it is not a matter of 
controlling it so much as managing it, and understanding that the personal connections are an 
important part of response. 
 Emergency managers know each other through a variety of ways.  The most common 
scenarios are through training exercises and when responding to incidents.  Emergency managers 
are a tight-knit community of men and women who have committed themselves for the public 
good.  Many managers, although they may switch jobs, do not tend to move out of the field.  
Shifts in positions are common, particularly now because moving from the regional level of 
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 operations to local levels seem to be a reoccurring trend.  Throughout these transitions and 
through the training exercises and response actions, the emergency managers become familiar 
with not only who others are, but also how they tend to act when in a certain scenario. 
 This understanding has many benefits, including knowing who is the best person for what 
role.  The emergency managers interviewed tend to have the fundamental understanding that 
they may not be the best person to complete a certain task.  This is a humbling finding for it 
results in a strong awareness of what they are capable of and when they need assistance or to 
relocate a certain task.  Sometimes, the best person to do a certain job is not from their agency or 
department.  At times, the best person comes from an outside agency or department.  Utilizing 
this skill set promotes a collaborative response where the focus in on a successful mission 
instead of promoting certain egos.  This is an important shift to highlight.  In the past, because of 
the lack of coordinated efforts, emergency response was fractured by individual approaches to 
address the needs.  While some rogue responses still occur where egos get in the way of a 
collective response, those incidents are seemingly few in today’s emergency management 
system.  There is a strong understanding that working with each other, even when across 
departments, agencies or disciplines, maximizes a quick and successful outcome. 
 Ego is the largest hindrance to effective personal interactions.  This has many forms 
including one agency or person thinking that they know better than another agency or person, 
and jumping the chain of command because they perceive that they know what the best course of 
action is.  Another hindrance is the allocation of resources based on friendships rather than a 
systematic equiTable 6pproach.  Fortunately, for California, these types of examples are the 
exception rather than the rule.  And, it seems to be an issue with a small number of emergency 
managers who approach preparedness and response activities with stronger emphasis on who 
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 they are rather than the task at hand.  The most important finding in this category was that the 
negatives were largely left out suggesting that the system works because of personal interactions 
but is not significantly hampered by individuals who act inconsistently with the rest of the 
collaborative approaches.  This understanding shapes the role of structure within the organization 
from forcing interactions in a hierarchical structure, a better approach is to foster environments 
where unstructured and lateral relationship are encouraged to emerge. 
8.2.  LEADERSHIP 
 The effectiveness of the emergency management system could be a result of leadership. 
The most important trait outside of commonly identified leadership skills and values was simply 
“staying out of the way.”  While many of the descriptive words are consistent with leadership 
characteristics and skill sets in other sectors, like having a vision, setting goals, integrity, 
authority, confidence, the suggestive nature of simply letting the system work is incredibly 
powerful.  It is not to say that there is a lack of attention in designing an emergency management 
system, but when an incident occurs, enough trust has to be placed both in the human and 
mechanical components of the system.   
Leadership is not just about vision and setting the direction.  Instead, it is a combination 
of five components: knowledge, action, relations, management skills, and character.  Leaders 
must have the tactical and technical experience with the knowledge to predict when and how the 
conditions affect response efforts.  They must have the conceptual knowledge of past 
experiences and understand what resources are available and how to utilize them. 
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 Personal actions are another key component.  Besides the obvious notion of taking 
charge, leaders must admit when they are wrong and take the necessary actions to rectify the 
situation.  They lead by example, understand personal limitations, and create a vision for the 
organization. 
The third component is interpersonal relations.  Leaders must be able to communicate, 
coordinate, mediate and facilitate.  Influencing behavior for a positive result is essential. 
Often overlooked, the fourth component of strong leadership is management skills.  In 
the literature about leadership, a dichotomy is made between leadership and management.  But, 
from the findings of this study, the two meet.  Leaders must have a working understanding and 
practice of management skills.  This includes not only knowing the policies and procedures but 
also being able to see the big picture and move the organization towards that goal.  Having a 
vision is not enough.  The leader must be able to understand the organizational structure well 
enough to allocate and mobilize resources and to set the goals and objectives.  This does not 
begin when an incident occurs.  Instead, it is through careful planning and preparation that the 
system is empowered to operate effectively when it is necessary to do so. 
Finally, the last component is human character.  A leader must share the core values of 
the organization and must have integrity, honesty, openness and flexibility, and the ability to 
listen effectively and learn. 
Since emergency management is a human experience, leaders must also remember that 
assisting people in their times of need is paramount.  They must be able to manage, not control, 
the chaos that an incident creates.  To do so, coordinated efforts have to be undertaken through 
strong leadership. 
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 Leadership within emergency management occurs in one of three ways: hierarchy, 
character, or circumstance.  Hierarchy is commonly understood.  This is promotion through the 
ranks.  Character is important and the least understood.  It is placing individuals in  leadership 
roles simply based on who they are.  Sometimes, this approach works well where a dynamic 
person is placed in a role to advance the organization.  But, the downfall is to appoint a person 
because he or she talks a good game but is unable to deliver.  The third type of leadership 
emergence is by circumstance.  In this instance, an individual excels during an incident, not 
through the system, because he or she did the right thing at the right time. 
Finally, on political leadership, this topic carried with it the most emotion from the 
participants, but it was the least talked about, especially in specifics.  Yet, there is an important 
finding.  Political leaders must have the restraint to let the system work.  And, when their 
involvement is necessary to reassure the public that appropriate actions are undertaken, these 
leaders must do so in ways that do not hamper recovery efforts. 
8.3.  LEGAL STRUCTURES 
Legal structures provide the framework in which emergency management operates.  It is 
not surprising, then, that when questioned about legal structures, respondents discussed the 
evolution of the current system from being largely unorganized in the early 1900s to the 
introduction of the Emergency Services Act in the 1920s to the mutual aid agreements of the 
1950s to the Incident Command System of 1970s to the Standardized Emergency Management 
System of the 1990s to the implementation of the National Incident Management System of 
today. 
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 The important finding, however, was not that the policies advanced but of how 
California’s networked system evolved.  Transformational transitions were made to continually 
improve the preparedness and response processes through organizational learning.  From the 
very beginning of emergency management within the State, the system was open.  Emergency 
managers were able to respond to an incident, reflect upon it, and then make adjustments 
collectively to strengthen the system.  This willingness and commitment to make the system 
better for the entire good has allowed California’s system to be a leader in how other states 
approach incidents.   
The largest critique of this current trend has to do with funding and staffing.  While there 
is enough staff to currently operate, the informants tended to agree that there should be more 
staff both to be ready for incidents and to continue the momentum for continual growth within 
the field.  This is particularly true at the regional levels where emergency managers are 
becoming inundated with paperwork instead of being allowed to strengthen personal 
relationships and to explore better ways of implementing its mission.  In some cases, the 
personnel has been cut by up to 62% but the responsibilities of the offices continue to expand. 
Since operational dollars, in some respects, are tied to grants, one of the main focuses of 
managers is to apply for funding.  But, it is not just a matter of seeking additional monies, since 
the grants are outcome specific, emergency managers must redefine their missions based on how 
the money is allowed to be used for the execution of the grant as opposed to what may be best 
for the community.  This is of particular concern when grant money is tied directly to fighting 
terrorist activities.  While some emergency managers indicate that preparing for all emergencies 
is basically the same, that is answering how people and resources are dispersed to meet the 
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 specific incident environment, in California the likelihood of natural disasters occurring far 
outweighs that of a manmade incident. 
To help remedy both concerns, the political outcome to be prepared for terrorism and the 
imminent threat of natural disasters, grant funding should have flexibility to allow some 
discretion of the recipient to use the funding in ways that make the most sense for the calculated 
risks in that region. 
8.4.  COMMUNICATION 
Advancements made in information technology assist in the way emergency managers 
communicate.  It is not just a matter of 24-7 access with cell phones and blackberries, but also 
the use of the other technologies, such as wikis and blogs, that enhance the preparedness and 
response efforts. 
The evolution of IT parallels that of the field of emergency management with today’s 
focus on collaborative efforts.  IT, through blogs and wikis, support that focus.  In examples 
given in putting out the San Diego fires in 2007, emergency responders used this real time 
information to assist them in strategizing to eliminate the incident and tracking the fire’s 
movements.  This type of communication would not have been possible even a few years ago. 
As the “digital immigrants” move closer to retirement, the younger generations are 
quickly incorporating IT into the daily work environment.  Having access to greater information 
is important, but so is using the resources to its greatest potential.  Since technologies are 
advancing so quickly, there is no prediction on how IT will affect preparedness and response 
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 efforts other than, based on recent incidents, that it will only continue to strengthen networks of 
responders to meet the response demands. 
There is a downside.  Advancements in IT provide an influx of information, and 
emergency managers are just beginning to understand how to manage it.  Assuming that there are 
three types of information--structured, operational, and unstructured--the structured and 
operational are the easiest to incorporate into the current system as it focuses on current tools in a 
new format.  The unstructured information, however, is becoming a challenge to manage. 
Since information is constantly generated, the rate of new information is growing at a 
faster rate than anytime in the past.  This information is largely unstructured as it includes 
policies, procedures, reports, websites and e-mails that were not previously available.  Because 
the information is created digitally, it can also be readily available for multiple people to see it 
and act upon it.  Therefore, it provides a false sense of availability that, while it is viewable, it 
does not necessarily mean that it can be acted upon instantly. 
The most important finding with communication is that face-to-face interaction is still 
crucial.  Technology can assist in providing background information to foster a more productive 
meeting, but the human component must not be overlooked. 
8.5.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 From the findings, twelve recommendations were identified to continue to strengthen 
emergency management practices in California.  State, county and local governments must: 
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 1. Foster environments where personal interactions, both formal and informal, can thrive. 
2. Dedicate funding sources that allow local, county and state organizations to implement long-
term goals. 
3. Get out of the trap of being reactionary and take a proactive approach to eliminate or minimize 
known threats. 
4. Continue to have legal structures that provide frameworks but that are flexible to adapt to local 
or regional environments. 
5. Continue to encourage mutual aid agreements where neighbors benefit neighbors. 
6. Encourage leadership principles instead of administrative processes. 
7. Continue to provide realistic training exercises that test the emergency management system 
without creating a false sense of security. 
8. Build from past experiences to redefine the role and capacity of emergency management. 
9. Search for humanness in the positions and appreciate the people who make the system work. 
10. Have enough staffing to allow relationships to occur. 
11. Let the emergency management system work, including creating a sensitive balance to 
“politician visibility” when an incident occurs, and in terms of allocating resources and 
responding to an incident. 
12. Work with local planners to reduce threats, like not letting people build unnecessarily in 
flood plains. 
These recommendations are drawn out of the key findings of this research.  As part of the 
organizational learning that is inherent in California’s emergency management system, these 
twelve points should be remembered to allow the continual growth and effectiveness of an 
already strong system.  Emergency managers must have the resources that they need to prepare 
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 effectively for AND to respond to incidents.  This systems blends leadership and management, 
but one is not more important than the other.  Both must work systematically towards the goal of 
protecting California’s inhabitants.  This goal requires funding the right number of staff members 
to meet the administrative demands and to allow larger questions to be addressed; encourage 
support networks, both formal, like mutual aid agreements, and informal, like human 
interactions; and take a proactive approach to effectively preparing for known and reoccurring 
threats.  Earthquakes, fires and floods are not going away.  The system should continue to learn 
from these incidents while preparing for threats that are less common. 
In greater reflection for the need of continued and expanded collaboration opportunities, 
the importance of personal interactions cannot be understated.  While theorists such as 
Frederickson and Slaughter focused on this critical relationship in their governmental foci at the 
metropolitan and international levels respectively, collaboration towards a specific goal, either 
identified through rule of law or a leader’s unifying vision, was essential in the successful 
operation of emergency management.  This association was demonstrated through the strong 
quantitative correlations between frequency of interaction and effectiveness, and was further 
supported by expert interviews, which reiterated the humanness of the governmental system and 
the role of coordinated-collaborative efforts in minimizing the negative impacts of incidents 
while strengthening communities. 
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 9.0    CHAPTER 9:  CONCLUSION IN UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA’S 
NETWORKED APPROACH IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL INTERACTIONS 
 This research set out to understand how organizations could have both structure and 
flexibility through personal interactions, official communications, legal policies and leadership 
affect emergency preparedness and response within California.  Because California has arguably 
the most efficient and effective emergency response system in the United States, it is important 
to understand what makes the approach work.  By understanding the impact of the 
aforementioned factors, a larger and more applied emergency response plan can be adapted to 
other states and countries. 
 California has a long history of responding to emergencies.  While most of the response 
efforts are in relation to natural disasters, the general strategic planning behind it remains largely 
the same.  That is to say, responding to a wildfire that is in a collision course with a residential 
neighborhood initiates some of the same efforts as responding to a potential terrorist act, like 
informing/evacuating residents, putting hospitals on alert, deploying first responders, activating 
mutual aid agreements, information gathering and exchange, and all other necessary procedures 
already established.  The biggest differences between the two responses are the specialized 
personnel needed, intelligence gathering, and type of equipment used.  So when thinking about 
responding to emergencies, the planning has to include anticipated incidents, those that are likely 
to occur based on history, and unanticipated incidents that are typically man-made.  Emergency 
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 managers, therefore, have a huge task--prepare for, respond to, and mitigate both known and 
unknown threats. 
 By responding to multi-jurisdictional incidents annually, California’s emergency 
response system was allowed to grow because of the commitment and openness of emergency 
managers to continually better the system.  This included both the incorporation of new 
technologies and, perhaps more importantly, the adaptation of procedures and personnel to meet 
varying environmental challenges.  Historical perspectives led to this innovation. 
 The earthquake of 1906 in San Francisco was a turning point in how Californian’s 
responded to emergencies.  In contrast to what was largely an independent local approach to both 
prepare for and respond to incidents, the aftermath of the earthquake was a wake up call for the 
importance of city planning and smart growth practices while preparing for the impact of future 
incidents.  By the mid-1950s, the benefits of mutual aid practices first surfaced and the concept 
was embraced by a collective state mutual aid agreement. 
 The 1970s built upon this approach by creating the Incident Command System.  This 
approach retains flexibility to respond to different and complex environments by creating a set of 
commonly agreed upon policies and procedures.  The success of ICS relied on the buy in from 
all of the responding stakeholders to place trust in one commander and the established 
procedures. 
 This tactic worked well but was further enhanced in the 1990s.  Plagued with a number of 
earthquakes, urban fires, deep frosts and other natural disasters within a short time period, 
California created the Standardized Emergency Management System.  SEMS incorporated the 
procedures of ICS but created a statewide common understanding and practice of procedures and 
equipment so that it could be applied across all jurisdictions when an incident occurred.  It 
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 identified five main functions--command, operations, planning/intelligence, logistics and 
finance--and common practices that could be easily practiced by all emergency managers in 
changing and uncertain environments.  SEMS has three main features--modular organization of 
ICS, Incident Action Plans, and Unified Command. 
 In the early 2000s another adaptation emerged.  After the 2001 terrorist attacks in New 
York, Washington, DC and Pennsylvania, the federal government initiated a comprehensive 
effort to reform and strengthen national homeland security.  While the nation’s attention was 
distracted to invest in preparedness procedures and infrastructure to thwart and respond to 
terrorist acts, the devastation that could be a result of natural disasters was understated.  This 
changed in 2005 with the destruction of major communities by levee breaches.  After Hurricane 
Katrina struck, the New Orleans community breathed a sigh of relief--but only for a few seconds.  
While the winds and torrential rains left the region soaked with expected damage, the breach of 
poorly maintained levee systems flooded the area.  This devastation was followed by chaos as 
communities looked for leadership but found none.  No effective local plans and resources were 
available.  No effective state plans or resources existed.  Even the national response through 
Federal Emergency Management Agency was largely ineffective.  Fortunately, the Coast Guard 
and National Guard were able to restore order and provide the necessary transition to help 
stranded people find assistance and begin the transformation form a land of ruin to normalcy. 
 Because of these national challenges, a National Incident Management System is 
implemented.  Arguably based on California’s success of SEMS, NIMS has many of the same 
components but instead of Unified Command structures, a Unity of Command system emerged 
where a collaborative effort of vested governmental stakeholders make collective decisions on 
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 how best to respond to incidents.  This approach is undertaken to ensure that all of the varying 
laws are adhered to and the mobilization of collective resources is used most effectively. 
 The impressive nature of California’s emergency response system allows it to continually 
evolve based on circumstance because while the stakeholders may not always agree, there is a 
common value to protect the inhabitants that California encompasses.  Through the flow of 
disclosed information, including after action reports, collective strategy sessions, and open 
communication across all levels of governments within the emergency management community, 
California has created a highly adaptive and flexible system that can effectively approach both 
natural and man-made incidents. 
 This study set out to uncover how organizations can be designed to retain both structure 
and flexibility by understanding the role of personal interactions, legal structures, 
communication and leadership in affecting preparedness and response activities.  To accomplish 
that, a two-prong approach was used.  First, after the research instruments were tested, 196 
emergency managers were surveyed, with a response rate of 75%.  Those people involved with 
the planning of Golden Guardian 2006 selected the personnel.  It was comprised of all levels of 
California government--state, county and local.  The instrument was designed to assess the 
frequency and effectiveness of working across governmental sectors in both preparedness and 
response activities.  The finding was surprising. 
 In each case, when calculated in the aggregate, there was a statistically significant 
relationship between the two factors--frequency and effectiveness--across all levels of 
government.  The findings suggest that the more frequent the interaction, the more effective the 
results.  The survey was then controlled for level of governments by conducting t-tests between 
state and county personnel responses.  Only these two levels of government were compared 
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 because they had the largest response rate.  In these cases, eight significant differences emerged 
when looking at personal interactions.  It was not surprising that there was a difference, as state 
and county employees interact with the State Operation Center and local utilities in different 
ways.  Some of the interaction from the county level is limited because of the organizational 
structure of the emergency system.  What was not anticipated was that the responses of state and 
county respondents were similar for the other factors studied.  This suggests that the types of 
interaction with legal structures, leadership, and communication tend to have similar 
effectiveness. 
 The greatest findings came through the interviews.  When talking about personal 
interactions, it was reiterated numerous times that the human connection is critical in preparing 
for and responding to incidents.  Technological advancements were seen as a way to enhance this 
interaction but were not, and cannot, be a replacement for it.  Personal interactions build trust, 
which can make stressful situations manageable.  By understanding the strengths and limitations 
of colleagues, emergency managers are able to deploy resources and strategies to maximize 
impact.  This relationship dynamic evolves over time through training together, responding 
together, and working together.  Organizational learning also takes place through personal 
interactions. 
 A number of respondents provided examples of how the organization learns, that is, a 
continual evolution to better the organization’s outcomes.  The example highlighted in this work 
was a training exercise with mass casualties who needed to be transported to receive medical 
treatment.  After the training exercise, as with all trainings and responses, an after-action report 
was created.  Through the exploratory process, a number of recommendations was made to better 
the response efforts.   Because of the flexibility of the organization, the response teams could 
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 quickly adapt the recommendations.  Not more than three weeks passed before a mass casualty 
incident occurred.  Because of the open working environment where individuals were able to 
share their experiences and recommendations in a safe environment and organization that was 
able to incorporate the recommendations quickly, the incident that occurred after the training 
exercise was able to be executed with extreme precision with great results. 
 Personal interactions can also hinder response efforts.  In generic descriptions, 
respondents indicated that there could be times when people in authority allocate resources based 
on who receives them or which communities are assisted.  These points were taken under 
consideration but the more important hindrances were backed up with examples.  In some cases 
it was politicians who insisted on being in location and on camera as soon as an incident 
occurred.  Although there is a need for this type of visibility, it must be done in ways that do not 
hinder response efforts.  Other examples were of people in authority who thought that they knew 
the best course of action, but did not.  Instead, greater reliance and trust should have been placed 
in subordinates to help guide the supervisor to make the right decision.  The third example was 
of individuals who jump the chain of command because they think that faster results will occur.  
While the intentions might be good, the result only slows the process as those in decision making 
positions must now sort through more information that is coming to them from varying angles.  
The final example was how personnel’s skill sets could be underutilized when deployed to help 
another region, county, or city, as the mind set of the hosting agency could be that they can do it 
themselves or that they are the best ones to make decisions. 
 This is where leadership comes into play.  Leaders must be able to manage chaos, be able 
to create a shared vision and have the skill sets to accomplish a particular goal.  Leadership is not 
just about having a good idea; it is about mobilizing others to unite around core values and to 
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 have a particular outcome.  In emergency management, it is about keeping the state’s inhabitants 
safe through planning and response. 
 Leadership, as described through the interviews, has five components: Knowledge, 
Personal Action, Interpersonal Relations, Management Skill Sets, and Human Characteristics.   
Effective leadership takes advanced learning.  This learning is gained certainly through academic 
ranks, but also through life experiences, like training and response.  Personal actions include 
understanding and knowing individual limitations, admitting when wrong, being self aware, and 
setting the example.  Interpersonal relations are being able to work well with others.  This 
includes mediation, negotiation, facilitation, communication, and coordination skills.  
Management skill sets understand how the system operates and how to use these policies and 
procedures to the advantage of the larger goal.  The final component is human characteristics, 
that is, the values so important to individuals (and hopefully to society) that they would do 
anything in their power to protect them.  This includes having integrity, being able to listen and 
take counsel, being open, and being flexible and adaptive. 
  Leadership in emergency management emerges in three different ways.  The easiest to 
recognize and explain is through the hierarchical process.  In this case, individuals advance 
through the ranks to assume more responsibility because they have demonstrated their abilities at 
lower positions.  The second way is through personal characteristics.  Many informants spoke 
about the je ne sais quoi of a leader, that is, the special quality or attribute that sets one apart 
from the others, but that cannot be easily identified.  In some cases, this is confused through 
appointments by giving authority to individuals who should not be in the positions.  The final 
way leaders emerge is through circumstance.  Just by the very nature of stepping up in times of 
need can set individuals apart to be seen as leaders. 
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  The final main topic that surfaced during the leadership conversation was that of political 
influence.  Besides political appointments, politicians, in particular, need to be aware of the 
impact that they have on emergency management.  From budget to response efforts, they impact 
what can be done.  Politicians must understand the importance of letting the system work the 
way that it was designed.  Emergency management procedures are not set in stone.  It is a 
working set of protocols and policies that adapt over time based on experiences in the field, 
either through an actual incident or training exercise.  Politicians who make shoot-from-the-hip 
decisions without taking into consideration how the current policies emerged can cause more 
harm than good to response efforts.  Sending emergency managers on wild goose hunts to collect 
information is not good use of their time when their efforts should be concentrated on containing 
the immediate effects of incidents. 
 Both personal interactions and leadership are shaped through legal structures.  Legal 
structures provide the framework in which emergency managers operate.  Throughout 
California’s evolution of preparedness and response efforts, legal structures solidified effective, 
yet disorganized, procedures into common practices.  One of the first ways that this was 
accomplished was through the mutual aid system.  By understanding the true importance of 
collaborative efforts, mutual aid agreements provided opportunities to share resources, both 
personnel and equipment, in times of need.  Acting in the common good rose above perceived 
local gains.  This created an atmosphere of sharing resources and expertise, all within reason.  
The gains far out measured the hurt egos along the way. 
 Through organizational learning, the emergency management system continued to evolve 
through the Incident Command System to the Standardized Emergency Management System to 
today’s National Incident Management System.  When trying to understand if there are too many 
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 or too few legal structures, the overwhelming response was that there is just enough.  
California’s emergency services networking structure is able to respond to incidents effectively 
while having the flexibility to meet uncertain environments.  This finding is somewhat 
unexpected, as some existing legal structures are simultaneously thought to reduce the flexibility 
that response efforts need to meet changing environmental conditions and type of each incident. 
 Instead of legal structures being the problem, it is the funding source, which affects 
staffing.  In recent years, there is a perception that the numbers of emergency managers is 
decreasing to a critical level, especially at the regional level.  There is an exodus of state, 
regional, and county personnel opting for the local levels because of the increase in pay, but 
perhaps more importantly, the type of work that they undertake.  Many of the emergency 
managers’ roles have changed to focus more on administrative responsibilities than actually 
preparing for and responding to incidents.  While this is still a major component, staff is 
spending increasing time responding to grants in order to raise the critically needed funding to 
support training exercises and to purchase equipment. 
 While the dollars are appreciated, in most cases, funds cannot be used to build a human 
resources infrastructure, like hiring additional personnel.  This then further limits the current 
staff on how much interaction they can have with different stakeholders and colleagues to be 
able to focus on the larger picture of emergency management, other than the microenvironments 
that earmarked funding sources create.  This is seen as a limitation as it does not allow 
emergency managers to effectively plan and create the human infrastructure necessary to allow 
the system to grow as fast as it could had these resources been in place. 
 Use of technology has helped to minimize the impact of decreased staff, but it does not 
replace the emphasis placed on human, face-to-face interactions.  Technology has helped 
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 emergency managers stay more connected through the use of cell phones, black berries, and the 
like.  The emergency response system has embraced technology, and it is now used in a variety 
of ways.  The most evident is through the technologies just identified, but there is an on-the-
ground advantage as well. 
 Experiences from recent fires demonstrated how blogs can be used to track conditions on 
the ground through personal observation.  This information is then used to mobilize resources to 
where the fire is likely to go next.  Previously, this information was gathered at a slower pace 
either through ground or air observation.  But now, anyone who has internet access can add to 
the volume of information that may assist senior personnel to make the best informed strategic 
decision. 
 Another advancement, wikis, adds to shared references, particularly for information 
gathering in regard to terrorist activities.  At the federal level, for example, a terrorist database is 
shared within the law enforcement community.  This type of open and accessible information 
assists in the continued growth of the organization to best protect society. 
 The major drawback to technology as it currently exists is the volume of information that 
it creates.  While some of the information is invaluable, it is mixed between both valid and 
invalid information that may or may not be credible to the incident at hand.  To wade through 
this information, emergency managers use a number of techniques, like having staff presort it.  
While they are trying to manage it, the information provides a false sense of availability.  Just 
because the information is made public does not mean that time is sufficient to utilize it in ways 
that are helpful in reducing a threat.  This is part of the modern paradox of having access of more 
information but less time to actually use it in a constructive manner. 
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  While the most discussed factor studied was personal interactions, California’s 
networked system is impressive because of the human component, the frameworks created by 
legal structures, strong leadership practices, and advancements in technology that enhance 
communication practices.  The combination of these factors creates a flexible network system to 
meet the chaotic and changing conditions that emerge from a vast array of incidents. 
 To further the growth of the emergency management system in California, conscious 
decisions must continue to be made to maintain the flexibility necessary to respond to incidents.  
Additionally, the emergency managers must be able to work beyond administrative 
responsibilities to think strategically about preparing for and responding to future incidents.  This 
strategic process should not be limited to the identified organizational leaders, but throughout the 
entire system.  With this is the need of dedicated funding to reestablish a healthy number of 
emergency managers at all levels of government, particularly at the regional and county levels, 
so that they can help to continue to foster mutual aid agreements and procedures that are of 
regional benefit.  This approach takes leadership that is from a larger area beyond localized 
efforts.  Finally, the organization must continue to learn from past experiences and build upon 
those efforts to increase effectiveness, efficiency and economy. 
 California has a long history of developing networked systems for the greater shared 
good.  This practice must be continued. 
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APPENDIX A 
Pearson Correlations Across Levels of Government for Personal interactions 
 
 
KEY:  OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State); SOC-State Operation Center (State); REOC-Regional 
Emergency Operation Center (Region); EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County); FOPS-Field Operations 
(Local); UTIL-Utility Companies; NON-Nonprofit Organizations; 1A or 6A-Frequency; 1B or 6B-Effectiveness; 
Scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
 Correlations 
 
  OES_1A OES_1B OES_6A OES_6B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .680(**) .739(**) .658(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
OES_1A 
N 141 119 113 103 
Pearson Correlation .680(**) 1 .662(**) .739(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
OES_1B 
N 119 120 102 97 
Pearson Correlation .739(**) .662(**) 1 .883(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000 
OES_6A 
N 113 102 115 105 
Pearson Correlation .658(**) .739(**) .883(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
OES_6B 
N 103 97 105 105 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Correlations 
 
  SOC_1A SOC_1B SOC_6A SOC_6B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .666(**) .678(**) .612(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
SOC_1A 
N 134 95 104 86 
Pearson Correlation .666(**) 1 .697(**) .768(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
SOC_1B 
N 95 97 83 77 
Pearson Correlation .678(**) .697(**) 1 .862(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
SOC_6A 
N 104 83 109 90 
Pearson Correlation .612(**) .768(**) .862(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
SOC_6B 
N 86 77 90 90 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  REOC_1A REOC_1B REOC_6A REOC_6B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .694(**) .652(**) .516(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
REOC_1A 
N 136 109 108 94 
Pearson Correlation .694(**) 1 .661(**) .694(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
REOC_1B 
N 109 112 95 87 
Pearson Correlation .652(**) .661(**) 1 .794(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
REOC_6A 
N 108 95 116 101 
Pearson Correlation .516(**) .694(**) .794(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
REOC_6B 
N 94 87 101 102 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Correlations 
 
  EOC_1A EOC_1B EOC_6A EOC_6B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .747(**) .665(**) .638(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
EOC_1A 
N 134 116 110 102 
Pearson Correlation .747(**) 1 .682(**) .752(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
EOC_1B 
N 116 119 100 95 
Pearson Correlation .665(**) .682(**) 1 .801(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
EOC_6A 
N 110 100 117 108 
Pearson Correlation .638(**) .752(**) .801(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
EOC_6B 
N 102 95 108 109 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  FOPS_1A FOPS_1B FOPS_6A FOPS_6B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .680(**) .641(**) .577(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
FOPS_1A 
N 134 119 113 108 
Pearson Correlation .680(**) 1 .540(**) .653(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
FOPS_1B 
N 119 119 103 99 
Pearson Correlation .641(**) .540(**) 1 .848(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
FOPS_6A 
N 113 103 117 110 
Pearson Correlation .577(**) .653(**) .848(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
FOPS_6B 
N 108 99 110 112 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
 
 
Correlations 
 
  UTIL_1A UTIL_1B UTIL_6A UTIL_6B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .826(**) .807(**) .679(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
UTIL_1A 
N 121 98 99 86
Pearson Correlation .826(**) 1 .735(**) .762(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
UTIL_1B 
N 98 102 86 80
Pearson Correlation .807(**) .735(**) 1 .814(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
UTIL_6A 
N 99 86 107 93
Pearson Correlation .679(**) .762(**) .814(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
UTIL_6B 
N 86 80 93 94
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  NON_1A NON_1B NON_6A NON_6B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .756(**) .690(**) .658(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
NON_1A 
N 124 105 97 88 
Pearson Correlation .756(**) 1 .738(**) .759(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
NON_1B 
N 105 107 85 79 
Pearson Correlation .690(**) .738(**) 1 .815(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
NON_6A 
N 97 85 104 93 
Pearson Correlation .658(**) .759(**) .815(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
NON_6B 
N 88 79 93 94 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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APPENDIX B 
  Pearson Correlations Across Levels of Government for Leadership 
 
KEY:  OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State); SOC-State Operation Center (State); REOC-Regional 
Emergency Operation Center (Region); EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County); FOPS-Field Operations 
(Local); UTIL-Utility Companies; NON-Nonprofit Organizations; 4A or 9A-Frequency; 4B or 9B-Effectiveness; 
Scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
 Correlations 
 
  OES_4A OES_4B OES_9A OES_9B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .768(**) .642(**) .598(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
OES_4A 
N 126 120 111 106 
Pearson Correlation .768(**) 1 .635(**) .769(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
OES_4B 
N 120 122 109 105 
Pearson Correlation .642(**) .635(**) 1 .755(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
OES_9A 
N 111 109 116 110 
Pearson Correlation .598(**) .769(**) .755(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
OES_9B 
N 106 105 110 110 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 Correlations 
 
  SOC_4A SOC_4B SOC_9A SOC_9B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .818(**) .691(**) .605(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
SOC_4A 
N 110 94 98 88 
Pearson Correlation .818(**) 1 .701(**) .798(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
SOC_4B 
N 94 98 87 83 
Pearson Correlation .691(**) .701(**) 1 .738(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
SOC_9A 
N 98 87 108 95 
Pearson Correlation .605(**) .798(**) .738(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
SOC_9B 
N 88 83 95 95 
   
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  REOC_4A REOC_4B REOC_9A REOC_9B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .798(**) .732(**) .573(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
REOC_4A 
N 120 107 103 94
Pearson Correlation .798(**) 1 .761(**) .831(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
REOC_4B 
N 107 110 94 89
Pearson Correlation .732(**) .761(**) 1 .818(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
REOC_9A 
N 103 94 113 101
Pearson Correlation .573(**) .831(**) .818(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
REOC_9B 
N 94 89 101 102
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Correlations 
 
  EOC_4A EOC_4B EOC_9A EOC_9B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .811(**) .821(**) .680(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
EOC_4A 
N 118 111 104 100 
Pearson Correlation .811(**) 1 .717(**) .745(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
EOC_4B 
N 111 114 101 100 
Pearson Correlation .821(**) .717(**) 1 .839(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
EOC_9A 
N 104 101 115 110 
Pearson Correlation .680(**) .745(**) .839(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
EOC_9B 
N 100 100 110 110 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  FOPS_4A FOPS_4B FOPS_9A FOPS_9B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .819(**) .761(**) .686(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
FOPS_4A 
N 121 111 107 105
Pearson Correlation .819(**) 1 .736(**) .792(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
FOPS_4B 
N 111 115 104 103
Pearson Correlation .761(**) .736(**) 1 .854(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
FOPS_9A 
N 107 104 114 111
Pearson Correlation .686(**) .792(**) .854(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
FOPS_9B 
N 105 103 111 111
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Correlations 
 
  UTIL_4A UTIL_4B UTIL_9A UTIL_9B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .806(**) .745(**) .654(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
UTIL_4A 
N 108 93 92 82
Pearson Correlation .806(**) 1 .701(**) .789(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
UTIL_4B 
N 93 94 81 77
Pearson Correlation .745(**) .701(**) 1 .898(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
UTIL_9A 
N 92 81 100 89
Pearson Correlation .654(**) .789(**) .898(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
UTIL_9B 
N 82 77 89 90
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  NON_4A NON_4B NON_9A NON_9B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .807(**) .832(**) .765(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
NON_4A 
N 107 93 90 81
Pearson Correlation .807(**) 1 .781(**) .804(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
NON_4B 
N 93 94 80 78
Pearson Correlation .832(**) .781(**) 1 .896(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
NON_9A 
N 90 80 97 87
Pearson Correlation .765(**) .804(**) .896(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
NON_9B 
N 81 78 87 87
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 183
  
APPENDIX C 
Pearson Correlations Across Levels of Government for Legal Structures 
 
KEY:  OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State); SOC-State Operation Center (State); REOC-Regional 
Emergency Operation Center (Region); EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County); FOPS-Field Operations 
(Local); UTIL-Utility Companies; NON-Nonprofit Organizations; 3A or 8A-Frequency; 3B or 8B-Effectiveness; 
Scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
 Correlations 
 
  OES_3A OES_3B OES_8A OES_8B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .804(**) .708(**) .701(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
OES_3A 
N 120 108 99 92 
Pearson Correlation .804(**) 1 .664(**) .819(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
OES_3B 
N 108 109 95 89 
Pearson Correlation .708(**) .664(**) 1 .815(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
OES_8A 
N 99 95 103 96 
Pearson Correlation .701(**) .819(**) .815(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
OES_8B 
N 92 89 96 96 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Correlations 
 
  SOC_3A SOC_3B SOC_8A SOC_8B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .762(**) .686(**) .668(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
SOC_3A 
N 104 89 85 74 
Pearson Correlation .762(**) 1 .684(**) .820(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
SOC_3B 
N 89 89 79 72 
Pearson Correlation .686(**) .684(**) 1 .812(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
SOC_8A 
N 85 79 96 81 
Pearson Correlation .668(**) .820(**) .812(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
SOC_8B 
N 74 72 81 81 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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  Correlations 
 
  REOC_3A REOC_3B REOC_8A REOC_8B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .805(**) .642(**) .604(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
REOC_3A 
N 107 92 86 73
Pearson Correlation .805(**) 1 .644(**) .748(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
REOC_3B 
N 92 93 80 72
Pearson Correlation .642(**) .644(**) 1 .780(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
REOC_8A 
N 86 80 99 83
Pearson Correlation .604(**) .748(**) .780(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
REOC_8B 
N 73 72 83 83
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Correlations 
 
  EOC_3A EOC_3B EOC_8A EOC_8B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .827(**) .727(**) .655(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
EOC_3A 
N 116 106 93 84 
Pearson Correlation .827(**) 1 .647(**) .813(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
EOC_3B 
N 106 107 89 83 
Pearson Correlation .727(**) .647(**) 1 .813(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
EOC_8A 
N 93 89 106 94 
Pearson Correlation .655(**) .813(**) .813(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
EOC_8B 
N 84 83 94 94 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  FOPS_3A FOPS_3B FOPS_8A FOPS_8B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .839(**) .727(**) .627(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
FOPS_3A 
N 114 104 93 85
Pearson Correlation .839(**) 1 .780(**) .776(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
FOPS_3B 
N 104 105 88 84
Pearson Correlation .727(**) .780(**) 1 .847(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
FOPS_8A 
N 93 88 106 98
Pearson Correlation .627(**) .776(**) .847(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
FOPS_8B 
N 85 84 98 98
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Correlations 
 
  UTIL_3A UTIL_3B UTIL_8A UTIL_8B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .862(**) .785(**) .658(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
UTIL_3A 
N 102 88 80 70
Pearson Correlation .862(**) 1 .749(**) .718(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
UTIL_3B 
N 88 88 70 66
Pearson Correlation .785(**) .749(**) 1 .813(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
UTIL_8A 
N 80 70 93 80
Pearson Correlation .658(**) .718(**) .813(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
UTIL_8B 
N 70 66 80 81
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  NON_3A NON_3B NON_8A NON_8B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .828(**) .731(**) .599(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
NON_3A 
N 102 87 79 70
Pearson Correlation .828(**) 1 .687(**) .734(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
NON_3B 
N 87 87 68 65
Pearson Correlation .731(**) .687(**) 1 .792(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
NON_8A 
N 79 68 92 78
Pearson Correlation .599(**) .734(**) .792(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
NON_8B 
N 70 65 78 80
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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APPENDIX D 
Pearson Correlations Across Levels of Government for Communication 
 
KEY:  OES-California Office of Emergency Services (State); SOC-State Operation Center (State); REOC-Regional 
Emergency Operation Center (Region); EOC-Emergency Operation Center (County); FOPS-Field Operations 
(Local); UTIL-Utility Companies; NON-Nonprofit Organizations; 2A or 7A-Frequency; 2B or 7B-Effectiveness; 
Scale: 5-Most Frequent or Effective to 1-Not at All Frequent or Effective; 0-Not Applicable 
 
 Correlations 
 
  OES_2A OES2B OES_7A OES_7B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .709(**) .687(**) .673(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
OES_2A 
N 136 115 116 107 
Pearson Correlation .709(**) 1 .652(**) .777(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
OES2B 
N 115 115 103 98 
Pearson Correlation .687(**) .652(**) 1 .854(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
OES_7A 
N 116 103 118 108 
Pearson Correlation .673(**) .777(**) .854(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
OES_7B 
N 107 98 108 108 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Correlations 
 
  SOC_2A SOC_2B SOC_7A SOC_7B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .706(**) .674(**) .670(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
SOC_2A 
N 126 96 106 90 
Pearson Correlation .706(**) 1 .652(**) .743(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
SOC_2B 
N 96 96 88 82 
Pearson Correlation .674(**) .652(**) 1 .860(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
SOC_7A 
N 106 88 112 94 
Pearson Correlation .670(**) .743(**) .860(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
SOC_7B 
N 90 82 94 94 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 188
  Correlations 
 
  REOC_2A REOC_2B REOC_7A REOC_7B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .711(**) .626(**) .561(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
REOC_2A 
N 127 105 107 94
Pearson Correlation .711(**) 1 .617(**) .782(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
REOC_2B 
N 105 105 93 86
Pearson Correlation .626(**) .617(**) 1 .851(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
REOC_7A 
N 107 93 118 102
Pearson Correlation .561(**) .782(**) .851(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
REOC_7B 
N 94 86 102 102
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Correlations 
 
  EOC_2A EOC_2B EOC_7A EOC_7B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .765(**) .697(**) .648(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
EOC_2A 
N 131 116 112 106 
Pearson Correlation .765(**) 1 .685(**) .778(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
EOC_2B 
N 116 117 100 97 
Pearson Correlation .697(**) .685(**) 1 .852(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
EOC_7A 
N 112 100 119 111 
Pearson Correlation .648(**) .778(**) .852(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000   
EOC_7B 
N 106 97 111 111 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  FOPS_2A FOPS_2B FOPS_7A FOPS_7B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .755(**) .676(**) .664(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
FOPS_2A 
N 130 116 113 109
Pearson Correlation .755(**) 1 .612(**) .739(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
FOPS_2B 
N 116 116 103 102
Pearson Correlation .676(**) .612(**) 1 .868(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
FOPS_7A 
N 113 103 118 112
Pearson Correlation .664(**) .739(**) .868(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
FOPS_7B 
N 109 102 112 114
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Correlations 
 
  UTIL_2A UTIL_2B UTIL_7A UTIL_7B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .763(**) .759(**) .655(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
UTIL_2A 
N 118 97 99 90
Pearson Correlation .763(**) 1 .733(**) .809(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
UTIL_2B 
N 97 99 86 84
Pearson Correlation .759(**) .733(**) 1 .835(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
UTIL_7A 
N 99 86 105 94
Pearson Correlation .655(**) .809(**) .835(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
UTIL_7B 
N 90 84 94 95
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Correlations 
 
  NON_2A NON_2B NON_7A NON_7B 
Pearson Correlation 1 .820(**) .775(**) .671(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000
NON_2A 
N 117 97 97 88
Pearson Correlation .820(**) 1 .667(**) .723(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000
NON_2B 
N 97 97 82 79
Pearson Correlation .775(**) .667(**) 1 .852(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .000
NON_7A 
N 97 82 103 92
Pearson Correlation .671(**) .723(**) .852(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
NON_7B 
N 88 79 92 92
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 191
  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
 Survey Instrument 
 192
  193
  194
  195
  196
  197
  
 198
 APPENDIX F 
Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
 
 
 
Questions on Personal interactions 
Describe how personal interactions can enhance emergency preparedness and response. 
Are there times when personal interactions might hinder emergency preparedness and response? 
When? 
How has this changed since the 1990s? 
EMAG Emergency aid mutual response agreement (Renteria) 
Questions on Legal Structures 
How do legal structures aid in emergency preparedness? emergency response? 
How do legal limitations affect preparedness and response? Which legal limitations? 
Are there too many/too little legal frameworks? Explain. 
Are there laws that work against each other, like silt build-up in the Sacramento river and 
environmental protection not allowing it to be dredged 
Referring to NIMS, local governments are held with increasing responsibility; to what extent 
does this become a worrisome process? 
Questions on Leadership 
How do you define leadership in disaster management? 
In your perspective, what are the most important leadership skills? 
How does this carry over into emergency management? 
In what ways do you encourage leadership within your organization? 
How do successful leaders emerge in your organization? 
 199
 How does the political environment affect emergency services? 
To what extent have you received political support for preparedness and response?  
To what extent has the support changed over the last ten years, if it has changed? 
Question on Official communications 
What communications are most beneficial? 
How do you distinguish validity of information? 
How would you measure its effectiveness? 
What are the alternatives to official communications practices? 
To what extent are official communications timely in current emergency incidents? recent earth 
quakes/tsumani warning in the Bay Area (Coastal), wild fires (Southern), flood protection 
(Inland and Coastal) 
Questions on Jurisdictions 
What are the most critical relationships for you when responding to an interjurisdictional 
emergency? 
 
With which jurisdictions do you interact on a regular basis?  What is the nature of that 
interaction? 
 
How do jurisdictional relationships emerge? 
 
What is done to foster interjurisdictional relationships? 
 
How do jurisdictions help emergency preparedness/response? 
 
How do jurisdictions hinder emergency preparedness/response? 
 
What is the responsibility of each jurisdiction in emergency management? 
 
Questions on Background 
Why are you in the position that you are? 
How/why did you choose the field? 
 200
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